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Abstract 
The influence of mood and motivation on cognitive processes has enjoyed a significant 
amount of attention in the last few decades, but due to inconsistencies in methodologies and 
tasks conclusions remain subject to debate. The questions addressed in this thesis are how: 1) 
positive mood, 2) negative mood, and 3) depressive symptoms influence or relate to 
cognitive flexibility using a category learning paradigm, and the final question addressed in 
this thesis is whether 4) regulatory focus and regulatory fit influence cognitive flexibility 
using a more naturalistic categorization task in which there are no correct or incorrect 
responses. Category learning and categorization tasks provide well-controlled and 
empirically validated paradigms in which to study the effects of mood and motivation on 
cognitive flexibility. Chapter 2 demonstrates that depressive symptoms are negatively related 
to complex rule-based category learning while positive mood is positively related to rule-
based category learning, but positive mood and lifetime history of hypomanic symptoms 
contributed the most unique variance to rule-based category learning performance. Chapter 3 
demonstrates that manipulated positive, but not negative, mood enhances performance on a 
complex rule-based category learning task, but mood does not significantly influence non-
rule-based category learning. Chapter 4 demonstrates that a promotion regulatory focus 
results in higher low typicality exemplar ratings than a prevention regulatory focus, and 
additionally demonstrates that negative mood accounts for most of this effect. This represents 
the first series of studies to examine the influence of mood on category learning and 
demonstrates that positive mood enhances and is positively related to rule-based category 
learning.  
Keywords 
Affect; Category Learning; Categorization; Cognitive Flexibility; Individual Differences; 
Mood; Motivation; Regulatory Focus Theory; Regulatory Fit Theory, Self Discrepancy 
Theory.  
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Chapter 1  
1  Motivation, mood, and cognition 
Plato distinguished between motivation, mood, and cognition and argued that they were 
separate, unrelated constructs (as cited by Scherer, 1995). This tripartite model has 
enjoyed a long-lasting legacy in psychological research. However with the decrease in 
popularity of the dominant behaviorist tradition (Skinner famously said that “The 
‘emotions’ are excellent examples of the fictional causes to which we commonly attribute 
behavior”, 1953, p. 160), and the rise of cognitive psychology and information-
processing models of cognition, the influence of mood and motivation on cognitive 
processes became more popular topics of study.1 The decades spanning from the 1980’s 
to the present time have seen tremendous growth in research that studies the 
interrelationships between motivation, mood, and cognition. It is now generally accepted 
that these components influence and interact with one another (Gray, 1990; Lazarus, 
1991a; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; Showers & Cantor, 1985; Sorrentino & Higgins, 
1986; Storbeck & Clore, 2007).  
The idea that motivation, mood, and cognition may be overlapping, and not just related 
constructs is a more contentious viewpoint. Lazarus (1984) argues that mood cannot exist 
in the absence of cognition. This is because for mood to exist there must be an appraisal 
of a situation that informs the individual whether there is the potential for something 
desirable or undesirable. In this view mood and cognition are interdependent, in that 
mood can influence cognition, but cognition comes first. Motivation underlies cognition 
(and therefore also mood), because motivation provides the meaning necessary for a 
cognitive appraisal of a situation (see Zajonc, 1984 for a rebuttal to this viewpoint).  
                                                 
1 It must be noted that there were psychologists, scientists, and philosophers who made advances in the 
understanding of cognition and mood/motivation prior to the 1980’s. For instance Thorndike (1911) 
included mention of “satisfying” and “annoying” events in his first “law of effect”, and William James 
(1884) published work on emotion. Much earlier than that Aristotle argued against splitting these elements 
apart (Fortenbaugh, 1975). 
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The topic of this dissertation is the influence of mood and motivation on cognitive 
processing in three distinct but related chapters.   
1.1 Definitions of mood and emotion 
There is no single definition of emotion that is universally agreed upon, in fact 
Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) conducted a survey of texts and related literature and 
identified 92 definitions that fit into 11 different categories. However, there is overall 
convergence with the idea that emotions are strong, at times overwhelming affective 
states that one is consciously experiencing, while moods are less strong, less 
overwhelming, and not always subject to conscious awareness (Eckman, 1994; Forgas, 
1992a; Frija, Mesquita, Sonnemans, & Van Goozen, 1991; Larsen, 2000; Morris, 1989; 
Panksepp, 1998; Parkinson Totterdell, Briner, & Reynolds, 1996; Watson, 2000). For 
instance Forgas (1992a) typifies emotions and moods according to their duration, 
intensity, origin, and cognitive content. He argues that emotions are intense, relatively 
short-lived, have a definite cause, and clear cognitive content, whereas moods are lower 
in intensity, longer lasting, without a definite cause, and little cognitive content. In this 
framework if one is experiencing an emotion one would be able to say “I feel 
angry/happy/sad”, but when experiencing a mood one would not be as specific and 
instead would express feeling “bad” or “good”. 
A helpful way of thinking about these terms is to picture mood as a background to 
emotion (Vosburg & Kaufmann, 1999). In this conceptual framework the emotion one is 
feeling could be either fear or sadness, but the mood would be negative in both cases. 
Likewise a general positive mood serves as the backdrop to positively valenced emotions 
such as joy or contentment.  
Throughout this thesis I distinguish between mood and emotion to reflect the distinction 
between mood and emotion as outlined above. This thesis is concerned with general 
mood states (positive and negative), not specific emotions. This treatment is based on the 
finding that specific emotions tend to be interrelated such that negative emotions (like 
fear and sadness) tend to co-occur or be reported more often within individuals, and 
likewise that positive emotions (like joy and contentment) also tend to be positively 
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related (Diener, Smith, & Fujita, 1995; Feldman, 1995; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). 
Further, manipulating specific emotional states presents some difficulties, an issue that is 
described below. 
1.2 Mood assessments and manipulations 
There is no single standard procedure or paradigm for assessing and manipulating mood 
in research studies, and even a cursory review of the literature reveals an abundance of 
measures and methods.2 In some studies, mood is manipulated and then assessed and 
compared to a control condition’s mood rating to determine if the induction was 
effective, or assessed, manipulated, and then assessed again to determine if the mood 
induction significantly changed people’s mood relative to their mood at the beginning of 
the experimental session. Mood and related individual difference variables can also be 
assessed but not manipulated (typically in correlational research or research where 
participants are split into different groups based on their responses).  
Although methods of manipulating mood are seemingly only limited by one’s 
imagination, a select few mood induction techniques have predominated the literature. 
One of the oldest is the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (VMIP; Velten, 1968), in 
which participants read 60 statements out loud that correspond to the desired/intended 
mood state, such as “Every now and then I feel so tired and gloomy that I'd rather just sit 
than do anything” to induce a depressed mood. This technique has been criticized for 
being subject to demand characteristics (Polivy & Doyle, 1980; as cited in Isen & 
Gorglione, 1983; Buchwald, Strack, & Coyne, 1981; as cited in Isen & Gorglione, 1983). 
Further, Isen and Gorglione (1983) reported that when mood was assessed immediately 
after the procedure the results indicated that the manipulation was effective, however 
                                                 
2 Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007) describe the multitude of available methods as “a baffling array”, p. 
10. Methods not included in this discussion include, but are not limited to: affective pictures (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), autobiographical recall, social recollection, and social interaction (Martin, 
Argyle, & Crossland, 1990), false success/failure feedback (Isen, Shalker, & Karp, 1978), facial 
expressions (Laird, Wagener, Halal, & Szegda, 1982), hypnotic suggestion (Bower, 1981; 1983), imagery 
(Wright & Mischel, 1982), empathy (Thompson, Cowan, & Rosenhan, 1980), and unanticipated 
reward/gift (Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1994). 
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after a neutral and brief (four minutes long) task participants no longer rated themselves 
as feeling significantly more positive or negative, suggesting that this method is not well-
suited to most psychology experiments.  
Film clips have been shown to be an effective method for manipulating positive and 
negative mood states (Gross & Levenson, 1995; see also Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 
1994 for a review). In contrast to the Velten Method, Isen and Gorglione (1983) reported 
that an amusing and brief film clip resulted in significant changes in self-reported 
positive mood immediately afterwards and after a brief intervening task.   
Music-based mood induction techniques, in which participants listen to music that 
conveys a specific mood state, have been shown to have high success rates (for reviews 
see Gerrards-Hesse et al., 1994; Martin, 1990). One potential drawback to this method 
pointed out by Lecci and Wirth (1996) is that it has a limited ability to induce a specific 
positive or negative mood state. For instance listening to the well-known and frequently 
used “Russia under the Mongolian Yoke” by Prokofiev at half-speed could make one feel 
sad, but it could also make one feel irritated. If one is trying to isolate a specific mood it 
might not be the best method. In some versions of this method participants are told to use 
the music as a background in which to become depressed (or happy, or neutral as 
required).  
The studies in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this thesis assess positive and negative mood using 
a validated measure, and the study in Chapter 3 manipulates mood. In Chapter 3, I elected 
to use a combination of music and video clips to elicit desired positive, negative, and 
neutral mood states. In a review, Martin (1990) reported that film and music clip 
inductions of mood are effective more than 75% of the time in participants based on a 
review of published studies. In a meta-analytic review of 11 mood induction techniques 
and 111 research articles Westermann, Spies, Stahl, and Hesse (1996) concluded that film 
and music inductions were most effective at eliciting both positive and negative mood 
states. I hypothesized that a combinatory approach would maximize the probability of an 
effective manipulation. Further, the combination of music and film clips has also been 
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used successfully in prior research (Bower, 1987; Foti & Hajcak, 2010; Gustafson, 1987; 
as cited in Gerrards-Hesse et al., 1994). 
1.3 Effects of mood on cognition 
Research on the interrelationship between cognition and mood has been quite active.3 
Below I outline research related to the influence of mood states on attention and cognitive 
flexibility. 
1.3.1 Positive mood findings 
What is known about the influence of positive mood on cognition has been greatly 
augmented by the work of Alice Isen. Isen and colleagues have demonstrated that mild 
positive mood, the kind that arises from receiving a small, unexpected gift, watching a 
funny video, or listening to pleasant music can result in significant changes in 
performance relative to a neutral mood on tasks tapping cognitive flexibility and 
problem-solving (see Isen, 1999a for a review). A key finding from this research is that 
positive mood broadens attention and enhances cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility 
is defined by Ashby, Isen, and Turken (1999) as the “ability to organize ideas in multiple 
ways and to access alternative cognitive perspectives” (p. 530).  
Isen and Daubman (1984) studied the influence of positive, neutral, and negative mood 
states on low typicality exemplar ratings taken from Rosch (1975) and a color chip 
sorting task. Item examples include ‘cane’ for the category ‘clothing’, and ‘camel’ for the 
category vehicle. Positive mood participants gave higher ratings to these atypical items 
and were more likely to consider them members of the category than participants in the 
neutral mood conditions. In the sorting task participants were presented with color chips 
that ranged along a continuum and instructed to sort them into as many or as few 
                                                 
3 Studies reporting the effects of mood on cognitive processes have been reported in several domains, 
including memory (Bower, 1981; Gray, 2001; Isen et al, 1978; Laird et al., 1981; Schacter, 1996; Storbeck 
& Clore, 2005; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979), attention (Frederickson & Branigan, 2005; Gasper & Clore, 
2002), decision-making (Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1997; Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Wright & Bower, 
1992), social judgment (Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Clore, 2009; Isbell, 2004), and creativity (Isen, Johnson, 
Mertz, & Robinson, 1985). 
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categories as they wanted. Positive mood participants created fewer categories than 
neutral mood participants, meaning they included a wider range of colors in their 
categories.  Isen, Johnson, Mertz, and Robinson (1985) reported that participants who 
underwent a positive mood induction made significantly more unusual (less common 
within the sample studied) word associates than neutral mood participants to neutrally 
valenced words. Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki (1987) reported that positive mood 
participants were more likely to solve the Duncker candle problem (Duncker, 1945), and 
to solve more moderately difficult problems from the Remote Associates Test (RAT; 
Mednick, 1968) than neutral mood participants.  
Murray, Sujan, Hirt, and Sujan (1990) demonstrated that positive mood leads to more 
flexible category use using a task similar to that used by Isen and Daubman (1984). 
Participants were asked to sort cards with the names of popular television show 
characters on them. Positive mood participants were able to generate more distinct 
categories when instructed to focus on differences, but also generated fewer categories 
when asked to focus on similarities compared to a neutral mood control group. The 
groups did not differ on the task when instructions did not make reference to similarities 
or differences. In a second study participants were asked to focus on similarities or 
differences between pairs of television shows. The uniqueness of the features listed by 
participants was rated in addition to the number of distinct attributes listed. Positive mood 
participants listed more features when asked to focus on differences, fewer features when 
asked to focus on similarities, and overall made more unusual responses than participants 
in a neutral mood. Positive mood participants were also more likely than neutral mood 
participants to make a creative first response. Finally in a third experiment the authors did 
not limit the time allowed to make categorizations and while positive and neutral 
participants made the same number of categorizations, the categorizations made by 
positive mood participants were rated as more creative and this difference in creativity 
persisted throughout the task, indicating that positive mood participants were creating 
more creative features from the beginning of the task and not simply when they had 
exhausted more typical responses. 
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More recently Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) reported that participants in specific 
positive emotion conditions were more likely to classify based on overall similarity than 
neutral emotion participants on a global-local triad classification task, indicating that 
positive emotions broaden attention, providing converging evidence for the effects of 
positive moods and emotions. However in contradiction to this Gasper and Clore (2002) 
reported a similar study but found no difference between positive and neutral mood 
conditions. Johnson, Waugh, Frederickson (2010) reported that genuine smiles were 
associated with faster responses to global stimuli relative to local stimuli, again 
suggesting that positive mood broadens attention, but their experimental mood 
manipulation did not result in any differences between conditions. Baumann and Kuhl 
(2005) reported that positive mood led to improved performance on a similar global-local 
processing task. However instead of simply asking participants to judge which stimuli 
were more similar (as in Frederickson & Branigan, 2005, and Gasper & Clore, 2002), 
participants were asked to make global responses on some trials and local responses on 
others, requiring participants to shift their attention between the two responses. Positive 
mood participants displayed faster reaction times than participants in a neutral mood on 
local trials even though participants overall made faster responses to global trials, 
indicating that positive mood allowed participants to shift their attention between trials 
more flexibly.  
There is also evidence that positive mood enhances careful thinking when needed. 
Physicians who received a small gift performed better on a clinical diagnostic reasoning 
task than physicians who did not receive a small gift. Specifically, physicians in whom 
positive mood was induced solved the case faster, were more flexible (i.e. demonstrated 
less anchoring), but did not show evidence suggesting that they made their decisions 
using superficial processing (Estrada et al., 1997). 
The research reviewed above makes a strong case for the idea that positive mood 
broadens attention and enhances cognitive flexibility. In light of these results it is 
tempting to surmise that positive mood has an overall beneficial impact on cognitive 
processing. However several studies demonstrate that the impact of positive mood on 
cognitive processing is not universally beneficial. In a review of the extant literature 
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Mitchell and Phillips (2007) conclude that positive mood has a detrimental influence on 
executive functioning.  
Spies, Hesse, and Hummitzsch (1996) reported that a positive mood manipulation 
resulted in impaired working memory ability using simple and complex word span tasks. 
Positive mood participants showed greater impairment on the complex span task 
compared to neutral mood participants. Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, and Williams (1996) 
reported that a positive mood manipulation resulted in reduced performance on a variant 
of the Wason card selection task, as well as performance on the Tower of London task, 
two tasks requiring convergent thinking. In contrast Phillips, Bull, Adams, and Fraser 
(2002) reported that positive mood participants were only impaired on the Tower of 
London task when participants were older, in young adults performance was not 
impaired. Phillips et al. (2002) reported that positive mood participants were slower than 
neutral mood participants on a complex Stroop task that required alternating between 
reading the color name and naming the display color, but were unimpaired on a classic 
Stroop task that did not require alternation. On fluency tasks, positive mood participants 
outperformed neutral mood participants when asked to list as many unusual uses for a 
cup as possible, but performed equivalently to the neutral mood condition on a letter 
fluency task and an alternating task in which participants were asked to alternate between 
listing words that began with the letter “M” and then naming a type of vegetable. The 
authors interpret this pattern of results as indicating that positive mood impairs task 
switching. Finally Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) reported that a positive mood 
manipulation improved performance on tasks requiring flexibility and switching, but 
found performance was impaired on a task where previously relevant stimuli served as 
distractors relative to a neutral mood condition. This indicates that positive mood can 
enhance switching to novel stimuli, but impair switching when ignoring previously 
relevant information is required. Overall this research demonstrates that findings on 
positive mood are complex and varied, but indicate that positive mood might impair 
certain aspects of executive functioning.  
Research by Rowe, Hirsh, and Anderson (2007) neatly demonstrates the benefits and 
trade-offs associated with broadened attention and enhanced cognitive flexibility. The 
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authors reported that manipulated positive mood improved performance relative to a 
neutral mood condition on RAT performance. RAT performance correlated negatively 
with performance on an attentional flanker task that required narrowed visual selective 
attention. Thus, the better participants did on the RAT, the worse their performance on 
the attentional flanker task. The distance of the flankers from the target was varied such 
that on some trials the flankers were spaced close to the target (near distance), on some 
trials the flankers were spaced less closely to the target (medium distance), and on some 
trials the flankers were spaced further away from the target (far distance). Positive mood 
participants responded more slowly than negative and neutral mood participants across 
all flanker trials, but this effect was strongest on incompatible trials. Further, neutral 
mood participants did not display effects of flanker compatibility at the far distance, 
while positive mood participants did.  
1.3.2 Remaining questions in positive mood research 
What should be clear from the above literature review is that positive mood broadens 
attention and enhances cognitive flexibility (sometimes at the cost of faster responding 
when narrowed attention is required). Isen (2001) summarized related research on 
positive mood by stating that: 
...as long as the situation is one that is either interesting or important to the 
decision maker, positive affect facilitates systematic, careful, cognitive 
processing, tending to make it both more efficient and more thorough, as well as 
more flexible and innovative. (p. 75)  
However some researchers have argued that positive moods detract from careful, 
systematic processing (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Mackie & Worth, 1989; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Mackie and Worth (1989) argue that positive mood acts as a 
cognitive load that reduces either the ability or the motivation to engage in careful, 
systematic processing and fosters the use of low effort heuristics. Bless et al. (1990) 
argue that positive mood encourages heuristic processing that is not necessarily careful, 
whereas negative mood encourages careful, systematic processing. In the mood/feelings-
as-information theory positive mood acts as a cue that indicates the absence of threat 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983). In the absence of threat, people are less motivated to maintain 
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rigorous problem-solving processing and more likely to rely on heuristics. In contrast 
negative mood indicates the presence of threat or a problem, and consequently people are 
more motivated to use systematic, careful, and detail-oriented strategies (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983).  
1.3.3 Thesis question 1 
The question my thesis seeks to address from the above-reviewed context is: does 
manipulated positive mood enhance performance on a category learning task that benefits 
from cognitive flexibility? 
1.3.4 Negative mood findings 
In light of the body of research showing that positive mood broadens attention and 
enhances creativity and problem-solving, one might assume that negative mood should 
result in the opposite pattern of results. However there is a relative scarcity of research 
that supports this conclusion when one focuses on studies involving the manipulation of a 
general negative mood state akin to the positive mood manipulations used in most 
positive mood research.  
The most commonly cited reference in support of the idea that negative mood narrows 
attention is an experiment by Gasper and Clore (2002). Gasper and Clore (2002) reported 
that participants in a manipulated negative mood condition (induced via writing about a 
life event that made them feel “sad and negative”) demonstrated a narrowed focus of 
attention as measured by the number of local triad classifications on a global-local 
classification task compared to positive and neutral mood condition participants (who 
wrote about “life events that made them feel happy and positive” and an “average, 
normal typical weekday” respectively). However this finding has not to my knowledge 
been replicated. Johnson et al. (2005) conducted a similar study and failed to replicate 
this finding. Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010) manipulated sadness and found that it led to 
broadened attention relative to a neutral mood condition on a global-local reaction time 
task, with sad mood participants exhibiting longer response times to local response trials.  
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While null results cannot serve as conclusive evidence that an effect does not exist, it is 
noteworthy that several other failures to find comparable negative mood results have 
been reported in studies looking at positive, negative, and neutral mood states. Isen et al., 
(1987) included manipulated negative mood by having participants view a likely fear-
provoking film clip depicting World War II death camps and did not find any difference 
between the negative and neutral mood conditions on RAT performance, despite 
participants in the negative mood condition reporting significantly higher negative mood 
ratings than participants in the neutral mood condition. It is hard to imagine that this film 
clip did not evoke sufficiently strong responses in participants. In this study there was a 
nonsignificant trend for negative mood participants to assign higher ratings to atypical 
items than neutral mood participants which also goes against the idea that negative mood 
narrows attention. This trend was also found in the sorting study where participants 
sorted color chips. Murray et al. (1990), and Hirt et al. (1996), who reported significant 
positive mood findings, did not find any differences between negative mood participants 
and the neutral mood control condition. Rowe et al. (2007) also failed to find any 
difference between their negative and neutral mood conditions on either RAT 
performance or flanker task performance, again in spite of a successful sad versus neutral 
mood induction, and in spite of “booster” repetitions of the mood induction procedure as 
well as the presence of valenced music playing throughout the study. Dreisbach and 
Goschke (2004) did not report any differences between negative and neutral conditions 
on a task tapping executive function. Indeed two meta-analyses have failed to find an 
association between negative mood and creativity (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; 
Davis, 2009). Despite the relative lack of confirmatory published results, the hypothesis 
that negative mood narrows attention persists, with researchers citing the few studies that 
have published that support this hypothesis. Baumann and Kuhl (2005) reported that 
people primed with negatively valenced words before each trial of a global-local response 
task were slower to respond to global trials than people primed with neutral words. 
Oaksford et al. (1996) reported that negative mood participants performed less well on a 
variant of the Wason card selection task than neutral mood participants, however there 
was no performance decrement between conditions on the Tower of London task.  
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1.3.5 Anxiety 
The idea that negative mood reduces cognitive flexibility and narrows attention is likely 
largely due to the clearer and better-supported findings that focus on anxiety. For instance 
the Easterbrook hypothesis (Easterbrook, 1959) is commonly cited as evidence that 
negative affect narrows attention. Easterbrook (1959) hypothesized that "emotional 
arousal acts consistently to reduce the range of cues that an organism uses, and that the 
reduction in range of cue utilization influences action in ways that are either organizing 
or disorganizing, depending on the behavior concerned" (p. 183). 
However Easterbrook’s work was concerned with high arousal negative states including 
fear and anxiety, not a general negative mood state or sadness. Likewise research by 
Tucker and colleagues (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994; Tucker & Williamson, 1984) reports 
that threatening situations constrict the scope of perceptual attention. In a series of studies 
Mikulincer, Kedem, and Paz (1990a) reported that state and trait anxiety was negatively 
related to low typicality exemplar ratings, indicative of narrowed conceptual attention. 
However Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) compared global-local triad selections 
between participants who viewed video clips that elicited anger/disgust, anxiety/fear, and 
a neutral mood state. Although the mood manipulations were effective, no differences in 
responses between these specific negative states and neutral conditions was found. Thus 
while research on the influence of anxiety on cognition is better supported than that for 
the influence of negative mood on cognition, findings are equivocal.  
1.3.6 Major depression and depressive symptoms 
Major depression is comprised of multiple symptoms including depressed mood and/or 
reduced interest or pleasure in activities, along with weight changes, sleep disturbances, 
slowed or disturbed motor and cognitive responses (e.g. psychomotor retardation or 
agitation), decreased energy/increased tiredness, increased guilty feelings, increased 
feelings of worthlessness, diminished ability to focus or think, and thoughts of suicide. 
Increased sad mood or anhedonia are necessary symptoms for diagnosis of major 
depression according to the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
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Mental Disorders by the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV; APA, 1994; and 
DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000). 
Major depressive disorder has been connected to a range of cognitive impairments (see 
Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001 for a review). While the range of cognitive deficits is 
broad, studies have consistently reported executive function impairments (Austin, Ross, 
Murray, O’Carroll, Ebmeier, & Goodwin, 1992; Austin et al., 1999; Elliot, Sahakian, 
McKay, Herrod, Robbins, & Paykel, 1996; Merriam, Thase, Haas, Keshavan, & 
Sweeney, 1999; Murphy et al., 1999). In particular, depressed patients are argued to be 
impaired on tasks requiring cognitive flexibility (see Fossati, Ergis, & Allilaire, 2002 for 
a review). For instance depression has been linked with poor performance on the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST; Austin et al., 1999; Merriam, Thase, Haas, 
Keshavan, & Sweeney, 1999). However Fossati, Ergis, and Allilaire (2001) reported that 
depressed patients were unimpaired on a modified version of the WCST, but showed 
deficits in concept generation. The authors suggest that depression might impair 
hypothesis-testing abilities as well as cognitive flexibility. Other research has reported 
deficits in working memory (Christopher & MacDonald, 2005).  
While studies that examine the cognitive abilities of patients who have been diagnosed as 
clinically depressed are most informative about major depression, another commonly 
used practice is to measure depressive symptoms in non-depressed university/college 
students, most often using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967). BDI cut-
off scores are used to create depressed and no/low-depression groups. This method has 
been criticized by researchers who argue that major depression and elevated depressive 
symptoms in students are qualitatively different (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Gotlib, 1984).  
Gotlib (1984) reviews research showing that in non-clinical populations measures of 
depression and anxiety tend to be highly interrelated, to the extent that it is difficult to 
find participants who score highly on depression but not anxiety, and vice versa (e.g. 
Hollon & Kendall, 1980; Strack, Blaney, Gannelen, & Coyne, 1985). To test this 
prediction Gotlib (1984) administered the BDI to 475 university students, along with 
other measures of depression, measures of dysfunctional attitudes, hostility, maladaptive 
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attitudes, anxiety, distress, and assertiveness. There were moderate to high positive 
intercorrelations between the BDI and all of the other measures, with the exception of 
assertiveness (which was negatively correlated with BDI scores). Students who scored 
highly on one measure tended to score high on the others. Given these results Gotlib 
(1984) argued that the BDI might be measuring general psychological distress, and not 
depression specifically. Depressive symptoms in university students have been 
characterized as mild and transient (Coyne, 1994). For instance Deardorff and Funabiki 
(1985) reported that out of 63 students with elevated BDI scores (above 9) only 6 were 
diagnosed with major depression in a clinical interview conducted 1 to 4 weeks later. 
So what does the BDI assess, if it is not assessing major depression? Gotlib (1984) 
suggests that in non-clinical university student populations “the BDI may be measuring a 
construct or emotional state considerably broader than depression” (p. 20). Kendall, 
Hollon, Beck, Hammen, & Ingram (1987) argue that depressive symptoms in non-clinical 
populations could represent “a variety of dispositional qualities, responses to stressful life 
events or other transitory happenings” (p. 292). Watson and Clark (1984) suggest the 
BDI taps into what they refer to as negative affectivity (NA), which is described as an 
individual difference variable that encompasses the tendency to respond to experiences 
with negative emotion, and to view the self negatively. Anxiety as well as “anger, scorn, 
revulsion, guilt, self- dissatisfaction, a sense of rejection, and, to some extent, sadness” 
(Watson & Clark, 1984; p. 465) are included in the description. People higher in NA are 
more likely to experience negative mood states and low self esteem than people lower in 
NA. The NA dimension is hypothesized to be relatively stable over time. This dimension 
is distinct from positive emotions and is not meant to indicate the lack of positivity, but 
rather the presence of negativity.  
However some researchers argue that there is a continuum between sub-clinical 
depressive symptoms and major depression (Enns, Cox, & Borger, 2001; Flett, 
Vredenberg, & Kramses, 1997; Hankin, Fraley, Lahey, & Waldman, 2005; Lewinsohn, 
Solomon, Seeley, & Zeiss, 2000; Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 1993). For instance 
Vredenburg et al. (1993) argue that the use of the BDI and student populations is valid, 
and that high levels of depressive symptoms in student populations corresponds 
15 
 
theoretically with clinical depression. The authors argue that many other measures 
correlate highly with depression questionnaires because they share a depression 
component. Further, the authors cite research showing that even in depressed patients, 
there are high intercorrelations between different measures, meaning that both groups 
demonstrate evidence of a general distress component. 
There is also evidence that non-clinical samples who score highly on depressive symptom 
measures perform more poorly on tasks tapping executive functioning. For instance 
Smith, Tracy, and Murray (1993) reported that university students and adult patients  
with higher than averaged depressive symptoms were slower to learn a categorization 
task that required a flexible, rule-based strategy, but unimpaired on a task that could be 
learned via similarity. 
1.3.7 Remaining questions in negative mood and depression 
research 
Due to conflicting and limited results, it remains unclear whether general negative mood 
narrows attention or impairs cognitive flexibility relative to a neutral mood. Research on 
anxiety is generally clearer. Research on depression also seems more conclusive in that 
many studies report that patients with major depression demonstrate executive function 
impairments, but some researchers argue that depression broadens attention and promotes 
creativity. For instance Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010) argue that depression might 
broaden attention, and cite studies by Andreasen (1987), and von Hecker and Meiser 
(2005) as evidence for this viewpoint.  
Andreasen (1987) studied 30 creative writers, 30 age, sex, and education-matched 
controls, and the first-degree family members of each group. Writers had significantly 
higher rates of bipolar disorder than the control group, and the relatives of the writer 
group had higher rates of major depression than the relatives of the control group. The 
relatives of writers were significantly more likely than the relatives of non-writers to have 
produced a significant creative accomplishment, such as producing an opera or patenting 
an invention. While these results partially support the hypothesis that depression is 
related to creativity Andreasen (2008) notes that:  
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There are also many examples of anecdotal accounts indicating that, creative 
individuals who have suffered from mood disorders find them to be disruptive and 
counterproductive. Among the writers in the Iowa Workshop study [Andreasen, 
1987], essentially all of them reported that they were unable to work creatively 
during periods of depression or mania. During depressive episodes their cognitive 
fluency and energy were decreased, and during manic periods they were too 
distractible and disorganized to work effectively. (p. 254)  
However the work of von Hecker and Meiser (2005) provides some experimental 
evidence that depressive symptoms could be related to broadened attention (and possibly 
to subsequent creativity although that was not shown). University students who reported 
higher levels of depressive symptoms performed the same as students with lower levels 
of depressive symptoms on a word recognition task, but students with higher levels of 
depressive symptoms were more likely to correctly remember the color of the frames 
around the words, indicating that they noticed non-essential elements of the task.  
Thus there is disagreement concerning the effects of depression on cognitive processing, 
and past research has used so many different tasks with different populations that it is 
hard to make comparisons across studies. However much research points to the idea that 
depression impairs flexibility and hypothesis testing, while some research hints at the 
possibility that depressive symptoms broaden attention (or is at least related to de-focused 
attention). 
1.3.8 Thesis questions 2 and 3: negative mood and depressive 
symptoms 
The second question my thesis seeks to address from the above-reviewed context is: does 
manipulated negative mood impair performance on a category learning task that benefits 
from cognitive flexibility? 
The third question my thesis seeks to address from the above-reviewed context is: are 
depressive symptoms negatively related to performance on a category learning task that 
benefits from cognitive flexibility? 
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1.4 Rationale for chapters 2 and 3: the category learning 
paradigm 
In order to address the above three questions Chapters 2 and 3 of my dissertation contain 
experiments that employ a category learning paradigm to study the influence of mood 
(positive and negative), and depressive symptoms on cognitive flexibility and hypothesis-
testing abilities. In the past two decades a large amount of research has been conducted 
with well-defined category sets that can be classified as either rule-based (RB) or non-
rule-based (NRB). This research has made it possible to create category sets that require 
or benefit from certain processes and not others. Category learning also provides a theory 
of category learning that can help to motivate mood research and make predictions about 
the findings. The COmpetition between Verbal and Implicit Systems (COVIS) theory of 
category learning (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998) is based on 
neuropsychological research and argues that there are separate category learning systems, 
one that is verbal, and one that is nonverbal. Table 1.1 below shows how the learning 
tasks used in this dissertation are theoretically related to the COVIS systems, as well as 
the key attributes of each type of learning task.  
Table 1.1. Category learning terminology and theoretical structure 
COVIS System Verbal system Nonverbal system 
Learning Tasks Rule-based (RB) Non-rule-based (NRB) 
Key Attributes 
of the learning 
tasks 
Verbalizable;  
taps cognitive flexibility, 
rule-selection, hypothesis-
testing;  
requires the separation of 
stimulus dimensions. 
Nonverbalizable;  
does not tap cognitive flexibility, 
hypothesis-testing;  
requires the integration of 
stimulus dimensions. 
The verbal system in COVIS is mediated by a circuit that goes from the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) and the prefrontal cortex (PFC) to the head of the caudate nucleus, and then 
goes back to the PFC. This model implicates the PFC for working memory and explicit 
reasoning, the ACC for rule selection, and the basal ganglia for rule switching. Working 
memory and executive attention are crucial cognitive components of the verbal system. 
Category sets that are RB are learned best by the verbal system because they draw upon 
explicit reasoning, working memory, rule selection, and rule-switching. One key feature 
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of RB category sets is that the optimal rule that distinguishes category exemplars between 
the categories is verbalizable. RB category sets can differ in terms of how complex the 
verbal rule is, from simple unidimensional rules, to multi-dimensional rules that require 
conjunctive or disjunctive reasoning. Unidimensional verbal rules are the most salient 
and easy to learn, and as complexity of the rule increases beyond conjunctions the 
category set may still be able to be described with a verbalizable rule, but it is unclear 
whether participants will rely on explicit reasoning processes and verbal rules to 
categorize stimuli (Ashby & Maddox, 2005). For participants to achieve high or perfect 
accuracy on a RB category learning task, participants must select and test rules held in 
working memory while they are being tested. When a rule is tested and found not to lead 
to correct feedback, the rule should be abandoned so that a new rule can be tested. The 
use of a new rule requires one to select a new possible rule, and then turn one’s attention 
away from the old rule to the new rule. More recently the medial temporal lobes, 
specifically the hippocampus, were also added to the COVIS model’s verbal system, 
because while rules can be held in working memory for short periods of time, rules must 
also be consolidated and stored in longer-term memory (Ashby & Valentin, 2005).  
According to Ashby et al. (1998) the verbal category learning system is most likely to be 
influenced by mood, depressive symptoms, and motivation, as will be discussed later on 
in this introduction. This is because mood, depressive symptoms, and motivational states 
have been found to influence the same cognitive processes that are used in rule-based 
category learning tasks.  
The nonverbal system is mediated by the basal ganglia, with a focus on the striatum due 
to its role in dopamine reward-based feedback and because most of the visual cortex 
extends directly onto the tail of the caudate nucleus (Ashby et al., 1998). Within the 
striatum the putamen is closely connected with motor output and the caudate nucleus is 
associated with cognitive behavior. Ashby et al. (1998) hypothesize that for every 
categorization decision made a unit in the prefrontal cortex is activated by the striatum 
and the strength of activation is indicative of the nonverbal system’s confidence that the 
response was correct. With repeated trials and activations the category responses become 
associated with the stimuli. Feedback is immediate and the dopamine released into the 
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striatum causes synapses that have been activated recently to be strengthened (Ashby & 
Maddox, 2005). The integration of relevant stimulus information prior to making a 
categorization decision is crucial for successful nonverbal learning to occur. This 
integration of information is nearly impossible to describe accurately using a verbal rule 
and the learning is thought to be procedural in nature (Ashby, El, & Waldron, 2003; 
Maddox, Bohil, & Ing, 2004). COVIS predicts that early learning relies on the verbal 
system, but if the category structure is not verbalizable, responding eventually switches to 
the nonverbal system (Ashby et al., 1998). 
COVIS specifies that both systems are active and in competition with one another during 
learning. Eventually one system will come to dominate the response output in a particular 
category-learning task. The system that comes to dominate responding is the one that 
receives the most correct feedback. The verbal system is hypothesized to dominate all 
early responding while the nonverbal system takes longer to learn categories and thus 
longer to dominate responding. 
1.4.1 Rationale for studying depressive symptoms and category 
learning  
As noted above, the COVIS model’s verbal system involves a circuit that extends from 
the PFC and ACC, the head of the caudate nucleus, and goes back to the PFC (Ashby et 
al., 1998). Depression represents an example of a condition that is associated with 
reduced activity in frontal brain regions that overlap with the verbal category learning 
system (Henriques & Davidson, 1991), and consequently an opportunity to evaluate the 
COVIS theory of category learning as well as theories of how depression influences 
cognitive processing.  
Ashby et al. (1998) hypothesized that depression should be related to impaired RB and 
possibly NRB category learning. The possibility of NRB impairment is due to the 
psychomotor agitation/disturbance found in some depressed patients (APA, 2011). Motor 
disturbances are mediated by the basal ganglia and thus the nonverbal system may be 
affected in some cases (Ashby et al., 1998). Only one set of studies has examined the 
influence of depressive symptoms on category learning. Smith et al. (1993) reported that 
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participants higher in self-reported depressive symptoms performed more poorly on a RB 
category learning task than participants lower in depressive symptoms. Depressive 
symptoms were not related to NRB category learning.  
Chapter 2 addresses the potential relationships between self-reported depressive 
symptoms, hypomanic and worry symptoms, trait approach and avoidance motivation, 
and RB and NRB category learning performance in two studies. While Smith et al. 
(1993) studied the relationship between depressive symptoms and category learning, no 
prior research (to the best of my knowledge), has explored factors other than depressive 
symptoms (e.g. hypomanic and worry symptoms, approach and avoidance motivation) in 
this context.  
Experiment 1 looks at the relationship between depressive symptoms and category 
learning, and is the first study to examine this relationship using a complex, RB 
categorization task, and the first to explore potential relationships between hypomanic 
symptoms, approach and avoidance motivation and category learning. This experiment’s 
original contribution to knowledge is that depressive symptoms are negatively related to a 
complex, RB learning task but unrelated to an easier, RB learning task or a NRB learning 
task.  
Experiment 2 uses more complex category sets to further study the potential relationships 
between these variables and RB and NRB category learning performance. This 
experiment’s original contribution to knowledge is that depressive symptoms are 
negatively related to performance on a complex, RB category learning task that benefits 
from cognitive flexibility, but unrelated to performance on a NRB category learning task 
that does not benefit from cognitive flexibility. Further, this study demonstrates that 
history of hypomanic symptoms is negatively related to RB category learning. This 
experiment also makes a further unique contribution to knowledge that is described 
below.  
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1.4.2 Rationale for studying positive and negative mood and 
category learning  
Ashby, Isen, and Turken’s (1999) dopamine hypothesis of positive mood posits that mild 
to moderate positive mood is associated with enhanced cognitive flexibility due to an 
increase of dopamine in the frontal cortical areas of the brain, specifically the PFC and 
the ACC. These brain regions overlap with the COVIS model of category learning’s 
verbal system. Category learning involves a combination of rule learning, selective 
attention, inhibition of response, sensitivity to feedback, and often requires the learner to 
engage in hypothesis-testing, making it well suited to the study of mood and cognitive 
processing. Many of these functions require cognitive control and flexibility (Markman, 
Maddox, & Baldwin, 2007). Furthermore, there is a strong body of evidence implicating 
working memory and executive function in learning RB categories (see DeCaro, Thomas, 
& Beilock, 2008; Grimm, Markman, Maddox, & Baldwin, 2008; Maddox, Baldwin, & 
Markman, 2006; Minda, Desroches, & Church, 2008). No prior research has looked at the 
relationship between positive and negative mood states on category learning 
performance, or the influence of positive and negative mood states on category learning 
performance.  
Chapter 2’s Experiment 2 is the first study to look at the relationship between current 
self-reported mood state and category learning performance. This chapter’s original 
contribution to knowledge is that self-reported positive mood is positively related to RB 
category learning, but unrelated to NRB category learning. Further, this study shows that 
when positive mood is taken into account, the relationship between self-reported 
depressive symptoms and RB category learning performance is no longer significant.   
Chapter 3 looks at the influence of manipulated positive, neutral, and negative mood 
states on RB and NRB category learning performance, and is the first experiment to study 
the influence of manipulated mood states on category learning performance. This 
chapter’s original contribution to knowledge is that positive mood enhances performance 
on a RB category set that benefits from cognitive flexibility. This has implications for 
category learning research and for research on positive mood. 
22 
 
1.5 Motivation and cognition 
As noted earlier, motivation has been argued to underlie cognition (Lazarus, 1991a). 
Without motivation, there would be no impetus to act (Carver & Scheier, 1998). 
Derryberry and Tucker (1994) argued that motivational states can affect conceptual, as 
well as perceptual attention, with approach states broadening and avoidance states 
narrowing attention. This hypothesis has been extended by researchers studying the 
influence of regulatory focus on cognitive processing.  
In regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) people are theorized to have distinct 
motivational orientations that are derived from the approach and avoidance systems and 
exist orthogonally to them, meaning that each system involves both approach and 
avoidance motivation. The promotion system prepares an individual to approach positive 
outcomes (gains) and avoid the absence of positive outcomes (non-gains) in the 
environment. The prevention system prepares an individual to approach potential positive 
outcomes (non-losses) in the environment and avoid potential negative outcomes (losses). 
Promotion goals are centered around and driven by nurturance needs, while prevention 
goals are centered around security needs (Higgins, 1997). These distinct needs engender 
different strategies of goal pursuit: promotion-focused individuals prefer to use eager, 
risky strategies while prevention-focused individuals prefer to use vigilant, conservative 
strategies (Crowe & Higgins, 1997).  
Due to the fundamental nature of these self regulatory systems, all people have a 
promotion system and a prevention system. However one system or the other can come to 
dominate people’s self regulation goals. This is thought to be due to the emphasis placed 
on ideals or oughts by an individual’s caregivers, role models, and peers across time 
(Higgins, 1987). This long-term, sustained focus is referred to as chronic regulatory 
focus, and has been found to be relatively unchanging over time (Higgins, 1998). These 
chronic systems can interact with the constraints and affordances of various situations 
and tasks, which can also be construed as promotion or prevention-focused. In addition to 
chronic regulatory states, it is possible to manipulate people’s dominant regulatory focus 
momentarily, and this temporary focus is referred to as situational regulatory focus.  
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The nurturance needs (e.g. advancement, growth, accomplishment) of promotion-focused 
people motivates them to achieve states that reflect their ideal selves (i.e. their hopes, 
wishes, and aspirations), whereas the security needs (e.g. protection, safety, 
responsibility) of prevention-focused people motivates them to achieve states that reflect 
their ought selves (i.e. their duties, obligations, and responsibilities). When one is in a 
promotion focus and achieves a goal that is in line with their ideal self (gain), they feel 
cheerfulness-related emotions, and when they fail to achieve a goal (non-gain), they feel 
dejection-related emotions. When one is in a prevention focus and achieves a goal in line 
with their ought self (non-loss) they feel quiescent-related emotions (e.g. calm/serene), 
and when they fail to achieve a goal in line with their ought self (loss), they feel agitated-
related emotions (e.g. anger/fear). During goal pursuit, the inferences people make about 
their relative success/failure also influence their emotional state (Higgins, 1998; Higgins, 
Shah, & Friedman, 1997). Higgins (2001) specifies that people “can be in a promotion 
state of eagerness or a prevention state of vigilance without currently experiencing 
emotions” (p. 208). Thus motivational state (non-emotional) interacts with emotional 
experiences.  
Idson, Liberman, and Higgins (2000) measured the chronic regulatory focus of 
participants before they completed an anagram solving task. Participants were given 
either success or failure feedback. Participants with a chronic promotion focus reported 
feeling happier than participants with a chronic prevention focus following success 
feedback, and participants with a chronic prevention focus reported feeling more anxious 
than participants with a chronic promotion focus following failure feedback. Similarly, 
participants with a chronic prevention focus reported feeling more relaxed following 
success feedback than participants with a promotion focus, and participants with a 
promotion focus reported feeling more dejected than prevention focus participants 
following failure feedback.  
Like mood states, regulatory focus has been found to influence conceptual breadth. In an 
experiment by Crowe and Higgins (1997) participants were asked to do a sorting task 
using lists of exemplars taken from Rosch (1975). Participants first sorted a list of 12 
high and moderate typicality fruits into subgroups according to any one dimension that 
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was plausible to the participant, and this task was repeated using a list of twelve 
vegetables that were also high and moderately typical category exemplars. Following this 
participants were asked to record as many other dimensions that could be used to sort the 
vegetables, excluding the one they had already chosen. Regulatory focus was 
manipulated by informing participants that they would get to do a liked (promotion 
condition) or disliked (prevention condition) activity based on their performance on the 
sorting task. Participants with a promotion focus sorted along dimensions that created 
more subgroups than participants with a prevention focus. Prevention-focused 
participants were also more likely to choose the same dimension across the two sorting 
tasks (i.e. they were more likely to perseverate). When participants were asked to list 
other dimensions that could be used to sort the categories, there was a trend for 
participants in the promotion condition to list more dimensions. The authors interpreted 
the results in a signal detection framework. In this framework a promotion focus is 
concerned with ensuring “hits” and avoiding errors of omission, whereas a prevention 
focus is concerned with insuring correct rejections and avoiding errors of commission. 
However this study can also be interpreted to suggest that participants with a promotion 
focus have a broader conceptual focus than participants with a prevention focus. 
The theory that a promotion focus is related to broadened attention compared to a 
prevention focus has been bolstered and expanded in subsequent research by Förster and 
colleagues (Förster & Higgins, 2005; Friedman & Förster, 2005). Förster and Higgins 
(2005) measured the chronic regulatory focus of participants and had them complete a 
global/local processing task. In this task participants are shown one of eight composite 
letters that is composed of smaller letters on each trial. Participants were asked to make a 
key press on a blue response key when they saw the letter “L” and a key press on a red 
response key when they saw the letter “H”. The location of the target letters was varied 
such that they appeared on the local or global level of the stimuli. The small (local) and 
composite (global) letters always mismatched so that the target was always only on either 
the local or global level. Participants with a chronic promotion focus responded faster to 
global targets whereas participants with a chronic prevention focus responded faster to 
local targets. Friedman and Förster (2005) induced approach (promotion) and avoidance 
(prevention) motivational states and then had participants perform a measure of 
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attentional flexibility (a Stroop task in Experiment 1 and a working memory 2-back task 
in Experiment 2). Participants in promotion conditions performed better than participants 
in prevention conditions. These results indicate that a promotion focus is associated with 
broadened attention and increased cognitive flexibility while a prevention focus is 
associated with narrowed attention and reduced flexibility.  
Regardless of whether the focus is chronic or situational in nature, regulatory states 
interact with the environment. That is, a regulatory state can either can fit or not fit with 
the reward structure of a task. In both cases, if one has a promotion focus (chronic or 
situational) and is in an environment that highlights gains, the subject is said to be in a 
state of regulatory fit, because looking for possible gains in the environment matches 
with an environment where gains are possible. If one has a promotion focus but the 
environment highlights losses, then the subjects is said to be in a state of regulatory 
mismatch because looking for possible gains in the environment does not match with an 
environment where only losses are possible. Likewise if one has a prevention focus and 
the environment highlights losses this creates a state of regulatory fit because looking for 
possible losses in an environment matches an environment where losses are possible. 
Finally if one has a prevention focus and the environment highlights gains, this creates a 
state of regulatory mismatch because looking for possible losses in the environment does 
not match with an environment where only gains are possible. 
While the above mentioned studies are informative regarding the influence of regulatory 
focus states on attentional and conceptual breadth and flexibility, more recent research 
argues that regulatory fit, and not simply focus, influences these factors. Markman and 
colleagues (Maddox et al., 2006; Grimm et al., 2008) have put forward the hypothesis 
that regulatory fit enhances cognitive flexibility. The authors define cognitive flexibility 
as “an increase in an individual’s ability or willingness to try different strategies across 
trials to achieve some stated goal, as opposed to utilizing gradual incremental changes in 
strategy” (Maddox et al., 2006, p. 1378). Across several studies they reported that 
regulatory fit improved performance on category learning tasks that benefitted from 
broad shifts in strategy and suffered on tasks that did not benefit from trying new 
strategies and abandoning old ones, relative to a regulatory mismatch condition. Grimm 
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et al. (2008) also reported that participants experiencing a match between their situational 
focus and the reward structure of the task performed better on different a category 
learning task that benefitted from cognitive flexibility and worse on a task that did not 
benefit from flexibility. Additionally they have used well known measures of cognitive 
flexibility, including the WCST (Maddox, Filoteo, Glass & Markman, 2010), and the 
RAT (Markman et al., 2007), and have again showed that a match between the situational 
focus and the task reward structure results in enhanced performance relative to a 
mismatch.  
While the body of work outlined above is compelling, the paradigm consistently used to 
support these results relies on setting up a situation in which explicit gains/non-gains 
(promotion) and non-losses/losses (prevention) are set up on two levels: situational 
regulatory focus and the reward structure of the task. The tasks participants complete 
always have correct and incorrect responses and participants receive feedback after they 
make each response. The feedback participants receive after each trial is critical to 
creating conditions of regulatory fit and non-fit. Prior research on regulatory focus effects 
also commonly uses tasks in which there is a correct or incorrect response, and where 
feedback occurs. The issue this poses is that it is unclear whether these effects will be 
found in more naturalistic situations in which there are many possible correct responses, 
or in which one’s response is not necessarily correct or incorrect.  
One study has used a different paradigm to study regulatory fit effects on cognitive 
processes. Memmert, Unklebach, and Ganns (2010) measured chronic regulatory focus 
using the General Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (GRFM; Lockwood, Jordan, & 
Kunda, 2002), and manipulated situational focus using approach and avoidance-priming 
mazes (Friedman & Förster, 2001). They reported that participants who experienced a fit 
between their chronic focus and their situational focus were more likely to notice an 
unexpected character in an inattentional blindness task. They hypothesized that 
regulatory fit led to broadened attention relative to regulatory mismatch (Memmert et al., 
2010).  
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Given that regulatory fit effects have largely been reported using a framework of gains 
and losses, I wanted to see whether regulatory fit effects would be found on a task where 
there was no correct or incorrect response and no explicit trial by trial feedback, as this is 
a more frequently occurring situation in everyday life, where there are multiple possible 
good choices and no clear feedback about whether one has made a good decision or not. 
Thus in the current study I use a different categorization task as a measure of cognitive 
flexibility, one that does not involve correct or incorrect responses and where feedback is 
not necessary. The paradigm I use to manipulate regulatory fit versus mismatch is derived 
from prior research by Memmert et al. (2010). Unlike Memmert et al. (2010) I use a 
different measure of chronic regulatory focus, and a different situational focus 
manipulation. The GRFM has been used in several studies looking at regulatory focus 
and fit (Keller & Bless, 2006; Memmert et al., 2010, Plessner, Unkelbach, Memmert, 
Baltes, & Kolb, 2009), however it has been reported to correlate more strongly with 
positive and negative mood, and approach and avoidance motivation than another 
commonly used measure of chronic regulatory focus (Summerville & Roese, 2008). For 
these reasons I employ the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Harlow, Friedman, & 
Higgins, 1997), which was not found to correlate with positive and negative mood, or 
approach and avoidance motivation (Summerville & Roese, 2008).  
The task I use is based on the work of Rosch (1975). In the original study participants 
were asked to rate the goodness of fit of a number of category exemplars to several 
different categories. Some category exemplars were considered a better fit to a given 
category than others. For instance, participants endorsed the exemplars “apple” and 
“orange” as extremely good members of the fruit category, whereas “prunes”, “coconut” 
and “olive” were considered less good members of the category. This work showed that 
people seem to have ideas of what makes a given exemplar a better or worse member of a 
category, and challenged the view that people use necessary and sufficient features in 
making categorization decisions.  
The exemplars and categories from Rosch (1975) have been used as a measure of 
conceptual breadth or cognitive flexibility in prior research (Isen & Daubman, 1984; 
Mikulincer et al., 1990a; Price & Harmon-Jones, 2010), by comparing people’s ratings of 
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low typicality items. Atypical/low typicality items are thought to tap cognitive flexibility 
because assigning a higher than average rating to a low typicality item means one is able 
to see features of the exemplars that connect them to the category and find different 
relationships between the exemplar and category that are less obvious, despite being 
plausible. In contrast high typicality items do not require as much flexibility because the 
aspects or features of the exemplar that relate to the category easily come to mind. For 
instance in the category “vehicle”, it is easy to agree that a “car” is a good example. 
However the exemplar “camel” requires a greater degree of flexibility, more flexibility 
than “car”. Past research has found that participants with higher state or trait anxiety are 
less inclusive in their ratings of atypical category exemplars (Mikulincer et al., 1990a), 
whereas participants in a positive mood (Isen & Daubman, 1984), or a low intensity 
approach state (Price & Harmon-Jones, 2010), assign higher ratings to atypical items than 
participants in a control or other condition.  
For the current research I predict that if regulatory fit enhances cognitive flexibility 
participants who experience a fit between their measured chronic focus and their 
situational focus will assign higher ratings to the low typicality exemplars than 
participants who experience a mismatch. This prediction is in line with past research by 
Memmert et al. (2010) and Markman and colleagues (Grimm et al., 2008; Maddox et al., 
2006; 2010; Markman et al., 2007). There may also be a main effect of either chronic or 
situational regulatory focus (or both), as suggested by the work of Crowe and Higgins 
(1997), and research by Förster and Friedman (Förster & Higgins, 2005; Friedman & 
Förster, 2005), such that participants with either a strong chronic promotion focus, or a 
manipulation situational promotion focus, assign higher ratings to atypical exemplars 
than participants with a less strong chronic promotion focus (or a stronger chronic 
prevention focus), or a situational prevention focus.  
No research to my knowledge has measured both approach and avoidance motivation 
with the Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation System scales (BIS/BAS; 
Carver & White, 1994) as well as chronic regulatory focus with the RFQ in a study of 
regulatory focus/fit effects. This is important because promotion and prevention foci 
involve both approach (behavioral activation) and avoidance (behavioral inhibition) 
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motivations, and are theoretically distinct from these systems. However some research 
that has measured approach and avoidance motivation have reported findings that are 
similar to those reported for regulatory focus. For instance De Dreu, Nijstad, and Baas 
(2011) reported that individuals high in trait approach motivation (as measured by the 
BAS scales) were more creative when they were primed with global processing 
manipulations. This can be considered akin to a regulatory fit effect, except that trait 
approach motivation is in the place of a promotion focus. Thus I wanted to know whether 
trait approach and avoidance motivation might interact with the situational focus 
manipulation in a similar manner to the results of Memmert et al. (2010). 
1.6 Rationale for studying motivation and categorization 
Chapter 4 investigates how two motivational states (promotion and prevention regulatory 
focus) influence performance on a categorization task. Additionally individual 
differences in motivation are measured prior to the manipulation, and mood is assessed 
following the regulatory focus manipulation. This chapter’s original contribution to 
knowledge is that manipulated regulatory focus states influence negative mood such that 
participants in a prevention focus reported significantly higher negative mood than 
participants in a promotion focus. Negative mood ratings were significantly negatively 
related to poor and moderate exemplar typicality ratings. Prior work has found mood 
effects on poor exemplar typicality ratings, but this is the first study to report that 
negative mood also relates negatively to moderate exemplar typicality ratings. 
1.6.1 Thesis question 4: the influence of motivation on cognitive 
processing 
The question my thesis seeks to address from the above-reviewed context is: Does 
regulatory fit result in broadened attention/enhanced cognitive flexibility on a naturalistic 
categorization task? 
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Chapter 2  
2 Is there an upside to feeling down? The relationship 
between depressive symptoms, hypomanic symptoms, 
mood, and category learning performance 
The influence of negative mood states on cognitive processing has been a popular topic 
of study, but questions remain as to the nature of the effects. Some studies have reported 
findings in line with the hypothesis that negative mood narrows attention; for instance 
Gasper and Clore (2002) reported that participants in a negative mood condition made 
more local triad classifications on a global-local classification task compared to positive 
and neutral mood condition participants. Baumann and Kuhl (2005) reported that people 
primed with negatively valenced words before each trial of a global-local response task 
were slower to respond to global trials than people primed with neutral words. Oaksford, 
Morris, Grainger, and Williams (1996) reported that negative mood participants 
performed less well on a variant of the Wason card selection task than neutral mood 
participants. Research by Tucker and colleagues (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994; Tucker & 
Williamson, 1984) reported that threatening situations constrict the scope of perceptual 
attention. In a series of studies Mikulincer, Kedem, and Paz (1990a), and Mikulincer, 
Paz, and Kedem (1990b) reported that state and trait anxiety was negatively related to 
low typicality exemplar ratings, indicative of narrowed conceptual attention. 
 
In contrast to the idea that negative mood narrows attention, Gable and Harmon-Jones 
(2010c) manipulated sadness and found that it led to broadened attention relative to a 
neutral mood condition on a global-local reaction time task, with participants in the sad 
mood condition exhibiting longer response times to local response trials. The authors 
suggested that depression might also broaden attention and be related to enhanced 
creativity. In line with this hypothesis von Hecker and Meiser (2005) reported that 
university students who reported higher levels of current depressive symptoms performed 
the same as students with lower levels of self-reported depressive symptoms on a word 
recognition task, but students with high self-reported depressive symptom were more 
likely to correctly remember the color of the frames around the words, indicating that 
42 
 
they noticed non-essential elements of the task better than students with lower levels of 
self-reported depressive symptoms. Although these results do not show that depression 
enhances creativity, it is possible that a less inhibited, defocused state of attention (which 
was displayed by the students with higher levels of self-reported depressive symptoms) 
could result in enhanced creativity. However two meta-analyses have failed to find a 
relationship between negative mood and creativity (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; 
Davis, 2009). Impairment on tasks that benefit from cognitive flexibility have also been 
reported in depressed patients, for instance major depression has been linked with poor 
performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Austin et al., 1992; Merriam, Thase, 
Haas, Keshavan, & Sweeney, 1999). In line with the idea that flexible processing is 
impaired in depression, Smith, Tracy, and Murray (1993) reported that university 
students and adult patients with higher than average self-reported depressive symptoms 
were impaired on a category learning task that benefited from a flexible, rule-based 
strategy, but unimpaired on a task that could be learned via similarity.  
 
Although there is generally more support for the hypothesis that negative mood states 
narrow attention and reduce flexibility than there is evidence that negative/depressive 
mood states broaden attention or enhance flexibility, the issue continues to be debated. 
This paper addresses the question of whether self-reported depressive symptoms in 
university students are related to better or worse performance on complex tasks that 
utilize executive functioning abilities such as hypothesis testing and rule selection using a 
category learning paradigm.  
 
The relationship between depressive symptoms and performance on learning tasks that 
benefit or do not benefit from cognitive flexibility is important because cognitive 
flexibility is beneficial for many commonly encountered everyday tasks as well as 
problem-solving tasks. If even moderate levels of depressive symptoms are related to 
lower performance on tasks benefiting from flexibility this has implications for 
understanding academic performance in undergraduate populations as well as employee 
performance in workplaces.  
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2.1 The category learning paradigm 
Category learning provides a useful paradigm in which to study the effects of depressive 
symptoms on cognitive performance. In the past two decades a large amount of research 
has been conducted with two groups of well-defined category sets: rule-based (RB) and 
non-rule-based (NRB). Category learning also provides a theory of category learning that 
can help to motivate this research and make predictions about the findings. The 
COmpetition between Verbal and Implicit Systems theory of category learning (COVIS; 
Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998) differentiates between verbal and 
nonverbal category learning systems and is based on neuropsychological research.  
 
RB category sets can be learned using explicit, verbal reasoning processes. A key feature 
of RB category sets is that the optimal rule that distinguishes the categories is 
verbalizable. A related feature is that the dimensions of the stimuli are treated separately. 
RB category sets can differ in terms of how complex the verbal rule is, from simple 
unidimensional rules, to multi-dimensional rules that require conjunctive or disjunctive 
reasoning. Unidimensional verbal rules are the easiest to learn and the most salient, and 
learning difficulty increases as the complexity of the rule increases. For participants to 
achieve high or perfect accuracy on a RB category-learning task, participants must select 
and test rules held in working memory. When a rule is found not to lead to consistently 
correct feedback, the rule should be abandoned so that new rules can be tested. The use of 
a new rule requires one to turn attention away from the old rule so that a new rule can be 
selected (Ashby et al., 1998). The verbal system is mediated by a circuit that goes from 
the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) to the head of the 
caudate nucleus, and back to the PFC. This model implicates the PFC for working 
memory, and explicit reasoning, the ACC for rule selection, and the basal ganglia for rule 
switching. Working memory and executive attention are crucial cognitive components of 
the verbal system. RB category sets are learned best by the verbal system because they 
draw upon explicit reasoning, working memory, rule selection, and rule-switching 
processes.  
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NRB category sets are not learned well using explicit, verbal reasoning processes. Instead 
of involving attention to separate stimulus dimensions, the integration of relevant 
stimulus information prior to making a categorization decision is crucial for successful 
NRB learning to occur. This integration of information is extremely difficult to describe 
using a verbal rule. The nonverbal system is mediated by the basal ganglia, with a focus 
on the striatum due to its role in dopamine reward-based feedback and because most of 
the visual cortex extends directly onto the tail of the caudate nucleus (Ashby et al., 1998). 
Within the striatum the putamen is closely connected with motor output and the caudate 
nucleus is associated with cognitive behavior. Ashby et al. (1998) hypothesize that for 
every categorization decision made a unit in the prefrontal cortex is activated by the 
striatum and the strength of activation is indicative of the implicit system’s confidence 
that the response was correct. With repeated trials and activations the category responses 
become associated with the stimuli. Feedback is immediate and the dopamine released 
into the striatum causes synapses that have been activated recently to be strengthened 
(Ashby & Maddox, 2005). NRB category sets are learned best by the nonverbal category 
learning system due to the lack of a perfect verbal rule that distinguishes between 
categories. 
 
COVIS specifies that both the verbal and nonverbal systems are active and in competition 
with one another during learning. Eventually one system will dominate the response 
output in a particular category learning task/learning session. The system that comes to 
dominate responding is the one that receives the most correct feedback. The verbal 
system is hypothesized to dominate all early responding while the nonverbal system takes 
longer to learn categories and thus longer to dominate responding. COVIS predicts that 
early learning relies on the verbal system, but if the category structure is not verbalizable, 
responding eventually switches to the nonverbal system (Ashby et al., 1998). 
 
If depressive symptoms are related to narrowed attention or reduced flexibility, then 
participants higher in self-reported depressive symptoms should perform less well on RB 
category learning tasks if those tasks benefit from cognitive flexibility. Performance on 
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NRB category learning may not be related to depressive symptoms but it is possible that 
early learning may be related to depressive symptoms if the verbal system is being used.  
2.2 The role of dopamine in category learning 
Category learning provides a useful paradigm for studying the relationship between 
depressive symptoms and cognitive processes for a further reason. The COVIS model 
makes specific predictions about the influence of dopamine on category learning. 
Dopamine is theorized to play a key role in both the verbal and nonverbal category 
learning systems (Ashby et al., 1998), and is also implicated in theories of positive mood 
(Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999), and depression (Nestler & Carlezon, 2006). 
 
In the nonverbal category learning system, dopamine that originates in the substantia 
nigra pars compacta travels to the tail of the caudate nucleus and provides the crucial 
reward signal needed for successful NRB learning to occur.  When corrective feedback is 
not given immediately after participants make a response, learning is impaired on NRB 
but not RB category sets (Maddox, Ashby, & Bohil, 2003). The learning of NRB 
category sets is reliant on closely-spaced corrective feedback because the cortico-striatal 
synapses that are crucial for feedback-based learning are only active for several seconds. 
If corrective feedback (and thus the dopamine-mediated reward signal) is not received in 
the same time period the nonverbal system cannot make the correct connection between 
the categorization response and the corrective feedback. As a result decreased dopamine 
in the tail of the caudate nucleus is hypothesized to impair non-rule-based category 
learning (Ashby et al., 1998). Support for this prediction comes from Parkinson’s disease. 
In Parkinson’s disease dopamine cells in the ventral tegmental area and the substantia 
nigra die in increasing numbers (Kolb & Whishaw, 1990). In a study by Knowlton, 
Mangels, and Squire (1996), Parkinson’s disease patients were impaired on a NRB 
category learning task, and there was a negative relationship between disease severity and 
performance. 
 
Dopamine also plays an important role in the verbal system. Ashby et al. (1998) make 
several predictions about interactions between dopamine levels and RB category 
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learning. They predict that increased dopamine levels in frontal brain regions enhances 
rule selection and RB category learning (up to a point, beyond which too much dopamine 
would impair rule selection and subsequent performance), whereas decreased dopamine 
in frontal brain regions (beyond usual levels) should impair RB category learning when 
rule selection and working memory are required. Ashby et al. (1998) also predict that 
decreased dopamine levels in the ACC impair performance on RB category learning 
tasks, whereas decreased dopamine levels throughout the caudate nucleus should cause 
deficits in rule-based category learning when switching executive attention is required.  
These predictions are based on several separate lines of evidence, including research 
showing that administration of amphetamines (which increases dopamine levels in frontal 
brain regions) is associated with increased response changing on a 2-choice guessing 
paradigm (Ridley, Baker, Frith, Dowdy, & Crow, 1988; cited by Ashby et al., 1998). 
Patients with positive schizophrenia symptoms (which is also thought to be associated 
with increased dopamine levels in frontal brain regions) exhibit difficulty maintaining 
cognitive set (DSM-IV; APA, 1994). Patients with negative schizophrenia symptoms, as 
well as people prescribed dopamine agonist medications (both of which are related to 
reductions in frontal region dopamine levels) exhibit increased perseverative errors on the 
WCST (Berger et al., 1989; cited by Ashby et al., 1998; Malmo, 1974; cited by Ashby et 
al., 1998).  
 
Ashby et al. (1998) hypothesized that depression should be related to impaired RB and 
possibly NRB category learning. This argument is based on research showing that 
depressed participants exhibit impairments on aspects of the WCST, which designed to 
assess frontal lobe impairments, and uses some of the same cognitive processes as rule-
based learning tasks (Berman, Doran, Pickard, & Weinberger, 1993; Franke et al., 1993). 
The possibility of NRB impairment is due to the psychomotor agitation/disturbance 
reported in some depressed patients, however this symptom is not found in everyone with 
major depressive disorder (Calligiuri & Ellwanger, 2000). Motor disturbances are 
mediated by the basal ganglia and thus the nonverbal system may be affected in some 
cases (Sobin & Sakheim, 1997).  
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There is growing evidence that dopamine plays a key role in depression, specifically the 
mesolimbic dopamine pathway that projects from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) to the 
nucleus accumbens (Nestler & Carlezon, 2006). While it is not possible to directly 
manipulate dopamine levels in specific brain regions in humans, a technique called 
optogenetics allows dopamine transmitting neurons in the VTA to be isolated and turned 
on and off via fibre optic cables inserted into the brains of mice (Deisseroth, 2010).  In a 
study using optogenetics, depression-like behaviors resulted (mice struggled less when 
suspended by their tails and showed a reduced preference for water containing sucrose) 
when VTA neurons were switched off. When the VTA neurons were turned on, the same 
mice significantly altered their behavior, behaving no differently than control mice that 
did not have their VTA neurons turned off. This is the first study to manipulate dopamine 
levels in the VTA and show a direct effect on depression-like behaviors (Tye et al., 
2012). This is significant because the VTA is a part of the COVIS model’s verbal 
category learning system.  
As previously mentioned, the verbal system contains a circuit that includes the PFC, 
caudate nucleus, and ACC (Ashby et al., 1998). According to COVIS the ACC selects 
which new verbal rules to try out, and the head of the caudate nucleus controls the rule 
switching. Dopamine projections between the VTA and substantia nigra mediate this 
switching process. Although dopamine is theorized to play a role in the nonverbal 
system, the dopamine projections in this system are between the substantia nigra and the 
visual cortex (Maddox & Ashby, 2004). Therefore depressive symptoms should be 
related to RB category learning but not NRB category learning. 
 
There are several links between RB category learning, dopamine, and depressive 
symptoms, but little research has specifically investigated depressive symptoms and 
category learning. Smith, Tracy, and Murray (1993) conducted two studies looking at the 
relationship between depressive symptoms and category learning. In the first study adults 
from a general university population completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; 
Beck, 1967) and then performed two category learning tasks, one that was RB and one 
that was NRB. The stimuli consisted of 4-letter nonwords (e.g. BUNO, KYRA). Using 
the BDI, adults with self-reported depression levels higher than the mean score reported 
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by all participants performed more poorly on the RB task than participants with scores 
lower than the mean. The second experiment studied a group of adult men who were 
patients at a medical centre for veterans.  Subjects were classified as non-depressed, 
moderately depressed, and severely depressed using the BDI recommended cut-off 
scores. Subjects completed either a RB category set or a NRB category set, and this time 
the stimuli consisted of abstract faces with four features that varied along one of two 
dimensions. Subjects classified as severely depressed (but not those classified as 
moderately depressed) were impaired on RB but not NRB category learning. There were 
no other differences between the groups.  
2.3 The current research 
To provide a fuller test of the hypothesis that depressive symptoms are negatively related 
to RB category learning I used a complex RB category set in addition to an easy to learn 
RB category set. In the studies by Smith et al., (1993) the perfect verbal rule (for the RB 
category set) in both studies was a relatively easy to learn single-dimensional rule. 
Smith et al. (1993) demonstrated that current self-reported depressive symptoms were 
related to impaired RB category learning. Some research has reported cognitive 
impairments in subjects who are no longer depressed (Weiland-Fiedler et al. 2004). To 
address the possibility that past depressive symptoms might be related to reduced RB 
category learning performance I assessed subjects’ history of depressive symptoms in 
addition to their current depressive symptoms.  
 
While depression is a relatively well-specified psychological disorder that can be linked 
to the COVIS theory of category learning, it is possible that related constructs may also 
show similar patterns, a possibility that has not, to the best of my knowledge, been 
examined. Both depression and bipolar disorder have been connected with frontal brain 
region dysfunction and working memory and executive function impairments (Arts, 
Jabben, Krabbendam, & van Os, 2008; Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009; Kurtz & Gerraty, 
2009; Robinson, Thompson, Gallagher, Goswami, Young, & Ferrier, 2006). Hypomanic 
symptoms are a predictor of bipolar disorder (Depue, Krauss, Spoont, & Arbisi, 1989). 
Therefore it is feasible that current hypomanic symptoms may be negatively related to 
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RB category learning performance. As in depression, I also assessed history of 
hypomanic symptoms.  
 
Depression is related to proneness to worry (Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 
2002; Starcevic, 1995). Further, worry has been found to impair verbal working memory 
(Rapee, 1993). Dual-task studies of category learning have reported that adding a verbal 
working memory task to a categorization task impairs RB learning to a greater extent 
than NRB learning (Waldron & Ashby, 2001; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006). Thus 
proneness to worry could act similarly to a verbal dual ask, and it is possible that worry 
will be negatively related to RB but not NRB category learning.   
 
Finally, depression is related to lower than usual approach motivation (Henriques & 
Davidson, 2000; Kasch, Rottenberg, Arnow, & Gotlib, 2002), or dysregulation of 
approach motivation, and higher than usual avoidance motivation (Depue & Iacono, 
1989; Kasch et al., 2002). Similarly, bipolar disorder has also been connected with 
approach motivation dysregulation (Alloy & Abramson, 2010). Therefore it is possible 
that either approach or avoidance motivation (or both) could be related to RB category 
learning performance. 
 
In the present research participants consisted of undergraduate students who reported a 
range of depressive symptoms but were not necessarily clinically depressed. The issue of 
whether even high levels of depressive symptoms reported by students is comparable to 
ratings of depression in clinically depressed patients is contentious, with some arguing 
that the two are qualitatively different (Gotlib, 1984), and others arguing that they are 
analogous (Vredenburg et al., 1993). Gotlib (1984) administered the BDI to 475 
university students, along with other measures of depression, measures of dysfunctional 
attitudes, hostility, maladaptive attitudes, anxiety, distress, and assertiveness. There were 
moderate to high positive intercorrelations between the BDI and all of the other 
measures, with the exception of assertiveness (which was negatively correlated with BDI 
scores). Students who scored highly on one measure tended to score high on the others. 
Given these results Gotlib (1984) argued that the BDI might be measuring general 
50 
 
psychological distress, and not depression specifically. Despite this issue it is of interest 
to understand how non-clinical depressive symptoms relate to category learning 
performance and to cognitive processing more generally.  
  
In the first study I used two RB category learning tasks, one that is similar to the stimuli 
used by Smith et al. (1993) in that it is relatively easy to learn using a perfect verbal rule, 
and a second, more complex rule-based category learning task that requires the use of a 
disjunctive verbal rule. This allowed for a fuller test of the hypothesis that there is a 
negative relationship between depressive symptoms and rule-based category learning 
performance. I also used a NRB category set that is similar to the one used by Smith et al. 
(1993) to investigate whether there is any relationship between NRB learning and 
depressive symptoms.  
In the second study I again tested the hypothesis that depressive symptoms are negatively 
related to RB category learning, but I also included a measure of positive and negative 
mood to assess whether current positive or negative mood is related to performance, and 
if so, what is the nature of the relationship for RB and NRB categories. The RB category 
set that I used has previously been reported to benefit from enhanced cognitive flexibility, 
while the NRB category set has been reported not to benefit from cognitive flexibility 
(Maddox, Baldwin, & Markman, 2006). In both studies I measured related constructs to 
explore possible relationships that have not previously been predicted or investigated in 
the COVIS theory of category learning. 
2.4 Study 1 
Study 1 was designed to investigate the relationship between self-reported depressive 
symptoms and RB and NRB category learning. Previous research suggests that 
performance on a RB category-learning task, but not a NRB task should be negatively 
related to depressive symptoms (Smith et al., 1993). In this research I compared learning 
on two RB category sets, one that can be learned via a single-dimensional verbal rule, 
and one that requires a complex disjunctive verbal rule for perfect performance. I also 
employed a NRB category set that is relatively complex but can be learned well without a 
verbal rule. In addition to current level of depressive symptoms, I also measured history 
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of depressive symptoms, proneness to worry, current hypomanic symptoms, history of 
hypomanic symptoms, and approach and avoidance motivational strength. To the best of 
my knowledge these constructs have not been previously studied in the context of 
category learning. I included several distinct but related measures because I wanted to 
know whether depressive symptoms specifically related to category learning performance 
given that prior research has found strong and positive intercorrelations between 
depression measures and other mood measures (Gotlib, 1984).  
 
I predicted that current depressive symptoms would be negatively related to complex RB 
category learning but not NRB learning, or simple RB category learning. This is in 
contrast to one of the findings of Smith et al. (1993), who in one study reported that 
performance on a simple RB category learning task was related to higher than average 
depressive symptoms, however it is in line with the results of a second study that found 
simple RB performance was related only to severe (and not moderate) levels of 
depressive symptoms. I predicted that simple RB category learning performance would 
not be related to depressive symptoms because the rule is so easy to find. There are three 
dimensions in this set (shape, colour, and size), meaning that participants have a 1 in 3 
chance of identifying and using the optimal verbal rule on the first trial. Thus while this 
category set requires participants to find and apply a verbalizable rule, this rule is easy to 
find and does not tap cognitive flexibility to the extent that the complex RB category set 
does. In contrast because the optimal verbal rule for the complex RB set is disjunctive, 
this taps cognitive flexibility and thus depressive symptoms should be negatively related 
to complex RB performance.  
 
I predicted that history of depressive symptoms, proneness to worry, hypomanic 
symptoms (past and present), and avoidance motivation might also be negatively related 
to complex RB category learning performance. My predictions about approach 
motivation were less clear, because it’s possible that people who are sensitive to rewards 
will be more engaged during category learning than people lower in behavioral 
activation. However because an overactive reward system has been linked to hypomanic 
symptoms (and bipolar disorder), it is possible that this relationship could be negative 
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(Alloy & Abramson, 2010). 
2.4.1 Method 
2.4.1.1 Sample and design 
Subjects included 90 university undergraduates (68 females, 22 males) from the 
University of Western Ontario who participated either for $10 pay or for one hour’s 
worth of course credit. Subjects were randomly assigned to each of the three category 
learning tasks. 
2.4.1.2 Materials 
2.4.1.2.1 Questionnaires 
The Beck Depression Inventory. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, 
& Brown, 1996) is designed to assess the severity of depressive symptoms in both 
psychiatric and normal populations. It consists of 21 groups of statements that assess the 
features of depression (e.g. sadness, loss of pleasure, changes in sleep, etc.). BDI-II 
statements are rated from 0-3, with higher scores indicating increasing severity of 
symptoms (Beck et al., 1996). Participants are asked to consider their symptoms in the 
past two weeks when responding. The BDI-II has a high level of internal consistency 
(Beck et al., 1996; Whisman, Perez, & Ramel, 2000), as well as good convergent and 
discriminant validity in college student populations (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998; 
Steer & Clark, 1997; Whisman, Perez, & Ramel, 2000). 
 
The General Behavior Inventory. The General Behaviour Inventory (GBI; Depue, 
1987) is a 73-item measure of bipolar and unipolar mood symptoms that was originally 
developed to assess minor forms of mood disorders as well as major depressive disorder 
and major bipolar disorder. The GBI has been used to identify adolescents and adults at 
risk of developing major depression or bipolar disorder (Akiskal, Khani, & Scott-Strauss, 
1979; Reichart et al., 2005). The GBI contains a 46-item depression scale (GBI-D) as 
well as a 28-item hypomania scale (GBI-H). Hypomania is associated with bipolar 
disorder and is characterized by persistent euphoric or irritable mood states (DSM-IV; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Responses are made on a 4-point scale ranging 
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from 1 (“Never or Hardly ever”) to 4 (“Very often or Almost constantly”). Participants 
are asked to rate how frequently they have experienced a behavior since they first noticed 
it across their lifetime. Many of the questions specify a minimum time range such as 
“several days or more”. An example question from the GBI-D scale is “Have there been 
times of several days or more when you were so sad that it was quite painful or you felt 
that you couldn’t stand it?” An example question from the GBI-H scale is “Have you had 
periods of extreme happiness and intense energy (clearly more than your usual self) 
when, for several days or more, it took you over an hour to get to sleep at night?” 
 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire. The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) is 
a 16-item questionnaire that assesses the frequency and intensity of proneness to worry 
(Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). Example items are “I find it easy to dismiss 
worrisome thoughts.” and “”I know I should not worry about things, but I just cannot 
help it”. Responses are made on a 5-item scale from 1 (“Not at all typical of me”) to 5 
(“Very typical of me”). This measure has good construct validity and internal consistency 
(Meyer et al., 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994).  
 
BIS/BAS scale. Carver and White’s (1994) Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral 
Activation System (BIS/BAS) scales were designed to assess Gray’s (1990) regulatory 
approach and avoidance systems in individuals. This is a 24-item measure and items are 
rated from 1 (“very true for me”) to 4 (“very false for me”). There are four subscales in 
this questionnaire, three that are BAS-related, and one that is BIS-related.  
 
The Behavioral Approach System (BAS) is sensitive to cues signaling reward and non-
punishment. The BAS governs movement towards desired end states. This system has 
been argued to underlie positive affective states, including happiness and elation (Gray, 
1990). Someone with a high BAS sensitivity should experience a strong pull to engage in 
goal-directed behavior and a strong reaction to impending incentives. Research has also 
connected an underactive BAS system with an increased risk of depression (Fowles, 
1988). BAS sensitivity has also been found to relate to depression (Campbell-Sills, 
Liverant, & Brown, 2004; Kasch et al., 2002; McFarland, Shankman, Tenke, Bruder, & 
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Klein, 2006) as well as bipolar disorder (Meyer, Johnson, & Carver, 1999). The three 
BAS-related subscales focus on distinct aspects of sensitivity to rewards, they are: BAS 
Drive (4 items), BAS Fun Seeking (4 items), the BAS Reward Responsiveness (5 items). 
An example BAS Drive subscale item is “I go out of my way to get things I want”. An 
example BAS Fun Seeking item is “I crave excitement and new sensations”. An example 
BAS Reward Responsiveness item is “When I see an opportunity for something I like I 
get excited right away”. The BAS subscales are often summed and used as an overall 
indicator of BAS sensitivity (Hayden et al., 2008; McFarland et al., 2006).  
 
The Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) is activated in response to environmental cues 
signaling punishment, novelty, and non-reward, and inhibits behavior that could lead to 
aversive outcomes. This system has also been argued to underlie other negative affective 
feelings including fear, sadness, and anxiety (Gray, 1990). High levels of BIS have been 
connected to higher self-reports of depression symptoms (Hayden et al., 2008). The BIS 
subscale (7 items) includes items such as “If I think something unpleasant is going to 
happen, I usually get pretty ‘worked up.’” and “Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a 
bit.”  
Hypomanic Personality Scale. The Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS, Eckblad & 
Chapman, 1986) is a 48-item true/false measure that assesses features of hypomanic 
personality (e.g., elevated sociability, mood, energy, and perceived uniqueness).  High 
scores on this measure are associated with increased rates of bipolar disorders and 
depressive episodes (Kwapil, Miller, Zinser, Chapman, Chapman & Eckblad, 2000). 
Example questions from the HPS are “Sometimes ideas and insights come to me so fast I 
cannot express them all” and “I frequently get into moods where I feel very speeded-up 
and irritable”.  
2.4.1.2.2 Category learning tasks 
Three category learning tasks were chosen from the original set of six created by 
Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961). In each category set there are three features 
(shape, size, and color) that can have one of two dimensions (square or triangle, large or 
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small, orange or blue), as shown in Figure 2.1. In each category set there are eight 
stimuli, and four belong in each of two separate categories.  
Easy rule-based. In the first category learning task, easy rule-based/Type I4 (ERB), only 
one feature is used to indicate category membership, and subjects can achieve perfect 
performance using a single-dimensional verbal rule. The rule that would result in perfect 
performance in Figure 2.1 is “Orange shapes belong in Category A, blue shapes belong in 
Category B” because the feature used to indicate category membership is color. Out of 
the original six category sets, this first type is the easiest to learn and results in the highest 
performance (Nosofsky, Gluck, Palmeri, McKinley & Glauthier, 1994; Shepard et al., 
1961).  
Hard rule-based. In the second category learning task, hard rule-based/Type II (HRB), 
two features are used to indicate category membership, and subjects can achieve perfect 
performance using a disjunctive verbal rule. The verbal rule that would result in perfect 
performance in Figure 2.1 would be “Blue triangles and orange squares belong in 
Category A, orange triangles and blue squares belong in Category B”. Thus neither color 
nor shape are individually helpful in assigning category membership, but the combination 
of color and shape is. This category set is the second easiest to learn out of the six 
category sets (Nosofsky et al., 1994; Shepard et al., 1961).  
Non-rule-based. In the third category learning task, non-rule-based/Type IV (NRB), all 
three features are used to indicate category membership and this task is thought to be 
learned primarily via family resemblance. This means that the members of Category A 
have features in common with one another, for instance in Figure 2.1 they are mostly 
large, and mostly orange, and mostly triangles, whereas Category B members are mostly 
small, mostly blue, and mostly square. However the NRB task can also be thought of as a 
rule-plus-exception category learning task. For instance, in Figure 2.1 another possible 
method of achieving perfect performance is to memorize the exceptional outlying stimuli 
                                                 
4 Shepard et al. (1961) created six category sets and ordered them according to difficulty (e.g. Type I, Type 
II…Type VI), although some category structures were equivalent in difficulty (Type III, IV, and V).  
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(in Figure 2.1 this is the large blue triangle and the small orange square). The verbal rule 
would be “Large shapes (except the blue square), plus the small orange triangle belong in 
Category A, and small shapes (except the orange triangle), plus the large blue square, 
belong in Category B”. This category set is the third hardest to learn of the six sets, and is 
equivalent in difficulty to Types III and V (Nosofsky et al., 1994; Shepard et al., 1961). 
 
Figure 2.1. Category learning tasks from Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961): easy 
rule-based (Panel A), hard rule-based (Panel B), non-rule-based (Panel C).  
2.4.1.3 Procedure 
Subjects were tested in groups of up to four in the Categorization Lab at the University of 
Western Ontario. Upon agreeing to participate, subjects completed the mood 
questionnaires using paper and pencil. Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of 
the three category learning conditions (ERB, HRB, and NRB) and completed 80 trials 
(ten repeating blocks of eight stimuli) of the task on a computer.  
Subjects were told that they would be presented with abstract shapes and asked to classify 
them as either belonging to the forest (category A) or the mountains (category B). 
Subjects saw each stimulus one-at-a-time on a computer screen and were instructed to 
ERB/Type I    HRB/Type II    NRB/Type IVa       b      c
57 
 
press the “0” or the “1” key to indicate whether the shape belonged in the forest or the 
mountains respectively. After responding, subjects were given corrective feedback: the 
shape would smile and move towards the correct location on the screen to indicate a 
correct response, or the shape would frown and move towards the incorrect location and 
then smile and move to the correct location to indicate an incorrect response. Another 
trial began following this feedback.  Stimuli were presented in a random order within 
each block of eight stimuli and blocks were presented in an unbroken fashion. Figure 2.2 
shows an example instance of the order of events for a correct response and the order of 
events for an incorrect response. 
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Figure 2.2. Sample screens of a correct trial and an incorrect trial on the categorization 
learning tasks. On correct trials the neutral face of the stimulus smiles and moves to the 
chosen (correct) location. On incorrect trials the neutral face is transformed into a frown, 
moves to the chosen (incorrect) location, then smiles and moves to the correct location to 
indicate the correct answer. 
2.4.2 Results 
2.4.2.1 Category learning performance  
Subjects performed ten blocks (80 trials) of one of the three category sets. The averaged 
performance of subjects who learned the ERB category set was M = .86, SD = .17. The 
averaged performance of subjects who learned the HRB category set was M = .68, SD = 
.16. The averaged performance of subjects who learned the NRB category set was M = 
Correct trial
Incorrect trial
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.68, SD = .14. The learning curve of all three category types across all ten blocks of 
learning is shown in Figure 2.3. This learning curve is similar to the one originally 
reported by Shepard et al. (1961), and repeated more recently (Nosofsky et al., 1994), 
with the ERB category set having the highest performance, followed by the HRB 
category set, and the NRB category set. An analysis of variance revealed a statistically 
significant effect of condition, F(2,90) = 17.02, p < .001, !2 = .28. Tukey HSD post hoc 
tests revealed that performance on the ERB category learning task was significantly 
higher than on the HRB or NRB tasks (p’s < .001). However performance between the 
HRB and NRB conditions did not differ, p = .98.5  
                                                 
5 Final block performance was also analyzed, and again an analysis of variance between the three 
conditions was significant, F(2,90) = 7.77, p < .01, !2  = .15 A Tukey post hoc test revealed that ERB final 
block performance was significantly higher than the HRB (p = .04) and NRB (p = .001) category sets.  
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Figure 2.3. Proportion correct across all ten learning blocks for the easy rule-based 
(ERB), hard rule-based (HRB), and non-rule-based (NRB) category sets. 
2.4.2.2 Questionnaire reliability and descriptives  
The BDI-II, GBI-D, and GBI-H questionnaires all showed good levels of reliability, ($’s 
= .89, .97, and .92) respectively. The PSWQ showed good reliability as well, ($ = .75). 
Finally the BIS/BAS subscales and BAS total showed good reliability levels, ($’s = .74 - 
.86), with the exception of BAS Fun Seeking, ($ =.62). Table 2.1 shows the means and 
standard deviations of all of the questionnaires, by category learning condition as well as 
across conditions. 
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Table 2.1. Means (and standard deviations) of measures of self-reported mood 
questionnaires across and within groups. 
Questionnaire/Measure ERB HRB NRB Overall 
BDI - II 12.00 (8.43) 9.56 (6.13) 10.13 (8.18) 10.44 (7.57) 
GBI- Depression 81.43 (22.15) 86.40 (26.52) 85.20 (26.80) 84.34 (25.05)  
GBI- Hypomania  48.92 (11.09) 54.72 (13.56) 50.50 (15.61) 51.38 (13.62) 
HPS 24.90 (4.76) 25.13 (6.07) 21.67 (4.78) 23.90 (5.42) 
PSWQ 51.20 (13.25) 50.37 (14.47) 55.83 (11.95) 52.47 (13.33) 
BIS 21.17 (3.51) 21.27 (4.88) 20.13 (5.06) 20.86  (4.52) 
BAS Total 41.50 (3.18) 39.17 (7.72) 38.97 (7.16) 39.88 (6.38) 
Notes: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II, GBI = General Behavior Inventory, HPS = 
Hypomanic Personality Scale, PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire, BIS = Behavioral 
Inhibition Scale, BAS = Behavioral Activation Scale. ERB = easy rule-based, HRB = hard 
rule-based, NRB = non-rule-based. 
2.4.2.3 Correlation and Regression Results  
To determine whether there were significant relationships between performance on the 
category learning tasks and any of the questionnaires, Pearson product moment 
correlations (all two-tailed) were performed between subjects’ averaged performance 
across all ten blocks of responding for each of the three category learning tasks and the 
BDI-II, GBI-D, GBI-H, HPS, PSWQ, BIS, and BAS Total scores. The BAS Total score 
is presented instead of the three BAS subscales because the subscales were moderately to 
highly intercorrelated (rs between .351 and .687) for all subscales and category learning 
tasks except one correlation in the ERB category learning task, and I was interested in 
general BAS sensitivity and not specific constructs measured by the BAS subscales. Due 
to experimenter error there was no BDI questionnaire data for nine subjects in the ERB 
condition and three subjects in the HRB condition. To correct the family-wise error rate, 
a stricter level of significance was adopted using a Bonferroni correction (.05/7 = p < 
.007). All correlations reported or flagged as significant meet this stricter criterion. 
As predicted, the BDI-II correlated significantly and positively with several of the other 
questionnaires (all questionnaire intercorrelations can be seen in Appendix E). Given the 
pattern of intercorrelations between questionnaires, I wanted to know whether these 
variables contributed a significant proportion of variance to performance on the category 
learning tasks that was not shared with the other variables. I conducted a multiple linear 
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regression on each of the category learning tasks with overall performance as the 
dependent variables and the questionnaire scores (BDI-II, GBI-D, HPS, GBI-H, PSWQ, 
BAS Total, BIS) as the predictor variables. All of the predictor variables were entered at 
the same time, and I centred all of the variables to insure against multicollinearity.  
Zero-order correlation results are presented and discussed first, followed by the multiple 
regression results. 
2.4.3 ERB Results 
There were no significant correlations between any of the mood questionnaires and 
overall performance on the ERB category set (all p’s > .007), as can be seen in Table 2.2. 
Scatterplots of all ERB and questionnaire correlations can be found in Appendix F. 
Table 2.2. Pearson product moment correlations between category learning task 
performance and all study 1 questionnaires. 
Questionnaire/Measure ERB 
Beck Depression Inventory Total .087 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire Total .045 
General Behavior Inventory - Depression -.126 
General Behavior Inventory - Hypomania -.120 
Hypomanic Personality Scale -.259 
BIS .108 
BAS Total .179 
Notes: ERB = easy rule-based, BAS = Behavioral 
Approach Scale; BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale.  
The multiple regression between the questionnaires and overall ERB performance did not 
reach significance, (R2= .171, adjusted R2 = - .275, F(7, 20) = 0.38, p = .90). 
2.4.4 HRB Results 
There were two significant zero-order correlations between the questionnaires and HRB 
performance, as shown in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.3. Pearson product moment correlations between category learning task 
performance and all study 1 questionnaires. 
Questionnaire/Measure HRB 
Beck Depression Inventory Total -.541** 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire Total .036 
General Behavior Inventory - Depression -.188 
General Behavior Inventory - Hypomania -.488** 
Hypomanic Personality Scale -.168 
BIS -.103 
BAS Total -.401 
Notes: HRB = hard rule-based, BAS = Behavioral 
Approach Scale, BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale.  
** p < .007 
There was a significant negative correlation between HRB performance and BDI-II score 
r(27) = -.541, p < .007. Figure 2.4 shows this relationship (Panel A), along with the ERB 
(Panel B) and NRB (Panel C) relationships.  
There was no significant correlation between HRB performance and the GBI-D scale, 
r(30) = -.188, p = .32. There was a significant negative correlation between HRB 
performance and the GBI-H scale, r(30) = -.488, p < .007, as shown in Figure 2.5, a 
subject with a GBI-H score of 94 and overall proportion correct of .48 appears to be 
exceptional and possibly driving the association. When this subject was removed from 
the analysis the strength of the relationship was reduced beyond the corrected 
significance level, r(29) = -.433, p = .02. Therefore this relationship should be interpreted 
with caution. There was no significant relationship between HRB performance and the 
HPS, r(30) = -.168, p = .38. 
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Figure 2.4. Correlations between overall performance and total Beck Depression 
Inventory Scores by category learning task: Hard rule-based (Panel A), Easy rule-based 
(Panel B), and Non-rule-based (Panel C).  
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Figure 2.5. Correlations between overall category learning performance and General 
Behavior Inventory Hypomania Scale score for the hard rule-based category set. 
There was no significant relationship between overall HRB performance and the PSWQ, 
r(30) = .036, p = .85.There was no significant relationship between overall HRB 
performance and the BAS Total score, r(30) = -.401, p = .03, or between HRB overall 
performance and the BIS scale, r(30) = -.103, p = .59.  
Scatterplots of all HRB and questionnaire correlations can be found in Appendix G. 
The multiple regression between the questionnaires and overall HRB performance 
reached significance, meaning that the linear combination of the seven questionnaires 
was significantly related to overall performance, (R2= .701, adjusted R2 = .591, F(7, 26) = 
6.38, p = .001).  
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The BDI-II (% = -.02, t = -4.689, p < .001) the PSWQ (% = .01, t = 3.04, p < .01), and the 
GBI-H (% = -.005, t = - 2.11, p < .05) questionnaires significantly predicted HRB overall 
performance.  
Table 2.4 shows the zero-order, part, and partial correlations of overall HRB performance 
with the questionnaires included in the regression. The partial correlations reflect the 
correlation between the predictor and criterion variables when the variation that can be 
attributed to any other predictor variable is removed (controlled for) from both the 
predictor and criterion. The part correlations reflect the degree of relationship between 
the predictor and criterion variables when the variation that can be attributed to another 
predictor is removed from the predictor variable but not the criterion variable. Here I 
interpret the part correlations because they can be compared to one another (because the 
criterion variable is not residualized), and because their squared value represents the 
proportion of variance from the criterion variable that is uniquely associated with the 
predictor variable (Cohen & Cohen, 1975).  
Table 2.4. Zero-order, partial, and part correlations between HRB performance and study 
1 questionnaires.  
Questionnaire/Measure Zero-order Partial Part 
Beck Depression Inventory Total -.541** -.732 -.588* 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire Total .036 .572 .381* 
General Behavior Inventory - Depression -.188 .339 .197 
General Behavior Inventory - Hypomania -.488** -.436 -.265* 
Hypomanic Personality Scale -.168 .012 .006 
BIS -.103 .085 .047 
BAS Total -.401 -.303 -.174 
Notes: ** p < .007, * p < .05 in regression analysis. BAS = Behavioral Activation 
Scale; BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale. 
The correlation between overall performance and the BDI-II remained significant when 
the variability from the other questionnaires was removed, r(27) = -.588, as did the 
correlation between GBI-H and overall performance, r(30) = -.265. An unexpected result 
is that the correlation the PSWQ and overall performance reached significance, r(30) = 
.381, and this relationship is positive. When the squared partial correlations were 
computed it was revealed that the BDI-II accounted for 35%, the PSWQ accounted for 
15%, and the GBI-H accounted for 7% of the variance in overall HRB performance.  
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2.4.5 NRB Results 
NRB/Type IV. There were no significant correlations between overall NRB performance 
and any of the questionnaires, as shown in Table 2.4. Scatterplots of all NRB and 
questionnaire correlations can be found in Appendix H. 
Table 2.5. Pearson correlations between non-rule-based category learning performance 
and all study 1 questionnaires. 
Questionnaire/Measure NRB 
Beck Depression Inventory Total -.124 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire Total -.294 
General Behavior Inventory - Depression -.418 
General Behavior Inventory - Hypomania -.315 
Hypomanic Personality Scale .166 
BIS -.027 
BAS Total .141 
Notes: NRB = Non-rule-based; BAS = Behavioral 
Activation Scale; BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale. 
The multiple regression for overall NRB category learning performance did not reach 
significance, (R2= .282, adjusted R2 = .054, F(7, 29) = 1.24, p = .33). 
2.4.6 Comparing correlations between learning tasks 
In order to determine whether the Pearson’s correlations between overall performance 
and each of the questionnaires/measured differed significantly from one another, tests of 
difference between independent correlation coefficients were conducted between all three 
conditions using freely available software (Preacher, 2002). Complete sets of 
comparisons can be seen in Appendix I.  
When the ERB and HRB conditions were compared, the BDI-II, and BAS Total 
correlations were significantly different (z = -2.22, p < .05, z = -2.23, p < .05; both two-
tailed) respectively. When the HRB and NRB conditions were compared only the BAS 
Total correlations differed significantly (z = -2.08, p < .05, two-tailed). The difference on 
the BDI-II was significant in the expected direction (z = -1.71, p < .05, one-tailed). There 
were no significant differences between the ERB and NRB conditions.  
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2.4.7 Discussion 
The current study examined the relationship between several different depression and 
mood-related questionnaires, and performance on three different types of category 
learning tasks: an easy rule-based task (ERB), a complex rule-based task (HRB), and a 
non-rule-based task (NRB).  
The primary relationship of interest was between self-reported current depressive 
symptoms (as assessed by the BDI-II), and performance on the category learning tasks. I 
predicted that there would be a significant negative relationship between BDI-II score 
and HRB performance, but no significant relationships between BDI-II score and ERB or 
NRB performance, and this hypothesis was confirmed when zero-order correlations were 
computed as well as when a multiple regression was conducted. I also collected 
participants’ ratings of their history of depressive symptoms, and found that this was not 
significantly related to ERB, HRB, or NRB category learning. When the BDI-II 
correlations were compared between the conditions, there was a significant difference 
between the ERB and HRB category learning tasks, but the difference between per the 
HRB and NRB tasks was only significant with a one-tailed test.  
Previous work by Smith et al. (1993) showed that subjects with higher ratings of 
depressive symptoms were impaired on RB category learning but unimpaired on NRB 
category learning. The present work replicates and extends those experiments with an 
updated measure of depressive symptoms (the BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996), and with a 
wider variety of category learning tasks. The RB tasks used by Smith et al. (1993) were 
equivalent in complexity to the ERB category set, and yet I did not find a significant 
negative relationship between task performance and depression score, while Smith et al.’s 
(1993) sample of university students with higher than average depressive symptom scores 
were impaired on this easy task relative to students with lower than average depressive 
symptom scores. One possibility is that the verbal nature of the stimuli used by Smith et 
al. (e.g. nonwords) increased the complexity of the task for participants. In a second study 
Smith et al. (1993) reported that only subjects classified as severely depressed were 
impaired on the criterial attribute (rule-based) category set, subjects classified as low and 
moderately depressed using BDI cut-offs were not. The HRB set used in the current 
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experiment resulted in a negative relationship between performance and current 
depressive symptoms, and this is in line with the Smith et al. (1993) results, and extends 
the results with a more complex category set. 
In addition to current depressive symptoms, I administered several related questionnaires. 
I predicted that current hypomanic symptoms might also be negatively related to 
performance on the HRB category set. I did not find this, or any other relationship 
between current hypomanic symptoms and category learning performance. This could be 
due to the fact that subjects in the current sample did not have a wide range of scores on 
this scale. However lifetime history of hypomanic symptoms was negatively related to 
overall HRB performance. This result was found in the zero-order correlations as well as 
the multiple regression analysis, and is in line with the hypothesis that hypomania could 
be related to executive function impairments (Malhi, Ivanovski, Hadzi-Pavlovic, 
Mitchell, Vieta, & Sachdev, 2007). However the differences between the correlation 
coefficients did not reach significance.  
I hypothesized that if worry takes up space in working memory (as argued by Rapee, 
1993) then higher levels of worry should impair complex rule-based (e.g. HRB) category 
learning. However proneness to worry was not related significantly to any of the category 
learning tasks when the zero-order correlation was inspected, however the results of the 
multiple regression indicated that proneness to worry was significantly and positively 
related to HRB performance. This unexpected result is difficult to interpret. It is possible 
that a harder to learn, rule-based category set would result in a significant negative 
relationship, and that on the current HRB set proneness to worry served to motivate 
participants to perform as well as possible.  
The current study and choice of the BDI-II was motivated by prior work (e.g. Smith et 
al., 1993). It is possible that current self-reported depressive symptoms may be related to 
cognitive resources used in RB category learning in a way that other related constructs 
are not, a possibility that is strengthened by the results of the multiple regression analysis.  
I predicted that there would be no relationship between performance on the NRB task and 
self-reported current depressive symptoms because the cognitive processes involved in 
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NRB learning are not mediated by the frontal brain regions affected by depression. In line 
with this hypothesis, no significant relationships between NRB category learning and any 
of the questionnaires were found in both zero-order correlations and regression analyses.  
Limitations of this study are that the NRB task could also be learned with a complex 
verbal rule as described earlier, and the relatively small number of learning trials (80) 
might not have been sufficient to allow participants to develop a nonverbal learning 
strategy. Thus in Experiment 2 I use a NRB category set that can only be learned well via 
nonverbal processes, and I utilize a greater number of learning trials than in Study 1. 
2.5 Study 2 
Study 1 demonstrated that current level of self-reported depression, and self-reported 
history of hypomanic symptoms were negatively related to performance on a complex 
RB task, but not performance on a simple RB task. In contrast on a difficult category 
learning task that could be learned via verbal or nonverbal processes none of the 
questionnaire scores were significantly related to or significantly predicted overall 
performance. Study 2 was designed to extend and generalize these results with a different 
complex RB category set and a second category set that can only be learned well via 
nonverbal processes. A longer learning period was used to look at potential differences 
between early and late learning stages in addition to overall performance.  
A measure of positive and negative mood was added to look at the relationship between 
current mood state and category learning performance. The use of the BDI in non-clinical 
student populations has been criticized and argued to not reflect major depression, but to 
reflect general distress or negative affectivity (Gotlib, 1984). In line with this argument, I 
found a pattern of strong positive intercorrelations between the majority of measures used 
in Study 1. However, the BDI-II accounted for the most variance in HRB performance. 
Adding a measure of current mood allows me to see the proportion of variance that is 
unique to BDI-II scores, in light of the current mood of participants. Watson et al. (1988) 
suggest that because depressive symptoms are affectively complex, it is helpful to include 
a measure of current mood that distinguishes between positive and negative mood states, 
as the BDI-II’s questions contain both positively and negatively valenced items. Further, 
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given the relationship between positive mood and cognitive flexibility (e.g. Isen, 
Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), it is possible that positive affect will be positively related 
to RB category learning performance. Positive affect is related to increased dopamine in 
frontal brain regions (Ashby et al., 1999; Depue & Collins, 1999). In contrast depression 
is associated with a pattern of left frontal hypoactivation (Henriques & Davidson, 1991), 
and possibly with reduced dopamine in frontal brain regions (Tye et al., 2012). Thus in 
Study 2 I again predicted that current depression symptoms would be negatively related 
to RB category learning performance, however it is unclear whether this relationship will 
remain significant in a regression with current mood included.  
The BDI-II and the mood measure, the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS: Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), are both straightforward measures of one’s 
current state. Given the strong relationship found in Study 1 between the BDI-II and 
complex RB category learning, I predict that I will find a similarly strong relationship for 
current positive mood state and complex RB performance. Prior research on negative 
mood is less straightforward, with some studies demonstrating that negative mood 
narrows attention (Gasper & Clore, 2002), and other studies reporting null effects (Isen et 
al., 1987). Therefore it is possible that current negative mood will be negatively related to 
rule-based task performance, but it is also possible that no significant relationship will be 
found. 
2.5.1 Method 
2.5.1.1 Sample and design 
Subjects included 82 adults (39 males, and 43 females) from the University of Western 
Ontario who participated for course credit. Average age was 18.89 years (SD = 1.10). 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two category sets (described below). 
2.5.1.2 Materials 
2.5.1.2.1 Questionnaires 
The majority of the questionnaires used in Study 1 were again used in Study 2: the Beck 
Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996), the General Behavior Inventory 
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(GBI; Depue, 1987), the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990), 
and the Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Approach System scale (BIS/BAS; 
Carver & White, 1994). The Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS; Eckblad & Chapman, 
1986), was not included in Study 2 due to the lack of significant relationships between 
HPS scores and category learning performance in Study 1, and to allow participants more 
time to complete the category learning tasks.   
Additionally, current mood was assessed using the Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988), a well-established measure of positive and 
negative mood consisting of ten positive and ten negative descriptors which are rated 
from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“extremely”). Participants are asked to rate how they feel “right 
now” in the “present moment” when responding. Responses to the positive (negative) 
descriptors are summed and averaged to create a positive (negative) affect scale. 
2.5.1.2.2 Category learning tasks 
Two category learning tasks were chosen: a) a complex, rule-based (RB) category 
learning task that could only be learned via a single-dimensional verbal rule, and b) a 
non-rule-based (NRB) category learning task that could only be learned well via a 
nonverbal rule.  
The category learning task stimuli consisted of sine-wave gratings that varied in spatial 
frequency and orientation. A total of 80 stimuli were generated for each category set (RB 
and NRB), with 40 stimuli in each category (Ashby & Gott, 1988; Zeithamova & 
Maddox, 2006). Stimuli were generated by randomly sampling 40 values from a 
multivariate normal distribution described by each category’s parameters. The PsychoPy 
package (Pierce, 2007) was used to generate sine wave gratings corresponding to each 
coordinate sampled from the distributions above. For both category learning tasks sine 
wave grating frequency was calculated as f = .25 + (xf/50) cycles per stimulus and 
orientation was calculated as o = xo x ("/20) degrees. The resulting category structures 
for the RB and NRB category sets are illustrated in Figure 2.6.  
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Figure 2.6. Rule-based (Panel A) and non-rule-based category (Panel B) category sets 
used in Study 2.  
The RB category learning task required learners to find a single-dimensional rule and to 
simultaneously inhibit responding to the other dimension. In order to correctly classify 
the stimuli in Figure 2.6, Panel A, the learner needed to base responding on the frequency 
dimension while ignoring the more salient orientation dimension. An example optimal 
verbal rule could be phrased as: “Respond A if the stimulus has three or more stripes, 
otherwise respond B”. The NRB category set in Figure 2.6, Panel B required learners to 
utilize both orientation and frequency, and there was no easily verbalizable rule that 
allowed for optimal performance.  
2.5.1.3 Procedure 
Subjects were tested in groups of up to 4 at a time, and each subject was seated at a carrel 
with a 15-inch iMac computer. Subjects completed the questionnaires on the computer 
and questionnaires were presented using SurveyMonkey. Following completion of the 
questionnaires subjects were randomly assigned to one of two category learning tasks 
(RB, NRB). Corrective feedback was given after each response on the category learning 
task. When responses were correct, participants saw the word “CORRECT” in green font 
before the next trial advanced. When a response was incorrect participants saw the word 
“INCORRECT” in red font. Participants had unlimited time in which to make responses. 
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All subjects completed four blocks of 80 trials (320 in total). The presentation order of 
the 80 stimuli was randomly generated on each block for each subject. After the 320 trials 
of the categorization task were completed participants were asked to complete a final 
survey unrelated to the present experiment and were then thanked for their participation 
and debriefed. 
2.5.2 Results 
2.5.2.1 Category learning task performance 
The averaged proportion correct across all 320 trials of subjects who learned the RB 
category set was M = .70, SD = .15. The averaged performance of subjects who learned 
the NRB category set was M = .60, SD = .10. Performance on the category learning tasks 
was significantly different, t(80) = 4.27, p < .001. The learning curve of the two category 
learning tasks across all four blocks of performance is shown in Figure 2.7.  
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant effect of block 
for the RB category learning task, F(3, 39) = 20.20, p < .001, !2 = .608, indicating that 
performance differed significantly across at least some learning blocks. Pair-wise 
comparisons showed that Block 1 (M = .62, SD = .13) performance was significantly 
lower than performance in Blocks 2 (M = .73, SD = .15), Block 3 (M = .73, SD = .15), 
and Block 4 (M =.71 , SD = .19),  p < .001. No other differences between blocks were 
significant (all p’s > .05). 
For the NRB category set, a repeated-measures ANOVA also found a significant effect of 
block, F(3, 37) = 2.96, p < .05, !2 = .193. Pair-wise comparisons showed that Block 1 (M 
= .57, SD = .07) differed significantly from Block 2 (M = .61, SD = .10), p < .05, and 3 
(M = .62, SD = .11), p < .01. However the difference between Block 1 and Block 4 (M = 
.61, SD = .12), did not reach significance, p = .058. No other differences between blocks 
reached significance (all p’s > .05). 
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Figure 2.7. Category learning proportion correct of rule-based and non-rule-based 
conditions by block.  
2.5.2.2 Questionnaire reliabilities and descriptives 
The means and standard deviations of the questionnaires are presented in Table 2.3. The 
reliability of the majority of questionnaires was good: Cronbach’s values between .73 and 
.95 for the BDI-II ($ = .90), the GBI-D ($ = .95), the GBI-H ($ = .91), BAS Drive ($ = 
.74), BAS Reward Responsiveness ($ = .73), BAS Fun Seeking ($ = .80), and BAS Total 
($ = .83), the PANAS Positive Scale ($ = .91), and the PANAS Negative Scale ($ = .92). 
The BIS scale however did not demonstrate good reliability ($ = .64). 
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Table 2.6. Means (and standard deviations) of all questionnaires total scores          
between and across conditions. 
Questionnaire Rule-based Non-rule-based Overall 
BDI-II 9.83 (6.56) 10.75 (9.52) 10.28 (8.10) 
PSWQ 47.41 (11.70) 46.72 (11.79) 47.08 (11.68) 
GBI-Depression 75.82 (16.96) 77.03 (21.90) 76.42 (19.47) 
GBI-Hypomania 48.13 (10.30) 47.23 (11.86) 47.68 (11.05) 
BAS Total 41.33 (4.86) 42.56 (4.78) 41.95 (4.83) 
BIS 20.67 (2.83) 20.53 (3.05) 20.60 (2.92) 
PANAS - Positive 2.52 (0.85) 2.73 (0.81) 2.62 (0.83) 
PANAS - Negative 1.63 (0.72) 1.68 (0.75) 1.65 (0.73) 
Notes: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II, PSWQ = Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire, GBI = General Behavior Inventory, BIS = 
Behavioral Inhibition Scale, BAS = Behavioral Activation Scale, 
PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule.  
2.5.2.3 Correlational and Regression Results 
BAS subscales (BAS Fun Seeking, BAS Drive, and BAS Reward Responsiveness) were 
combined into a BAS Total score for both category learning conditions due to significant 
moderate and positive intercorrelations between the subscales (r’s > .33), and because I 
was interested in overall BAS sensitivity, not specific BAS subscales. To correct the 
family-wise error rate, a more conservative p-value was used to determine significance 
using a Bonferroni correction (.05/8= p < .0063). All correlations reported or flagged as 
significant meet this stricter criterion. 
Although the BDI-II, PSWQ, and PANAS Positive scale questionnaires correlated 
significantly with overall performance on the RB category learning task, these 
questionnaires correlated significantly with several of the other questionnaires (all 
questionnaire intercorrelations can be seen in Appendix E). Given the pattern of 
intercorrelations between questionnaires, I wanted to know whether these variables 
contributed a significant proportion of variance to performance on the category learning 
task that was not shared with the other variables. Although I only found significant 
correlations between performance on the category learning task and the questionnaires on 
the RB category learning task, I conducted a multiple linear regression on both of the 
category learning tasks with Block 1 and overall performance as the dependent variables 
(in two separate regressions) and the questionnaire scores (BDI-II, GBI-D, GBI-H, 
PSWQ, BAS Total, BIS, PANAS Positive, PANAS Negative) as the predictor variables. 
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All of the predictor variables were entered at the same time, and I centred all of the 
variables to insure against multicollinearity.  
2.5.2.3.1 Rule-based correlations and regressions 
Table 2.7 shows the correlations between all measures and the RB category set.  
Depressive symptoms. As predicted, there was a significant correlation between subject 
scores on the BDI-II and overall RB category learning performance, r(42) = -.462, p < 
.002, shown in Figure 2.8, Panel B. This negative relationship between BDI total score 
and RB performance was present throughout performance, however it was strongest at 
the beginning of the learning task, r(42) = -.539, p < .001 (shown in Figure 2.8, Panel A), 
and not significant at any other learning block (r’s = .280 - .381). The correlation 
between performance on the RB category set and the GBI-D did not reach significance 
overall, r(39) = -.312, p = .053, or at any single learning block, although there was a trend 
in Block 1, r(39) = -.382, p < .02. 
Table 2.7. Correlations between performance on the rule-based category learning task 
and mood questionnaires.  
 Rule-based learning performance 
 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Overall 
BDI-II -.539* -.353 -.381 -.280 -.462* 
PSWQ -.424* -.312 -.200 .034 -.304 
GBI - Depression -.382 -.268 -.249 -.098 -.312 
GBI - Hypomania -.357 -.328 -.371 -.109 -.383 
BIS -.280 -.129 -.057 -.068 -.171 
BAS Total .055 -.044 -.013 -.053 -.007 
PANAS Positive Affect .454* .365 .310 .375 .397 
PANAS Negative Affect -.076 .007 -.009 .047 -.040 
Notes: * p < .0063. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II, PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire, GBI = General Behavior Inventory, BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale, 
BAS = Behavioral Activation Scale, PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule. 
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Figure 2.8. The relationships between: Block 1 rule-based category learning performance 
and current depressive symptoms (Panel A), and overall rule-based learning performance 
and current depressive symptoms (Panel B). 
Hypomania. There was no significant relationship between overall RB performance and 
the GBI-H, r(39) = -.383, p < .02. This relationship did not reach significance at any 
stage of learning (all r’s between -.109 and -.371). 
Worry. The correlation between RB overall performance and the PSWQ did not reach 
significance, r(41) = -.304, p = .05. However there was a significant relationship between 
the PSWQ and RB performance in Block 1, r(41) = -.424, p = .006, as shown in Figure 
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2.9. This relationship did not reach significance in any subsequent blocks (r’s = .034 - -
.312). 
 
Figure 2.9. Relationship between Block 1 rule-based category learning and proneness to 
worry.  
Mood. Current positive mood as measured by the PANAS Positive Scale correlated 
significantly and positively with performance on the RB category set in Block 1, r(39) = 
.454, p = .004, as shown in Figure 2.10, but not with overall performance, r(39) = .397, p 
= .01, or in Blocks 2-4 (r’s = .310 - .375).  In contrast negative mood did not correlate 
significantly with overall RB performance, r(39) = -.040, p = .81, or performance at any 
individual block (r’s = .007 - .076). 
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Figure 2.10. Relationship between Block 1 rule-based category learning and positive 
mood.  
Approach/avoidance motivation. There was no significant relationship between BIS 
and overall performance, r(39) = -.040, p = .81, or BAS Total and overall performance, 
r(39) = -.040, p = .81, or any significant relationships at any point in learning (all p’s > 
.006).  
All Block 1 and overall performance scatterplots for the RB category set can be found in 
Appendix J.  
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Block 1. The multiple regression between the questionnaires and Block 1 RB 
performance reached significance, meaning that the linear combination of the eight 
questionnaires was significantly related to performance, (R2= .501, adjusted R2 = .368, 
F(8, 38) = 3.76, p = .004). Only the PANAS positive mood subscale significantly 
predicted Block 1 RB performance, (% = -.01, t = 2.50, p < .05).  
Table 2.8 shows the zero-order, partial, and part correlations of Block 1 RB performance 
with the questionnaires included in the regression. When the variability from the other 
questionnaires was removed from performance only positive mood remained significant, 
r(39) = .322, p < .05, accounting for 10% of the variance in Block 1 RB performance. 
Notably, when the variability that could be attributed to other variables was removed 
from the BDI-II the relationship between the BDI-II and Block 1 RB performance was no 
longer significant, r(39) = -.143, p = .28. Similarly, when the variability that could be 
attributed to other variables was removed from the relationship between the PSWQ and 
Block 1 RB performance the relationship was no longer significant, r(39) = -.038, p = 
.77. 
Table 2.8. Zero-order, partial, and part correlations between rule-based Block 1 
performance and all questionnaires. 
 Rule-based block 1 performance 
 Zero-order Partial Part 
BDI-II -.539** -.199 -.143 
PSWQ -.424** -.054 -.038 
GBI - Depression -.382 .159 .114 
GBI- Hypomania -.357 -.320 -.238 
BIS -.280 -.158 -.113 
BAS Total .055 -.046 -.032 
PANAS Positive Affect .454** .415 .322* 
PANAS Negative Affect -.076 -.051 -.036 
Notes: ** p < .0063, * p < .05 in the regression equation. BDI-II = Beck 
Depression Inventory II, PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire, GBI = 
General Behavior Inventory, BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale, BAS = 
Behavioral Activation Scale, PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Schedule. 
When the regression analysis was repeated without the PANAS questionnaire subscales 
(positive and negative), the regression remained significant (R2= .382, adjusted R2= .266, 
F(6, 38) = 3.29, p = .012). The BDI-II (% = -.01, t = -2.36, p < .05), significantly 
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predicted RB Block 1 performance, accounting for 11% of the variance in performance. 
This result is in line with the main result from Study 1.  
Overall performance. The multiple regression between the questionnaires and overall 
RB performance also reached significance, meaning that the linear combination of the 
eight questionnaires was significantly related to overall performance, (R2= .471, adjusted 
R2 = .330, F(8, 38) = 3.34, p = .007).  
The GBI-H (% = -.01, t = -2.94, p < .01), and the PANAS positive subscale (% = .09, t = 
2.71, p < .05) questionnaires significantly predicted RB overall performance, accounting 
for 15% and 13% of the variance respectively.  
Table 2.9 shows the zero-order, part, and partial correlations of overall RB performance 
with the questionnaires included in the regression. Notably the correlation between 
overall RB performance and the BDI-II did not remain significant when the variability 
from the other questionnaires was removed, r(39) = -.121, p > .05.  
Table 2.9. Zero-order, partial, and part correlations between overall rule-based 
performance and all questionnaires. 
 Rule-based overall performance 
 Zero-order Partial Part 
BDI-II -.462** -.165 -.121 
PSWQ -.304 .026 -.019 
GBI – Depression -.312 .282 .214 
GBI- Hypomania -.383 -.473 -.390* 
BIS -.171 -.048 -.035 
BAS Total -.007 -.061 -.044 
PANAS Positive Affect .397 .444 .360* 
PANAS Negative Affect -.040 .039 .028 
Notes: ** p < .0063, * p < .05 in the regression equation. BDI-II = Beck 
Depression Inventory II, PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire, GBI = 
General Behavior Inventory, BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System, BAS = 
Behavioral Activation System, PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Schedule. 
When the regression analysis was repeated without the PANAS questionnaire subscales 
(positive and negative), the regression did not reach significance, (R2= .295, adjusted R2 = 
.162, F(6, 38) = 2.23, p = .07). 
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2.5.2.3.2 Non-rule-based correlations and regression 
As shown in Table 2.10, there were no significant correlations between overall NRB 
performance and any of the questionnaires (all p’s > .0063). Additionally when the four 
learning blocks were examined individually there were no significant correlations 
between NRB performance at any block and any of the questionnaires (all p’s > .0063). 
All Block 1 and overall performance scatterplots for the NRB category set can be found 
in Appendix K.  
Table 2.10. Correlations between performance on the non-rule-based category learning 
task and questionnaires. 
 Non-rule-based learning performance 
 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Overall 
BDI-II .025 -.186 .129 .014 -.001 
PSWQ -.096 -.284 -.020 -.081 -.142 
GBI – Depression -.024 -.255 -.066 -.093 -.138 
GBI- Hypomania .153 -.289 .007 -.090 -.083 
BIS .096 -.008 -.131 -.072 -.052 
BAS Total .184 -.122 .071 .012 .034 
PANAS Positive Affect .163 .209 .217 .185 .241 
PANAS Negative Affect -.060 -.088 .138 .150 .066 
Notes: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II, PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire, GBI = General Behavior Inventory, BIS = Behavioral Inhibition 
Scale, BAS = Behavioral Activation Scale, PANAS = Positive Affect Negative 
Affect Schedule. 
Although NRB performance was fairly low across the 320 trials (M = .60, SD = .10), the 
results do not indicate that the lack of significant correlations was due to an overall 
absence of learning. When participants were split into two groups based on overall 
performance (both N’s = 20) and the correlations between performance and the 
questionnaires were computed for these groups separately the pattern of results did not 
change. There were no significant correlations between NRB category learning and any 
of the questionnaires for either the high performance (M = .67, SD = .05) or low 
performance (M = .54, SD = .04) groups. Further, when the mean BDI score of high 
performing subjects (M = 11.10, SD =11.94) and low performing subjects (M = 10.75, SD 
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= 7.51) was compared, there was no significant difference between the groups, F(1, 39) = 
0.012, p = .91. 
NRB. The multiple regression between the questionnaires and NRB performance did not 
reach significance for either Block 1, (R2= .208, adjusted R2 = - .011, F(8, 37) = 0.01, p = 
.95), or overall performance, (R2= .168, adjusted R2 = - .062, F(8, 37) = 0.01, p = .73). 
2.5.3 Comparing correlations between conditions 
In order to determine whether the Pearson’s correlations between Block 1 and overall 
performance and each of the questionnaires/measured differed significantly from one 
another, tests of difference between independent correlation coefficients were conducted 
between the RB and NRB conditions using freely available software (Preacher, 2002). 
Complete sets of comparisons can be seen in Appendix L.  
When the Block 1 correlations between the RB and NRB conditions were compared, the 
BDI-II (z = -2.74, p = .006), GBI-H (z = -2.24, p < .05), and PANAS Positive (z = -2.62, 
p = .009) correlations were significantly different (all two-tailed). When overall 
performance correlations between the RB and NRB conditions were compared, only the 
BDI-II differed significantly (z = -2.17, p < .05, two-tailed). 
2.5.4 Discussion 
Study 2 extended the results of Study 1 by using a RB category learning task that has 
previously been found to benefit from cognitive flexibility, as well as a category set that 
can only be learned well via nonverbal processes, and has not been found to benefit from 
cognitive flexibility (Maddox et al., 2006). Due to the increased complexity of these 
category sets, and to allow for the examination of early versus late periods of learning, 
participants completed more trials than in Study 1. In addition to measuring current level 
of depressive symptoms and depressive symptom history and related constructs, I added a 
measure of current positive and negative mood.  
As in Study 1, there was a significant negative relationship between current level of self-
reported depressive symptoms and complex RB performance. This relationship was 
present in overall performance, and was strongest in the first block of learning (which is 
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equivalent to the overall performance of Study 1). As in Study 1 there were no significant 
relationships between history of depressive symptoms and RB category learning 
performance.  
Unlike Study 1 I found a significant negative relationship between proneness to worry 
and RB performance. Students who reported higher levels of worrying performed less 
well in the first block of learning. This difference in results could be due to the increased 
complexity of the current rule-based category set. Although the rule was single-
dimensional the current stimuli were more visually complex and may have placed 
increased demands on working memory.  
I found a strong and significant relationship between self-reported positive affect and RB 
category learning performance in early learning. There was no relationship between self-
reported negative affect and category learning.  
In addition to zero-order correlations, I also conducted a multiple linear regression in 
order to examine the influence of each of the questionnaires when the variability that was 
shared with other questionnaires was removed due to the strong and positive correlations 
between many of the questionnaires. The results revealed that although the BDI-II 
correlated strongly and negatively with RB performance, this correlation was reduced 
below significance in regressions examining the Block 1 and overall RB performance. 
Only positive mood significantly predicted Block 1 performance, and only positive mood 
and history of hypomanic symptoms significantly predicted overall performance.   
 
As in Study 1 there were no significant relationships between NRB performance and any 
of the questionnaire scores. This is in line with the idea that RB and NRB category 
learning are governed by distinct category learning systems (Ashby et al., 1998). 
2.6 General Discussion 
 The key findings from this series of studies are that a) self-reported depressive symptoms 
are negatively related to complex rule-based category learning performance, b) this 
relationship does not remain significant when the variance that can be attributed to 
positive mood is removed, and c) current self-reported positive mood is positively related 
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to complex rule-based category learning performance, and this relationship persists when 
the variance that can be attributed to other questionnaires/constructs is removed.  
Study 1 extends the results of Smith et al. (1993), showing that depressive symptoms (as 
assessed with a self report inventory) are negatively related to RB category learning.  
However Study 1 also assessed several related constructs, and found that history of 
hypomanic symptoms was also negatively related to RB performance, a finding that did 
not change when the variance that could be attributed to other measures was taken into 
consideration.  
In light of this pattern of results and the work of Smith et al. (1993), it would be tempting 
to conclude that depressive symptoms are negatively related to RB category learning 
performance, and that these results are in line with the idea that major depression is 
related to impaired executive functioning. However the pattern of intercorrelations 
between questionnaires and the results of Study 2 call this conclusion into question.  
Across both studies current depressive symptoms correlated positively with history of 
depressive symptoms, history of hypomanic symptoms, and proneness to worry. 
Interestingly, when a multiple linear regression was performed with positive mood 
included, the effects of depressive symptoms were reduced below significance, and only 
positive mood significantly predicted early RB learning. When positive mood was 
excluded from the regression, the results mirrored the results from Study 1, in that 
depressive symptoms significantly predicted RB performance. In light of the 
intercorrelations between these variables and the predictive power of current positive 
mood ratings it is hard to argue that the self-reports of depressive symptoms are 
measuring depression and not general psychological distress, as argued by Gotlib (1984). 
However Clark and Watson (1991) reported that the BDI seems to measure three 
components: a general distress component, a low positive mood component, and a 
general somatic complaints component. The finding that positive mood contributes more 
unique variance to RB category learning than depressive symptoms (that include a low 
positive mood component) suggests that in a general university population the BDI might 
be assessing (the lack of) positive mood. This is in line with the DSM-IV definition of 
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depression, which requires either elevated sad mood or a loss of pleasure/interest (e.g. 
anhedonia).  
Study 2 is the first study (to the best of my knowledge) to look at the potential 
relationship between mood and category learning performance. I found a significant 
positive relationship between positive mood and complex RB category learning in early 
learning. This finding is in line with prior research showing that positive mood increases 
cognitive flexibility (Ashby et al., 1999; Isen et al., 1987). The existence of a positive 
relationship between positive mood and RB learning, as well as the lack of any 
significant relationship between positive mood and NRB learning is in line with the 
hypothesis that positive affect is related to increased dopamine in frontal brain regions 
(e.g. Ashby et al., 1999). In contrast negative mood was not significantly related to either 
RB or NRB category learning performance.  
History of hypomanic symptoms significantly predicted complex RB performance in 
Study 1 and Study 2. Further research is needed to examine this potential relationship. As 
in depression, the mesolimbic dopamine circuit has been implicated in theories of bipolar 
disorder (Cousins, Butts, & Young, 2009), thus it might not be surprising that hypomania 
symptom history/future risk of bipolar disorder is negatively related to complex rule-
based category learning performance.  
Proneness to worry was assessed in both Study 1 and Study 2, with conflicting results. 
Study 1 found that proneness to worry was positively related to HRB category learning 
performance, while Study 2 found that proneness to worry was negatively related to early 
rule-based category learning performance. Further work is needed to clarify the nature of 
this relationship. 
Approach and avoidance motivation were assessed in both studies, and no significant 
results were found between category learning performance and either variable. The lack 
of relationship between avoidance motivation and category learning performance could 
be due to the fact that the category learning tasks were not particularly threatening. The 
relationship between approach motivation and HRB category learning performance 
approached significance in Study 1 but not Study 2. One speculation is that there was a 
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subtle activation of the approach system in Study 1 due to the use of smiling faces to 
inform subjects of correct responses.   
A key limitation to the generality of this work is the correlational nature of the studies. 
Although the correlations were theoretically motivated, and the results were compelling, 
strong conclusions cannot be drawn. Future research should examine the influence of 
manipulated mood on category learning. In order to address whether clinical depression 
is related to impaired RB category learning it will be necessary to use patients who have 
been identified as clinically depressed, something that my work nor the work of Smith et 
al. (1993) has done.  
So, is there an upside to feeling down? Based on the pattern of findings across the two 
studies, the short answer is “no”. Depressive symptoms were negatively related to 
complex, rule-based category learning performance, and negative mood ratings were 
unrelated to learning. Rather it seems that positive mood is related to improved complex 
learning. Current positive mood was positively related to complex rule-based category 
learning and when positive mood was included in a multiple regression with depressive 
symptoms, only positive mood significantly predicted performance.  
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Chapter 3  
3 Better mood and better performance: learning rule-
based categories is enhanced by a positive mood6 
3.1 Experiment  
A well-established finding is that mood interacts with cognitive processing (for a review, 
see Isen, 1999), with executive functioning implicated as a possible source of the effects 
of this interaction (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007). Positive mood leads to enhanced cognitive 
flexibility, whereas negative mood may reduce (or may not affect) cognitive flexibility 
(for a review, see Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999). Category learning has also been 
associated with cognitive flexibility7 (Ashby et al., 1999; Maddox, Baldwin, & Markman, 
2006), making category learning well suited to the study of the effects of mood on 
cognition. For example, Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, and Waldron (1998) predicted 
that depressed subjects should be impaired in learning rule-based (RB) category sets. 
Smith, Tracy, and Murray (1993) supported this prediction and also found that depressed 
subjects were not impaired when learning non-RB categories. However, the more general 
question of how induced positive and negative mood states influence category learning 
remains unanswered. We addressed this question by using two kinds of categories, one in 
which learning is thought to be enhanced by cognitive flexibility and one in which 
learning is not thought to be enhanced by cognitive flexibility (Maddox et al., 2006). 
Our starting point was the COmpetition between Verbal and Implicit Systems (COVIS) 
theory, which posits the existence of separate explicit/verbal and implicit/nonverbal 
category-learning systems (Ashby et al., 1998). The explicit/verbal system enables people 
to learn RB categories and is associated with the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the anterior 
                                                 
6 The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in Psychological Science, 21/12, 12/2010 by 
SAGE Publications Ltd./SAGE Publications, Inc., All rights reserved. © 2010. 
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/21/12/1770.full 
7 We define cognitive flexibility as the ability to seek out and apply alternate strategies to problems 
(Maddox, Baldwin, & Markman, 2006) and to find unusual relationships between items (Isen, Johnson, 
Mertz, & Robinson, 1985). 
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cingulate cortex (ACC). RB category learning uses hypothesis testing, rule selection, and 
inhibition to find and apply rules that can be verbalized, and it is influenced by cognitive 
flexibility. The implicit system enables people to learn non-RB categories, relies on 
connections between visual cortical areas and the basal ganglia, and is not affected by 
cognitive flexibility. This system is likely procedural in nature and dependent on a 
dopamine-mediated reward signal (Maddox, Ashby, Ing, & Pickering, 2004). RB and 
non-RB category sets have been dissociated behaviorally (for a review, see Maddox & 
Ashby, 2004) and neurobiologically (Nomura et al., 2007), making them appropriate for 
the study of mood effects. 
We argue that positive mood increases cognitive flexibility, and this effect enhances the 
explicit category-learning system mediated by the PFC (Ashby et al., 1999; Ashby & Ell, 
2001; Minda & Miles, 2010). We base our predictions on two lines of research. First, 
Ashby et al. (1999) hypothesized that positive affect is associated with enhanced 
cognitive flexibility as a result of increased dopamine in the frontal cortical areas of the 
brain. Second, the COVIS theory predicts that increased dopamine in the PFC and ACC 
should enhance learning on RB tasks, and reduced dopamine should impair learning on 
RB tasks (Ashby et al., 1998). Thus, positive mood should be associated with enhanced 
RB category learning, an important prediction that has not to our knowledge been tested 
directly. 
We induced a positive, neutral, or negative mood in subjects and presented them with one 
of two kinds of category sets that have been widely used in the category-learning 
literature (Ashby & Maddox, 2005). These sets consisted of sine-wave gratings (Gabor 
patches) that varied in spatial frequency and orientation. The RB set of Gabor patches 
required learners to find a single-dimensional rule in order to correctly classify the 
stimuli on the basis of frequency but not orientation, and the NRB set of Gabor patches 
required learners to assess both orientation and frequency. Subjects in the RB condition 
were able to formulate a verbal rule to ensure optimal performance, but subjects in the 
NRB condition were not able to form a rule that could be easily verbalized. 
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We predicted that subjects in a positive mood, compared with those in a neutral or 
negative mood, would perform better when learning RB categories. It was unclear 
whether a negative mood would impair RB learning relative to a neutral mood, as the 
effects of negative mood on cognitive processing are variable and difficult to predict (for 
a review, see Isen, 1990). Because the PFC and the ACC do not mediate the nonverbal 
system, we did not expect mood to affect NRB category learning. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Subjects 
Subjects were 87 university students (61 females and 26 males), who received $10.00 or 
1 hour of course credit for participation. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 
three mood-induction conditions and one of the two category sets. Six subjects who 
scored below 50% on the categorization task were excluded from data analysis. 
3.2.2 Materials 
We used a series of music clips and video clips from YouTube8 to establish affective 
states. We verified that these clips evoked the intended emotions by conducting a pilot 
study. After each viewing or listening, subjects in the pilot study (7 graduate students, 
who did not participate in the main experiment) rated how the clip made them feel on a 7-
point scale, which ranged from 1 (very sad) to 4 (neutral) to 7 (very happy). Table 3.1 
shows the complete list of clip selections and the average ratings by pilot subjects; it also 
denotes the clips selected for the main experiment. As a manipulation check during the 
main experiment, we queried subjects with the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS) after using the selected clips to induce moods. The PANAS assesses positive 
and negative affective dimensions (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
 
                                                 
8 The clips can be found by searching for their titles on YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/), or URLs can 
be obtained from the first author. 
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Table 3.1. Music and video clips used in the pilot study.  
Selection  Average 
subject rating 
Positive Music Mozart – “Eine Kleine Nachtmusik Allegro”* 6.57 
 Handel - “The Arrival of the Queen of Sheba” 5.00 
 Vivaldi - “Spring” 6.14 
Neutral Music Mark Salona - “One Angel’s Hands”* 3.86 
 Linkin Park - “In the End (Instrumental)” 4.14 
 Stephen Rhodes - “Voice of Compassion” 3.29 
Negative Music “Schindler’s List Soundtrack - Main Theme”* 2.00 
 “I Am Legend Movie Theme Song” 2.71 
 “Distant Everyday Memories” 2.57 
Positive Video “Laughing Baby”* 6.57 
 “Whose Line is it Anyway: Sound Effects” 6.43 
 “Where the Hell is Matt?” 6.00 
Neutral Video “Antiques Roadshow television show”* 4.14 
 “Facebook on 60 Minutes” 3.71 
 “Report on the importance of Sleep” 4.29 
Negative Video “Chinese Earthquake news report”* 1.43 
 “Madison’s story -- about child with cancer” 1.71 
 “Death scene from the film “The Champ”” 1.86 
Notes: Clips were taken from the Youtube Web site. Asterisks denote clips that were 
used in Experiment 1. 
The Gabor patches used in the main experiment were generated according to established 
methodologies (see Ashby & Gott, 1988; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006). For each 
category set (RB and NRB), we randomly sampled 80 values from a multivariate normal 
distribution described by that category’s parameters (shown in Table 3.2). The resulting 
structures for the RB and NRB category sets are illustrated in Figure 3.1.3 We used the 
PsychoPy software package (Pierce, 2007) to generate a Gabor patch corresponding to 
each coordinate sampled from the multivariate distributions. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Stimulus parameters and generation were the same as those used by Zeithamova and Maddox (2006). 
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Table 3.2. Distribution parameters for rule-based and non-rule-based category sets. 
Category Structure !f !o "2f "2o cov f, o 
Rule-based      
Category A 280 125 75 9000 0 
Category B 320 125 75 9000 0 
Non-rule-based      
Category A 268 157 4538 4538 435 
Category B 332 93 4538 4538 4351 
Notes: Dimensions are in arbitrary units; see Figure 3.1 for scaling factors. The 
subscripted letters o and f refer to orientation and frequency, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.1. Structures used in the rule-based category set (Panel A) and non-rule-based, 
category set (Panel B). Category A stimuli are represented by light circles, and Category 
B stimuli are represented by dark circles. The solid lines show the optimal decision 
boundaries between the stimuli. The values of the stimulus dimensions are arbitrary units. 
Each stimulus was created by converting the value of these arbitrary units into a 
frequency value (cycles per stimulus) and an orientation value (degree of tilt). For both 
category sets, the grating frequency (f) was calculated as 0.25 + (xf/50) cycles per 
stimulus, and the grating orientation (o) was calculated as xo ! ("/20)°. The Gabor 
patches are examples of the actual stimuli seen by subjects. 
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3.2.3 Procedure 
In the main experiment, subjects were assigned randomly to one of three mood-induction 
conditions (positive, neutral, or negative), as well as to one of two category sets (RB or 
NRB). Subjects were presented with the clips (music first, then video) from their 
assigned mood condition and then completed the PANAS so we could ensure that the 
mood induction was successful. 
After receiving instructions, subjects performed a category-learning task on a computer. 
On each trial, a Gabor patch appeared in the center of the screen, and subjects pressed the 
“A” or the “B” key to classify the stimulus. Subjects who viewed the RB category set 
(Figure 3.1, Panel A) had to find a single-dimensional rule to correctly classify the 
stimuli on the basis of the frequency of the grating, while ignoring the more salient 
dimension of orientation. The optimal verbal rule for such classification could be phrased 
as follows: “Press ‘A’ if the stimulus has three or more stripes; otherwise, press ‘B.’” The 
NRB category set (Figure 3.1 Panel B) required learners to assess both orientation and 
frequency. There was no rule for this set that could be easily verbalized to allow for 
optimal performance. In both conditions, feedback (“CORRECT” or “INCORRECT”) 
was presented after each response. Subjects completed four unbroken blocks of 80 trials 
each (320 total). The presentation order of the 80 stimuli was randomly generated within 
each block for each subject. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 PANAS 
Scores on the Positive Affect scale were as follows—positive-mood condition: 2.89; 
neutral-mood condition: 2.45; and negative-mood condition: 2.42. A significant effect of 
mood on positive affect was found, F(2, 78) = 3.98, p < .05, &2 = .093. Positive-mood 
subjects showed only marginally more positive affect than neutral-mood subjects did (p < 
.06), but they showed significantly more positive affect than negative-mood subjects did 
(p < .05). These scores indicate that the mood-induction procedures were effective. 
Scores on the Negative Affect scale were as follows—positive-mood condition: 1.15; 
neutral-mood condition: 1.18; and negative-mood condition: 2.13. A significant effect of 
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mood on negative affect was found, F(2, 78) = 30.36, p < .001, &2 = .438, with negative-
mood subjects showing significantly more negative affect than positive- and neutral-
mood subjects did (p < .0001 in both cases). These results again indicate that the mood-
induction procedures were effective. 
3.3.2 Category learning 
Figure 3.2 shows the learning curve (average proportion of correct responses in Blocks 
1–4) for each condition and each category set. A mixed analysis of variance revealed 
main effects of category set, F(1, 75) = 31.94, p < .001, &2 = .257; mood, F(2, 75) = 4.40, 
p < .05, &2 = .071; and block, F(3, 225) = 41.33, p < .001, &2 = .322. It also revealed a 
significant interaction between mood and category set, F(2, 75) = 4.17, p < .05, &2 = .067. 
We conducted two separate analyses of variance (one for the RB category and one for the 
NRB category) to examine this interaction. 
 
Figure 3.2. Average proportion of correct responses to stimuli in three mood conditions 
as a function of trial block. Subjects were tested on either the rule-based (RB) category 
set (Panel A) or the NRB category set (Panel B). Error bars denote standard errors of the 
mean.  
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A main effect of mood on overall performance was found for the RB category set, F(2, 
35) = 6.28, p < .001, &2 = .264. A Tukey’s honestly significant difference test showed that 
overall performance by subjects in the positive-mood condition (M = .85) was higher than 
performance by subjects in the negative-mood condition (M = .73, p < .0001) and 
subjects in the neutral-mood condition (M = .73, p < .0001). Performance did not differ 
between subjects in the neutral- and negative-mood conditions (p = .69). No effect of 
mood on overall performance was found for the II category set (p = .71). Overall 
proportions correct were as follows—positive-mood condition: .64; negative-mood 
condition: .66; and neutral-mood condition: .64. 
3.3.3 Computational modeling 
For insight into the response strategies used by our subjects, we fit decision-bound 
models to the first block of each subject’s data9 (see Ashby, 1992a; Maddox & Ashby, 
1993). We analyzed the first block of trials because that is when mood-induction effects 
are likely to be strongest, and it is also when cognitive flexibility is most needed. One 
class of models assumed that each subject’s performance was based on a single-
dimensional rule (we used an optimal version with a fixed intercept and a version with 
the intercept as a free parameter). Another class of models assumed that each subject’s 
performance was based on the two-dimensional NRB boundary (we used an optimal 
version with a fixed intercept and slope, a version with a fixed slope, and a version with a 
freely varying slope and intercept). We fit these models to each subject’s data by 
maximizing the log likelihood. Model comparisons were carried out using Akaike’s 
information criterion, which penalizes a model for the number of free parameters (Ashby, 
1992b). The proportion of subjects whose responses were best fit by their respective 
optimal model is shown in Figure 3.3. For the RB categories, .83 of positive-mood 
subjects, .62 of neutral-mood subjects, and .54 of negative-mood subjects were fit best by 
a model that assumed a single-dimensional rule. For the NRB categories, .71 of positive-
                                                 
9 See Appendix N for further computational modeling details.  
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mood subjects, .40 of neutral-mood subjects, and .43 of negative-mood subjects were fit 
best by one of the NRB models. 
 
Figure 3.3. Proportion of subjects in each mood-induction condition whose responses 
best fit the optimal model for the category set to which they were assigned. Subjects 
learned either the a) rule-based (RB) category set or the b) non-rule-based (NRB) 
category set.  
3.4 Discussion 
In this experiment, positive, neutral, and negative moods were induced before subjects 
learned either an RB or a NRB category set. The RB set required subjects to use 
hypothesis testing, rule selection, and response inhibition to achieve optimal 
performance, and the NRB set was best learned by associating regions of perceptual 
space with responses (Ashby & Gott, 1988). We found that positive mood enhanced RB 
learning compared with neutral and negative moods. Mood did not seem to affect NRB 
learning. However, a comparison of decision-bound models suggested that positive-mood 
subjects displayed a greater degree of cognitive flexibility compared with neutral- and 
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negative-mood subjects by adopting an optimal strategy early in both RB and NRB 
learning. 
The COVIS theory suggests that people learn categories using an explicit, rule-based 
system or an implicit, similarity-based system (Ashby et al., 1998; Ashby & Maddox, 
2005; Minda & Miles, 2010). The brain areas that mediate these systems have been well 
studied, linking the PFC, ACC, and medial temporal lobes to the explicit system but not 
to the implicit system. Our experiment highlights a variable that facilitates the learning of 
RB categories using the explicit system. 
The finding that positive mood enhances performance of the explicit system posited by 
the COVIS theory corresponds with the dopamine hypothesis of positive affect (Ashby et 
al., 1999). Our results connect this research with existing work on category learning, and 
we view this connection as a substantial step forward in the study of cognition and mood. 
We suspect that our positive-mood subjects experienced increased cognitive flexibility, 
which allowed them to find the optimal verbal rule faster than negative-mood subjects 
and neutral-mood subjects did. Performance on the NRB category set did not differ 
strongly across the different mood conditions. This result is also in line with the 
dopamine hypothesis, as positive mood is not theorized to affect the same brain regions 
hypothesized by the COVIS theory to be involved with the learning of NRB category 
sets. However, our modeling results suggest that the cognitive flexibility associated with 
positive mood may affect the strategies used in NRB category learning. This cognitive 
flexibility could allow the explicit system to exhaust rule searches more effectively, even 
though performance levels may remain unchanged between the conditions. 
We failed to find an effect of negative mood in RB learning. This is in line with previous 
research that reported no differences between negative- and neutral-mood subjects on 
measures of cognitive flexibility (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). It may be that 
negative mood does not affect RB category learning, although we think it could, given 
the right circumstances. One possible explanation of why we did not find such an effect is 
that the induced negative mood may not have been sustained long enough to interfere 
with performance. We suspect that subjects in certain negative states will be impaired in 
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RB category learning. Future work should examine ways of sustaining mood states and 
should explore a wider range of negative mood states. 
An intriguing possibility that was not observed is that negative mood could enhance NRB 
category learning. Recent research suggests that affective states low in motivational 
intensity (e.g., amusement, sadness) are associated with broadened attention, and 
affective states high in motivational intensity (e.g., desire, disgust) are associated with 
narrowed attention (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008, 2010). Thus, for example, sadness 
may facilitate performance when broadened attention is beneficial for category learning. 
We did not find this effect, either because learning of the NRB category set used did not 
benefit from broadened attention or because the induced negative mood was high in 
motivational intensity. These interesting ideas require further research. 
Smith et al. (1993) showed that clinically depressed subjects were impaired in RB 
category learning and unimpaired in NRB category learning, but our research is the first 
to investigate how experimentally induced mood states influence category learning. We 
have shown that positive mood enhanced the learning of an RB category set, an 
advantage that was strong and sustained throughout the task. Positive mood did not 
improve the learning of NRB categories, though there was evidence that positive mood 
enhanced selection of the optimal strategy. By connecting theories of multiple-system 
category learning and positive affect, our research suggests that positive affect enhances 
performance when category learning benefits from cognitive flexibility. Future work 
should examine the interaction between mood states (motivationally weak compared with 
intense), valence (positive compared with negative), and category type (explicit 
compared with implicit) in category learning. 
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Chapter 4  
4 The influence of regulatory focus and regulatory fit on 
categorization 
The ability to connect concepts that are usually unrelated to one another, take on multiple 
perspectives, and come up with new ways of doing things are highly valued skills in our 
society. These skills are examples of cognitive flexibility. Flexibility exists orthogonally 
to perseveration, where one cannot move beyond their current way of performing or 
thinking. A classic example that demonstrates both of these concepts is the Duncker 
Candle task (Duncker, 1945). In this paradigm participants are presented with three 
items: a box of tacks, a candle, and a matchbook. The participant is asked to find a way to 
attach the candle to the (corkboard) wall so that when the candle is lit the wax won’t drip 
onto the table below, using only the materials provided. The solution entails removing the 
tacks from the box, tacking the box to the wall, and using it as a holder for the candle. 
Then a match from the matchbook can be used to light the candle, and the box should 
block any melting wax from the table. Finding this solution is thought to require 
cognitive flexibility, because it requires participants to think of the box as a platform that 
can be tacked to the wall, and not simply as a holder of tacks. Perseverance/effort does 
not help people to solve this problem. When one has successfully shifted their thinking or 
strategy they have overcome functional fixedness. When participants are in a good mood 
they are more likely to solve the Duncker Candle problem (Isen, Daubman & Nowicki, 
1987), and several other studies have connected positive mood to enhanced cognitive 
flexibility (Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1997; Greene & Noice, 1988; Fredrickson, 2001; 
Kazen & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kazen, 1999).   
 
More recently motivational states been connected to conceptual breadth and cognitive 
flexibility. In regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) people are theorized to have 
distinct motivational orientations that are derived from the approach and avoidance 
systems and exist orthogonally to them, meaning that each system involves both 
approach and avoidance. The promotion system prepares an individual to maximize 
positive outcomes (gains) and minimize the absence of positive outcomes (non-gains) in 
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the environment. The prevention system prepares an individual to maximize potential 
positive outcomes (non-losses) in the environment and minimize potential negative 
outcomes (losses). Promotion goals are centered around and driven by nurturance needs, 
while prevention goals are centered around security needs (Higgins, 1996). These distinct 
needs engender different strategies of goal pursuit: promotion-focused individuals prefer 
to use eager, risky strategies to approach gains and avoid non-gains, while prevention-
focused individuals prefer to use vigilant, conservative strategies to approach non-losses 
and avoid losses (Crowe & Higgins, 1997).  
 
Due to the fundamental nature of these self-regulatory systems, all people have a 
promotion system and a prevention system. However one system or the other can come to 
dominate people’s self-regulation goals. This is thought to be due to the emphasis placed 
on ideals (hopes and aspirations) or oughts (duties and responsibilities) by an individual’s 
caregivers, role models, and peers across time (Higgins, 1996). This long-term, sustained 
focus is referred to as chronic regulatory focus. These chronic systems can interact with 
the constraints and affordances of various situations and tasks, which can also be 
construed as promotion or prevention-focused. In addition to chronic regulatory states, it 
is possible to manipulate people’s dominant regulatory focus momentarily, and this 
temporary focus is referred to as situational regulatory focus.  
 
Regulatory focus has been found to influence conceptual breadth. In an experiment by 
Crowe & Higgins (1997) participants were asked to do a sorting task using lists of 
exemplars taken from Rosch (1975). Participants first sorted a list of 12 high and 
moderate typicality fruits into subgroups according to any one dimension that was 
plausible to the participant, and this task was repeated using a list of 12 vegetables that 
were also high and moderately typical category exemplars. Following this participants 
were asked to record as many other dimensions that could be used to sort the vegetables, 
excluding the one they had already chosen. Regulatory focus was manipulated by 
informing participants that they would get to do a liked or disliked activity based on their 
performance on the sorting task. Participants with a promotion focus sorted along 
dimensions that created more subgroups than participants with a prevention focus. 
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Prevention-focused participants were also more likely choose the same dimension across 
the two sorting tasks (e.g. they were more likely to perseverate). When participants were 
asked to list other dimensions that could be used to sort the categories, there was a trend 
for participants in the promotion condition to list more dimensions. The authors 
interpreted the results in a strategic decision making framework. In this framework a 
promotion focus is concerned with ensuring “hits” and avoiding errors of omission, 
whereas a prevention focus is concerned with insuring correct rejections and avoiding 
errors of commission. However this study can also be interpreted to suggest that 
participants with a promotion focus have a broader conceptual focus than participants 
with a prevention focus. 
 
The theory that a promotion focus is related to broadened attention compared to a 
prevention focus has been bolstered and expanded in subsequent research by Förster and 
colleagues (Förster & Higgins, 2005; Friedman & Förster, 2005). Förster and Higgins 
(2005) measured the chronic regulatory focus of participants and had them complete a 
global/local processing task. In this task participants are shown one of eight composite 
letters that is composed of smaller letters on each trial. Participants were asked to make a 
key press on a blue response key when they saw the letter “L” and a key press on a red 
response key when they saw the letter “H”. The location of the target letters were varied 
such that they appeared on the local or global level of the stimuli. The small (local) and 
composite (global) letters always mismatched so that the target was always only on either 
the local or global level. Participants with a chronic promotion focus responded faster to 
global targets whereas participants with a chronic prevention focus responded faster to 
local targets. Friedman and Förster (2005) induced approach (promotion) and avoidance 
(prevention) motivational states and then had participants perform a measure of 
attentional flexibility (a Stroop task in Experiment 1 and a working memory 2-back task 
in Experiment 2). Participants in promotion conditions performed better than participants 
in prevention conditions. These results indicate that a promotion focus is associated with 
broadened attention and cognitive flexibility while a prevention focus is associated with 
narrowed attention and reduced flexibility.  
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Regardless of whether the focus is chronic or situational in nature, regulatory states 
interact with the environment. For instance a regulatory state can either can fit or not fit 
with the reward structure of a task (Maddox, Baldwin, & Markman, 2006). In both cases, 
if one has a promotion focus (chronic or situational) and is in an environment that 
highlights gains, the subject is said to be in a state of regulatory fit, because looking for 
possible gains in the environment matches with an environment where gains are possible. 
If one has a promotion focus but the environment highlights losses, then the subjects is 
said to be in a state of regulatory mismatch because looking for possible gains in the 
environment does not match with an environment where only losses are possible. 
Likewise if one has a prevention focus and the environment highlights losses this creates 
a state of regulatory fit because looking for possible losses in an environment matches an 
environment where losses are possible. Finally if one has a prevention focus and the 
environment highlights gains, this creates a state of regulatory mismatch because looking 
for possible losses in the environment does not match with an environment where only 
gains are possible (Maddox et al., 2006). 
 
While the above mentioned studies are informative regarding the influence of regulatory 
focus states on attentional and conceptual breadth and flexibility, more recent research 
argues that regulatory fit, and not simply focus, influences these factors. Markman and 
colleagues (Maddox et al., 2006; Grimm, Markman, Maddox, & Baldwin, 2008) have put 
forward the hypothesis that regulatory fit enhances cognitive flexibility. Maddox et al. 
(2006) define cognitive flexibility as “an increase in an individual’s ability or willingness 
to try different strategies across trials to achieve some stated goal, as opposed to utilizing 
gradual incremental changes in strategy” (p. 1378). Across several studies they reported 
that regulatory fit improved performance on category learning tasks that benefitted from 
broad shifts in strategy and suffered on tasks that did not benefit from trying new 
strategies and abandoning old ones, relative to a regulatory mismatch condition. Grimm 
et al. (2008) also reported that participants experiencing a match between their situational 
focus and the reward structure of the task performed better on a category learning task 
that benefitted from cognitive flexibility and worse on a task that did not benefit from 
flexibility.  Additionally they have used well-known measures of cognitive flexibility, 
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including the Wisconisn Card Sorting Task (WCST; Maddox, Filoteo, Glass & Markman, 
2010), and the Remote Associates Task (RAT; Markman, Maddox, Worthy & Baldwin, 
2007), and have again showed that a match between the situational focus and the task 
reward structure results in enhanced performance relative to a mismatch.  
 
While the body of work outlined above provides support for the idea that regulatory fit 
enhances cognitive flexibility, the paradigm consistently used to support these results 
relies on setting up a situation in which explicit gains/non-gains (promotion) and non-
losses/losses (prevention) are set up on two levels: situational regulatory focus and the 
reward structure of the task. The tasks participants complete always have correct and 
incorrect responses and participants receive feedback after they make each response. The 
feedback participants receive after each trial is critical to creating conditions of regulatory 
fit and non-fit. Prior research on regulatory focus effects also commonly uses tasks in 
which there is a correct or incorrect response, and where feedback occurs. This poses two 
issues: 1) given that success and failure feedback influence emotions, and that emotions 
are known to influence cognitive processing, it is difficult to disentangle effects deriving 
from feedback from effects deriving from motivational state 2) it is unclear whether these 
effects will be found in more naturalistic situations in which there are many possible 
correct responses, or in which one’s response is not necessarily correct or incorrect. One 
study has used a different paradigm to study regulatory fit effects on cognitive processes. 
Memmert, Unklebach, & Ganns (2010) measured chronic regulatory focus using the 
General Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (GRFM; Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002), 
and manipulated situational focus using approach and avoidance-priming mazes 
(Friedman & Förster, 2001). They reported that participants who experienced a fit 
between their chronic focus and their situational focus were more likely to notice an 
unexpected character in an inattentional blindness task. They hypothesized that 
regulatory fit led to broadened attention relative to regulatory mismatch (Memmert et al., 
2010).  
 
It is not yet known whether regulatory fit will influence cognitive flexibility using a task 
with no corrective feedback, and previous research studying the influence of regulatory 
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fit on cognitive flexibility has used a paradigm with gains and losses and clear correct 
and incorrect responses. I wanted to see whether regulatory fit effects would be found on 
a task where there were no correct or incorrect response and no explicit trial by trial 
feedback, as this is a more frequently occurring situation in everyday life, where there are 
multiple possible good choices and no clear feedback about whether one made a good 
decision or not. The paradigm I used to manipulate regulatory fit versus mismatch is 
derived from Memmert et al. (2010). Unlike Memmert et al. (2010) I use different 
measures of chronic focus, and a different situational focus manipulation. The GRFM has 
been used in several studies looking at regulatory focus and fit (Keller & Bless, 2006; 
Memmert, Unkelbach & Ganns, 2010, Plessner, Unkelbach, Memmert, Baltes, & Kolb, 
2009), however it has been reported to correlate more strongly with positive and negative 
mood, and approach and avoidance motivation than another commonly used measure of 
chronic regulatory focus (Summerville & Roese, 2008). For these reasons I will be using 
the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Harlow, Friedman, & Higgins, 1997), which was 
not found to correlate with positive and negative mood, or approach and avoidance 
motivation (Summerville & Roese, 2008).  
 
The task I used is based on the work of Rosch (1975). In the original study participants 
were asked to rate the goodness of fit of a number of category exemplars to ten different 
categories. Some category exemplars were considered a better fit to a given category than 
others. For instance, participants endorsed the exemplars “apple” and “orange” as 
extremely good members of the fruit category, whereas “prunes”, “coconut” and “olive” 
were considered less good members of the category. This work showed that people seem 
to have ideas of what makes a given exemplar a better or worse member of a category, 
and challenged the view that people use necessary and sufficient features in making 
categorization decisions.  
 
The exemplars and categories from Rosch (1975) have been used as a measure of 
conceptual breadth or cognitive flexibility in prior research (Isen & Daubman, 1984; 
Mikulincer, Kedem & Paz, 1990a; Price & Harmon-Jones, 2010), by comparing people’s 
ratings of low typicality items. Atypical/low typicality items are thought to tap cognitive 
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flexibility because assigning a higher than average rating to a low typicality item means 
one is able to see features of the exemplars that connect them to the category and find 
different relationships between the exemplar and category that are less obvious, despite 
being plausible. In contrast high typicality items do not require as much flexibility 
because the aspects or features of the exemplar that relate to the category easily come to 
mind. For instance in the category “vehicle”, it is easy to agree that a “car” is a good 
example. However the exemplar “camel” requires a greater degree of flexibility, more 
flexibility than “car”. Past research has found that participants with higher state or trait 
anxiety are less inclusive in their ratings of atypical category exemplars (Mikulincer et 
al., 1990a), whereas participants in a positive mood (Isen & Daubman, 1984), or a mild 
state of arousal (Price & Harmon-Jones, 2010), assign higher ratings to atypical items 
than participants in a control or other condition.  
 
For the current research I predicted that if regulatory fit enhances cognitive flexibility 
participants who experience a fit between their measured chronic focus and their 
situational focus will assign higher ratings to the low typicality exemplars than 
participants who experience a mismatch. This prediction is in line with past research by 
Memmert et al. (2010) and the work of Markman and colleagues (Grimm et al., 2008; 
Maddox et al., 2006; 2010; Markman et al., 2007). There may also be a main effect of 
either chronic or situational regulatory focus (or both), as suggested by the work of 
Crowe and Higgins (1997), and research by Förster and Friedman (Förster & Higgins, 
2005; Friedman & Förster, 2005), such that participants with either a strong chronic 
promotion focus, or a manipulated situational promotion focus, assign higher ratings to 
atypical exemplars than participants with a less strong chronic promotion focus (or a 
stronger chronic prevention focus), or a situational prevention focus.  
 
No research to my knowledge has measured both approach and avoidance motivation 
with the BIS/BAS scales as well as chronic regulatory focus with the RFQ in a study of 
regulatory focus/fit effects. This is important because promotion and prevention foci 
involve both approach and avoidance motivations, and are theoretically distinct from 
these systems. However some research that has measured approach and avoidance 
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motivation have reported findings that are similar to those reported for regulatory focus. 
For instance De Dreu, Nijstad, and Baas (2011) reported that individuals high in trait 
approach motivation (as measured by the BAS scales) were more creative when they 
were primed with global processing manipulations. This can be considered akin to a 
regulatory fit effect, except that trait approach motivation is in the place of a promotion 
focus. Thus I wanted to know whether trait approach and avoidance motivation might 
interact with the situational focus manipulation in a similar manner to the results of 
Memmert et al. (2010). 
 
Beyond the possibility of regulatory fit and focus effects, another issue I wanted to 
address was the possible interaction between approach and avoidance motivational states, 
regulatory focus, and mood. Summerville and Roese (2008) administered several 
motivation questionnaires to 504 undergraduate students, including the GRFM 
(Lockwood et al., 2002), the RFQ (Harlow et al., 1997), the Behavioral Inhibition 
Scale/Behavioural Approach Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994). Although 
promotion and prevention states are supposed to exist orthogonally to approach and 
avoidance, the GRFM promotion subscale correlated strongly with the approach items on 
the BIS/BAS, and the GRFM prevention subscale correlated strongly with the avoidance 
items on the BIS/BAS. In another experiment, the authors reported that the GRFM 
promotion and prevention subscales correlated significantly with the positive and 
negative affect scales from the PANAS. This is problematic because regulatory focus is 
supposed to be independent of valence (Higgins, 1996). The authors conclude that the 
Lockwood et al. (2002) questionnaire functions more like a measure of 
approach/avoidance than like a measure of regulatory focus, and that affect seems to play 
a significant role in this measure. However the RFQ did not correlate with the BIS/BAS 
or the PANAS, indicating that it is measuring something other than mood and approach 
and avoidance motivation. Prior work examining regulatory fit effects has often used the 
GRFM (including Memmert et al., 2010). Thus I wanted to know whether I would extend 
their effects using the RFQ instead of the GRFM.  
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4.1 Experiment  
4.1.1 Methods  
4.1.1.1 Sample and design 
Participants were 86 undergraduates (66 females, 20 males) who participated for course 
credit, 43 in the Promotion condition and 43 in the Prevention condition. One participant 
was not included in the analyses for failing to follow instructions (they completed the 
categorization task prior to completing the essay manipulation), leaving 43 in the 
Promotion condition and 42 in the Prevention condition. 
4.1.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
Participants were informed that they were completing two separate experiments, one on 
“student life” and one on “categorization” to reduce expectancy effects. Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the promotion or the prevention regulatory focus condition. 
In both conditions participants were told that they would be completing several 
questionnaires (the chronic regulatory focus measure, the approach/avoidance motivation 
measure) and an essay-writing task concerned with student life (the regulatory focus 
manipulation) and then a simple cognitive task (the Rosch categorization task). Up to five 
participants completed the experiment in each session, and participants were seated in 
individual carrels within a single room. Figure 4.1 shows the order in which participants 
completed the different measures and tasks. 
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Figure 4.1. Visual representation of experimental methods.  
 
Participants first completed a questionnaire measuring their chronic regulatory state, the 
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Harlow, Friedman, & Higgins, 1997, The 
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire, Columbia University, unpublished manuscript). It was 
designed to assess one’s history of promotion and prevention-related successes, and the 
frequency of those successes, with higher scores indicating more success than lower 
scores. In this measure participants assign a numeric value ranging from 1 “never or 
seldom” to 5 “very often” (with 3 “sometimes” as the midpoint) alongside 11 questions 
concerned with promotion or prevention goals. An example promotion subscale question 
is “Do you often do well at different things that you try”? An example prevention 
subscale question is “How often did you obey rules and regulations that were established 
by your parents”? Six of the items comprise a promotion subscale and five comprise a 
prevention subscale. Each of these scales are reported to share a low correlation with one 
another, indicative of their mutual independence (Harlow et al., 1997; Higgins et al., 
2001). A measure of chronic regulatory strength/ promotion focus strength can be 
computed by subtracting the prevention subscale total from the promotion subscale total.  
 
Questionnaires
BIS/BAS (approach/avoidance)
RFQ (promotion/prevention)
Rosch Categorization Task
10 categories
10 exemplars/category
Mood Check
PANAS
Situational Focus Manipulation
Promotion Essay OR
Prevention Essay
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Following completion of the regulatory focus measure participants completed a measure 
of approach/avoidance motivation, the Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral 
Activation System scales (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994). The BIS/BAS scales were 
designed to assess Gray’s (1990) regulatory approach and avoidance systems in 
individuals. This is a 24-item measure and items are rated from 1 (very true for me) to 4 
(very false for me). There are four subscales in this questionnaire, 3 which are BAS-
related, and 1 that is BIS-related. The Behavioral Activation System (BAS) is sensitive to 
cues signaling reward and non-punishment and governs movement towards desired end 
states. This system has been argued to underlie positive affective states, including 
happiness and elation (Gray, 1990). An example BAS Drive item is “When I want 
something I usually go all-out to get it”. An example BAS Reward Responsiveness item 
is “When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away.” An example 
BAS Fun Seeking item is “I crave excitement and new sensations.” The BAS subscales 
are often summed and used as an overall indicator of BAS sensitivity (Hayden et al., 
2008; McFarland et al., 2006). Someone with a high BAS sensitivity should experience a 
strong pull to engage in goal-directed behavior and a strong reaction to impending 
incentives. The Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) is sensitive to cues signaling 
punishment, non-reward, and novelty. This system is argued to underlie negative 
affective states, including anxiety, and sadness (Gray, 1990). Example behavioral 
inhibition/avoidance items are “Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit” and “I feel 
worried when I think I have done poorly at something important”. Someone with a high 
BIS sensitivity should be concerned with avoiding negative outcomes and be sensitive to 
negative feedback.  
 
Upon completion of the motivation questionnaires situational regulatory focus was 
manipulated by asking participants to spend between five and seven minutes writing a 
short essay about their “hopes and aspirations” (promotion condition) or their “duties and 
obligations” (prevention condition) in “the next few years” on a lined sheet of paper with 
the instructions at the top of the page.  
 
Following the situational regulatory focus manipulation the current mood state of 
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participants was assessed using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). In this 20-item mood measure participants are asked 
to rate the extent to which they are currently feeling 20 emotions, 10 positive and 10 
negative on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Not at all”) to 5 (“Extremely”). The 
positive and negative items are averaged to create a positive mood score and a negative 
mood score.  
 
After indicating their current mood state, participants completed the 100-item 
categorization task based on Rosch’s Cognitive Representions of Semantic Categories 
(1975). Participants were presented with a list of 10 categories (furniture, fruit, vehicle, 
weapon, vegetable, carpenter’s tool, bird, sport, toy, clothing) and 10 respective 
exemplars from each category that varied in prototypicality, from extremely typical (e.g. 
car), to moderately typical (e.g. scooter), to atypical (e.g. camel). Participants were asked 
to rate the extent to which each exemplar fit a given category label, for instance they 
were asked “How good of a Vehicle [category label] is a Scooter [category exemplar]”? 
Participants filled in their responses using paper and pencil on a 7-point Likert scale, 
from 1 (“not at all a good fit) to 7 (“extremely good fit”). For each category label, each 
set of category exemplars included 2 extremely typical (high typicality) exemplars, 3 
moderately typical (medium typicality) exemplars, and 5 atypical (low typicality) 
exemplars. The first exemplar participants rated was always a typical one, and the 
following 9 exemplars were randomly presented. The high and medium typicality items 
were used as filler and control items, and the ratings of low typicality items were of 
primary interest. The category labels, the subset of exemplars I chose for each, and the 
original ratings presented by Rosch (1975) can be seen in Appendix Q.  
 
Upon completion of the ratings task participants completed a short questionnaire asking 
them demographic information and information about their day (unrelated to current 
experiment) and were then thanked for their participation and debriefed.  
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4.1.2 Results 
4.1.2.1 Questionnaire reliability and descriptives  
The means and standard deviations of the questionnaires are presented in Table 4.1. The 
reliability for the RFQ was questionable for the Promotion subscale (6 items; $ = .63), 
good for the Prevention subscale (5 items; $ = .80), acceptable for the BAS Total score 
(13 items; $ = .77), and BIS Total score (7 items; $ = .71), and good for the PANAS 
positive affect and negative affect scales, (10 items for each; $ = .88 for both positive and 
negative scales). 
Table 4.1. Means (standard deviations), and alphas of mood and motivation measures. 
Questionnaire Promotion  Prevention Overall ! 
RFQ Promotion 22.23 (3.10) 21.33 (3.47) 21.79 (3.30) 0.63 
RFQ Prevention 16.26 (4.15) 15.14 (3.55) 15.71 (3.88) 0.80 
BAS Total 40.95 (5.19) 40.87 (4.58) 40.91 (4.87) 0.77 
BIS 20.95 (3.80) 21.19 (3.65) 21.07 (3.71) 0.71 
PANAS Positive 3.06 (0.85) 3.26 (0.74) 3.16 (0.80) 0.88 
PANAS Negative 1.59 (0.57) 1.91 (0.70) 1.75 (0.65) 0.88 
Notes: RFQ = Regulatory Focus Questionnaire; BAS = Behavioral 
Approach Scale; BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale; PANAS = Positive 
Affect Negative Affect Scale.  
 
Across conditions the RFQ promotion subscale mean (M = 21.79, SD = 3.30) was 
significantly higher than the prevention subscale mean (M = 15.71, SD = 3.88), t(84) = 
13.34, p < .001. Similarly the PANAS positive mood scale score (M = 3.16, SD = 0.80) 
was significantly higher than the PANAS negative mood scale score (M = 1.75, SD = 
0.65), t(84) = 16.76, p < .001. These differences are in line with the original results 
reported by the authors of the questionnaires (Higgins et al., 2001; Watson et al., 1988).  
While the BAS Total score (M = 40.91, SD = 4.87) is higher than the BIS Total score (M 
= 21.07, SD = 3.71) this difference is not meaningful and is due to the fact that the BAS 
Total score is the sum of three BAS subscales. Because I am interested in general 
approach motivation, and because the three BAS subscales were significantly and 
positively intercorrelated (all r’s = .27 - .51), I use the BAS Total score in subsequent 
analyses as opposed to analyzing the three BAS subscales separately. 
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Between situational regulatory focus conditions (promotion essay versus prevention 
essay) there were no significant differences on the RFQ, F(1, 84) = 1.59, p = .21 for 
Promotion, F(1, 84) = 1.78 p = .19 for Prevention, or BIS/BAS Total scores, F(1, 84) = 
0.01, p = .94 for BAS, F(1, 84) = 0.09, p = .77 for BIS, which was expected given that 
these questionnaires were completed prior to the situational focus manipulation. 
Participants completed the PANAS after the situational focus manipulation, and while the 
positive affect scale of the PANAS did not differ between the promotion (M = 3.06, SD = 
.85) and prevention (M = 3.26, SD = .74) regulatory focus conditions, F(1, 84) = 1.43, p = 
.24,  there was a significant difference between conditions on the negative mood scale of 
the PANAS, with participants in the prevention condition (M = 1.91, SD = .70) reporting 
significantly higher levels of  negative mood than participants in the promotion condition 
(M = 1.59, SD = .57), F(1, 84) = 5.60, p = .02, !2 = 0.06. 
4.1.2.2 Rosch ratings 
To confirm that participants rated typicality according to the Rosch norms, a repeated 
measures analysis of variance was conducted with typicality rating (good, moderate, and 
low exemplars) as a within-subjects variable and regulatory focus condition (promotion, 
prevention) as a between-subjects variable. There was a significant effect of typicality 
rating F(2, 82) = 723.73, p < .001, !2 = 0.95. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the 
good exemplar (M = 6.80, SD = .30) ratings were significantly higher than the moderate 
(M = 5.57, SD = .54), and low (M = 4.03, SD = .72) exemplar ratings (all p’s < .001). 
Moderate exemplar ratings were significantly higher than poor exemplar ratings (p < 
.001). This demonstrates that participants rated good exemplars as more typical than 
moderate and poor exemplars, and moderate exemplars more highly than poor exemplars. 
Table 4.2 shows the averaged typicality ratings by level (good, moderate, and poor) by 
each of the ten categories, across all participants.  
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Table 4.2. Typicality ratings for poor, moderate, and good exemplars  
across all subjects. 
Category Poor Moderate Good 
Furniture 3.33 (1.34) 4.71 (1.02) 6.84 (0.38) 
Fruit 3.36 (1.29) 6.25 (0.90) 6.89 (0.38) 
Vehicle 3.49 (1.43) 4.72 (1.23) 6.93 (0.27) 
Weapon 4.00 (1.27) 5.89 (0.82) 6.79 (0.42) 
Vegetable 4.92 (1.21) 5.91 (1.26) 6.57 (0.82) 
Carpenter Tools 4.76 (1.18) 5.05 (1.41) 6.79 (0.56) 
Birds 4.85 (1.18) 6.37 (0.77) 6.85 (0.52) 
Sports 3.74 (1.23) 6.20 (0.89) 6.91 (0.37) 
Toys 4.19 (1.46) 4.86 (1.33) 6.57 (0.98) 
Clothing 3.62 (1.08) 5.73 (1.04) 6.88 (0.30) 
 4.03 (0.72) 5.57 (0.54) 6.80 (0.30) 
4.1.2.3 Regulatory focus and trait motivation effects 
4.1.2.3.1 Chronic focus and trait motivation effects 
In order to examine whether chronic regulatory focus was related to typicality ratings of 
poor exemplars, I conducted a series of regressions with chronic promotion focus, 
chronic prevention focus, and chronic regulatory strength (chronic promotion – chronic 
prevention) as criterion variables and poor exemplar typicality ratings as the dependent 
variable. It was not possible to conduct an analysis of variance with the RFQ chronic 
focus scores because the majority of participants had a promotion scale score greater than 
their prevention scale score. None of these chronic regulatory focus variables 
significantly predicted poor exemplar typicality ratings (all p’s > .05).  
 
To examine a possible influence of trait motivation on poor exemplar typicality ratings, I 
conducted regressions with the BAS and BIS total scores as the independent variables 
and poor exemplar typicality ratings as the dependent variable, and again the regression 
models did not reach significance (all p’s > .05) 
4.1.2.3.2 Situational focus effects 
Although I predicted that I would find a fit between chronic and situational focus, it is 
also possible that situational focus alone influenced the poor exemplar typicality ratings. I 
wanted to test whether participants with a manipulated promotion versus a prevention 
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focus showed differences on their typicality ratings of poor exemplars. Based on prior 
research showing that a promotion focus is associated with broadened attention and 
attentional flexibility, and a prevention focus with narrowed attention and reduced 
attentional flexibility (Förster & Higgins, 2005; Friedman & Förster, 2005), I predicted 
that the promotion and prevention conditions would differ in their poor exemplar 
typicality ratings, with the promotion condition displaying higher typicality ratings than 
the prevention condition. I also predicted that there would be no differences between the 
two groups on their ratings of good and moderate exemplar typicality ratings because 
these exemplars did not tap conceptual breadth or flexibility to the same extent.  
 
I averaged each type of typicality rating for each category across participants and 
averaged these ratings by condition. I conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance 
with typicality rating (good, moderate, and poor) as a within-subjects variable and 
regulatory focus condition (promotion, prevention) as a between-subjects variable. There 
was a significant effect of typicality rating F(2, 82) = 723.73, p < .001, !2 = 0.95, 
reflecting the differences in ratings between good, moderate, and poor exemplars, but the 
interaction between typicality rating and condition was not significant, F(2, 82) = 1.64, p 
= .20. However because I made the a priori prediction that the promotion and prevention 
conditions would differ significantly on their poor exemplar typicality ratings only, I 
conducted a one-way between-subjects analysis of variance and found that the promotion 
condition (M = 4.18, SD = .75) assigned higher typicality ratings to poor exemplars than 
participants in the prevention condition (M = 3.87, SD = .67), and this difference was 
significant, F(1, 84) = 4.30, p = .049, !2 = .041.  
 
Figure 4.2 shows the averaged typicality ratings by type (good, moderate, and poor). 
Table 4.3 shows these ratings by individual category, between situational regulatory 
focus conditions.  
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Figure 4.2. Typicality ratings ordered by exemplar type (good, moderate, and poor). 
Note: * p < .05.  
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Table 4.3. Means (and standard deviations) of typicality ratings by category and between situational regulatory focus conditions. 
 Promotion Prevention 
Category Poor Moderate Good Poor Moderate Good 
Furniture 3.26 (1.34) 4.68 (1.08) 6.76 (0.48) 3.41 (1.35) 4.74 (0.97) 6.93 (0.21) 
Fruit 3.41 (1.34) 6.54 (0.66) 6.87 (0.40) 3.30 (1.26) 5.96 (1.00) 6.90 (0.35) 
Vehicle 3.80 (1.37) 4.74 (1.40) 6.90 (0.36) 3.17 (1.43) 4.69 (1.06) 6.96 (0.13) 
Weapon 4.30 (1.34) 6.09 (0.86) 6.80 (0.44) 3.71 (1.15) 5.69 (0.73) 6.79 (0.40) 
Vegetable 5.17 (1.07) 6.28 (0.96) 6.73 (0.65) 4.66 (1.30) 5.52 (1.42) 6.40 (0.94) 
Carpenter Tools 4.76 (1.32) 4.93 (1.53) 6.84 (0.42) 4.76 (1.04) 5.18 (1.27) 6.74 (0.68) 
Birds 5.02 (1.06) 6.35 (0.74) 6.92 (0.34) 4.68 (1.27) 6.40 (0.81) 6.79 (0.66) 
Sports 3.82 (1.28) 6.18 (0.97) 6.85 (0.49) 3.66 (1.19) 6.23 (0.81) 6.96 (0.17) 
Toys 4.44 (1.39) 4.94 (1.21) 6.70 (0.63) 3.94 (1.50) 4.79 (1.46) 6.44 (1.23) 
Clothing 3.82 (1.01) 5.78 (1.02) 6.87 (0.31) 3.40 (1.13) 5.67 (1.07) 6.88 (0.29) 
 4.18 (0.75) 5.65 (0.61) 6.82 (0.32) 3.87 (0.67) 5.49 (0.46) 6.78 (0.27) 
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Considered in isolation these results suggest that the situational focus manipulation 
resulted in a significant difference in participants’ poor exemplar typicality ratings. 
However due to the significant difference in negative mood reported by participants 
between the two situational regulatory focus conditions I conducted a final series of 
analyses to examine the interaction between regulatory focus condition, self reported 
negative affect, and poor exemplar typicality ratings further. 
 
I conducted a multiple regression with regulatory focus condition (promotion essay, 
prevention essay) and negative affect ratings as predictor variables and poor exemplar 
typicality ratings as the criterion variable. The model was significant, F(2,84) = 4.70, p = 
.01, !2 = .10. An examination of the coefficients revealed that regulatory focus condition 
did not reach significance, (! = .152, t = 1.40, p = .16), but negative affect ratings did, (! 
= -.247, t = -2.28, p = .03). This shows that as negative mood ratings decreased, poor 
exemplar typicality ratings increased.  
 
Although I had not predicted that there would be differences in moderate exemplar 
typicality ratings, due to the significant correlation between negative affect ratings and 
moderate exemplar typicality ratings I wanted to see whether the same pattern held. I 
again entered regulatory focus condition (promotion essay, prevention essay) and 
negative affect ratings into a regression with moderate exemplar typicality ratings as the 
dependent variable. The model significantly predicted the data, F(2,84) = 3.60, p = .03, 
!2 = .08. An examination of the coefficients revealed that regulatory focus condition did 
not significantly account for the variability in moderate exemplar typicality ratings, (! = 
.088, t = 0.80, p = .42), but negative affect ratings did, (! = -.249, t = -2.28, p = .03). Thus 
for both poor and moderate exemplars, as negative mood decreased, typicality ratings 
increased.  
4.1.2.4 Regulatory fit effects 
I wanted to know whether participants experiencing a fit between their chronic and 
situational regulatory foci were more likely to give higher ratings to the poor exemplar 
items than participants experiencing a mismatch, and followed the regression technique 
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used by Memmert et al. (2010). I conducted a multiple regression with situational 
regulatory focus condition (promotion condition coded as “1”, prevention as “-1”), 
chronic regulatory focus strength (the RFQ prevention subscale score of each participant 
subtracted from the RFQ promotion subscale score of each participant), and the 
interaction between situational regulatory focus condition and chronic regulatory strength 
as predictor variables and the proportion of poor exemplar typicality ratings averaged 
across the 10 categories as the criterion variable. The continuous variable (chronic 
regulatory focus strength) was centered to reduce the risk of multicollinearity in the 
interaction term. The analysis of variance for the regression did not reach significance, 
F(3,84) = 1.45, p = .23, indicating the model did not significantly predict the data. I also 
conducted two regressions using each of the RFQ subscales, promotion and prevention, 
but neither analysis of variance reached significance (both p’s > .10).  
4.1.2.4.1 Approach/avoidance fit effects 
A final possibility related to regulatory fit that I wanted to explore was whether the BAS 
or BIS total scores interacted with the regulatory focus manipulation to predict poor 
exemplar typicality ratings. This was a valid possibility because prior work has reported 
strong correlations between another regulatory focus measure (the General Regulatory 
Focus Measure; Lockwood et al., 2002) and the BIS/BAS scales (Summerville & Roese, 
2008). I repeated the multiple regression steps as described above, first with the BAS 
total and again with the BIS total, but neither analysis reached significance (both p’s > 
.19). 
4.1.2.5 Correlations between questionnaires and typicality ratings 
I wanted to know whether the poor exemplar typicality ratings were related to any of the 
motivation (RFQ, BIS/BAS) and mood (PANAS) questionnaires. Based on prior research 
I predicted that positive affect would be positively correlated with poor exemplar 
typicality ratings, and that negative affect would be negatively correlated with poor 
exemplar typicality ratings (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Mikulincer et al., 1990). Given the 
relationships previously described between positive mood and approach motivation, and 
negative mood and avoidance motivation, I anticipated that there could also be significant 
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positive relationships between the BAS Total score and poor exemplar typicality ratings, 
and significant negative relationships between the BIS and poor exemplar typicality 
ratings. Finally although prior research has reported that the RFQ is not related to 
approach and avoidance motivation or mood, because these variables are related in my 
current sample it is also possible that the RFQ promotion subscale will be positively 
related to the poor exemplar typicality ratings, and that the RFQ prevention subscale will 
be negatively related to poor exemplar typicality ratings.  
 
Table 4.4 shows the correlations between typicality ratings (poor, moderate, and good) 
and the motivation and mood measures. The poor exemplar typicality ratings were 
significantly negatively correlated with scores on the PANAS negative affect subscale, 
r(85) = - .29, p = .008, and that was the only significant correlation between the poor 
exemplar typicality ratings and any of the motivation and mood subscales.10  
 
Figure 4.3 shows the relationship between the negative mood ratings and poor exemplar 
typicality ratings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 This relationship remained significant when I controlled for the PANAS positive affect scale, r(82) = -
.28, p = .009. 
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Table 4.4. Correlations between typicality ratings and mood and motivation measures. 
 Typicality Ratings 
 Poor 
Exemplars 
Moderate 
Exemplars 
Good 
Exemplars 
Poor Exemplars ------   
Moderate Exemplars .72*** ------  
Good Exemplars  .35** .59*** ------ 
RFQ Promotion Scale .14 .19 .10 
RFQ Prevention Scale .05 .08 .07 
Behavioral Approach Scale Total -.04 .07 .12 
Behavioral Inhibition Scale Total .02 .101 .25* 
PANAS Positive Scale Total -.07 -.14 .01 
PANAS Negative Scale Total  -.29** -.27* -.17 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05; RFQ = Regulatory Focus Questionnaire; 
PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale.  
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Figure 4.3. Relationship between poor exemplar typicality ratings and negative mood.  
Although I did not predict any significant correlations would be found between moderate 
exemplar typicality ratings and motivation and mood measures, the PANAS negative 
affect scale correlated significantly and negatively with moderate exemplar typicality 
ratings, r(85) = - .27, p = .01.11 Figure 4.4 shows this relationship. 
                                                 
11 This relationship remained significant when I controlled for positive affect, r(82) = -.24, p = .03. 
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Figure 4.4. Relationship between moderate exemplar typicality ratings and negative 
mood.  
A final unexpected significant correlation is that the BIS scale correlated positively with 
good exemplar typicality ratings, r(85) = .25, p = .02. However when the scatterplot of 
this relationship was inspected it was apparent that this small-sized positive relationship 
was being driven by a single participant (BIS = 13, high typicality rating = 5.05). When 
this participant’s data was removed the relationship was no longer significant, r(84) = 
.12, p = .27, thus this relationship should be interpreted with caution.  
4.1.2.6 Negative mood effects 
A key question given the significant difference in negative mood between conditions, as 
well as the significant negative correlations between poor and moderate exemplar 
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typicality ratings and negative mood, is what caused the variability in negative mood 
ratings across participants? I did not predict that there would be differences in negative 
mood between situational regulatory focus conditions, and prior research has not reported 
similar differences following regulatory focus manipulations. It is plausible that 
individual differences in regulatory focus, approach motivation, avoidance motivation, 
and the essay manipulation could all influence or be related to differences in negative 
mood. Thus I entered each centred continuous variable (BAS, BIS, RFQ Promotion, RFQ 
Prevention) as well as Regulatory Focus Condition (Promotion = 1, Prevention = -1) into 
a multiple linear regression, with PANAS negative mood rating as the dependent 
variable. Following guidelines by Yzerbyt, Muller, and Judd (2004), interactions between 
each continuous variable (BAS, BIS, RFQ Promotion, RFQ Prevention) and Regulatory 
Focus condition were entered as predictors to ensure that the interaction between negative 
mood and regulatory focus condition was not biased.  
The regression model was significant and the variables accounted for a significant 
amount of the variance in negative mood ratings (R2 = .291, adjusted R2 = .195, F(10, 84) 
= 3.04, p < .01). An examination of the coefficients revealed that BAS Total (! = .042, 
t(74)= 2.72, p < .01), RFQ Promotion (! = -.079, t(74)= -3.21, p < .01), and Regulatory 
Focus Condition (! = -.133, t(74)= -2.06, p < .05) were significantly related to negative 
mood. The relationship between BAS and negative mood was positive, indicating that the 
higher the BAS rating the higher the negative mood rating, and the relationship between 
RFQ Promotion and negative mood was negative, indicating that the higher the RFQ 
Promotion score the lower the negative mood rating. Finally the relationship between 
regulatory focus condition and negative mood rating was also negative. Regulatory focus 
condition was coded as (1 = promotion, -1 = prevention), reflecting that negative mood 
ratings were higher in the prevention condition. 
4.1.3 Discussion 
This experiment was concerned with the influence of motivation and mood on cognitive 
flexibility. I found that participants who wrote about their hopes and aspirations gave 
higher typicality ratings to poor exemplars than participants who wrote about their duties 
and responsibilities. This is in line with prior research indicating that regulatory focus 
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influences attentional breadth and flexibility (Förster & Higgins, 2005; Friedman & 
Förster, 2005). However the current results use a different manipulation of regulatory 
focus, as well as a task in which there are no correct or incorrect responses, and extends 
the results to conceptual breadth/flexibility. The present results also diverge from prior 
work in one key way: prior work has not reported significant mood differences between 
regulatory focus conditions (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Förster & Higgins, 2005; Friedman 
& Förster, 2005). When negative mood was taken into account it became clear that 
negative mood, and not the essay manipulation, was accounting for the poor exemplar 
typicality ratings.  
 
The finding that poor and moderate exemplar typicality ratings were negatively related to 
negative mood is in line with the hypothesis that negative mood is related to narrowed 
attentional and conceptual breadth and reduced flexibility (e.g. Gasper & Clore, 2002; 
Mikulincer et al., 1990a; Mikulincer et al., 1990b). Mikulincer et al. (1990a) measured 
participants’ trait anxiety and reported that participants with lower levels of self-reported 
anxiety gave higher ratings to poor exemplar items. The PANAS negative affect scale has 
been found to tap state and trait anxiety (Watson & Clark, 1984). My research extends 
the results of Mikulincer et al. (1990a) by showing that an evaluative framework need not 
necessarily be explicit in the task paradigm to have an influence on poor exemplar 
typicality ratings.  
 
There are several possibilities to explain why my results differ from prior reported 
results, in that the regulatory focus manipulation influenced negative mood ratings. The 
first is simply that the essay manipulation of regulatory focus engendered more negative 
mood in the prevention condition. I asked participants to write about their “hopes and 
aspirations” or their “duties and responsibilities in the next few years”. It is possible that 
for undergraduate students just beginning their studies that thinking about their “duties 
and responsibilities” over the course of their studies increased their negative mood 
relative to students writing about their “hopes and aspirations”. This possibility is in line 
with Higgin’s self discrepancy theory (1987), which theorizes that when one is 
promotion-focused and does not achieve their goal, they feel sad/dejected, but when one 
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is prevention-focused and does not achieve their goal they feel anxious. It is possible that 
in writing about their upcoming duties and responsibilities this evoked a sense of failing 
at one’s duties and responsibilities in first year undergraduate students. A related 
possibility is simply that thinking about their duties and responsibilities was 
overwhelming and unpleasant. There is also research showing that prevention-focused 
failure produces anxiety (Higgins, 1997). This suggests that the prevention manipulation 
created an anxious state in participants. However the results of a regression analysis 
showed that BAS and RFQ Promotion scores also contributed to ratings of negative 
mood, showing that individual differences in approach motivation and chronic regulatory 
focus were related to negative mood.  
 
A second possibility as to why my mood results differed from prior research is that the 
mood measure I used was more sensitive than that used previously. The PANAS 
conceptualizes mood as involving independent positive and negative valences, whereas 
the one-item question used by Friedman and Forster (2005) asked participants “How do 
you feel right now”? This conceptualizes mood as a single dimension ranging from 
negative (“very bad”) to positive (“very good”). Participants answered this question after 
completing a maze manipulation of approach and avoidance motivation. The authors 
reported that there were no significant mood differences between conditions, and that 
mood did not change the pattern of results when it was included in regression analyses. 
This difference could account for the lack of correspondence between my results and 
previous work.12  
 
Likewise participants in a study by Förster and Higgins (2005) answered the same mood 
question after having their chronic regulatory focus measured and after completing the 
main task. The authors reported that mood did not influence the pattern of results. Crowe 
and Higgins (1997) measured mood at the beginning of the experiment, after completing 
                                                 
12 Some studies subtract the PANAS Negative scale score from the Positive scale score to compute an 
overall mood score. When I did this and used the subtracted total as the dependent variable in an analysis of 
variance, there was no significant mood difference between the promotion and prevention situational focus 
conditions. 
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several of the tasks, and at the end of the experiment, and the summed scores (across the 
three time points) did not differ between conditions or influence the results. In contrast I 
measured people’s positive and negative affect levels using a 20-item questionnaire that 
distinguished between positive mood states and negative mood states, and the 
questionnaire was administered immediately after participants completed the regulatory 
focus manipulation. Future research should employ a diversity of mood measures and 
regulatory focus manipulations to find out whether the difference in mood reported 
between the regulatory focus conditions is due to study design or is a real effect.  
 
I also explored whether regulatory fit influenced people’s poor exemplar typicality 
ratings. I did not find any significant regulatory fit effects. This is in contrast with the 
results of Memmert et al. (2010), who reported a significant effect of regulatory fit using 
the same paradigm (with a different task). However I used a different, and more 
theoretically valid measure of regulatory focus. Grimm, Markman, Maddox, and Baldwin 
(2009) argue that a situational focus manipulation can override a participant’s chronic 
focus, and they also used the RFQ to measure chronic focus. My results are consistent 
with this explanation. Future research should examine whether there is further evidence 
whether the RFQ always over-rides one’s chronic focus or whether there are cases in 
which fit effects between situational focus and chronic focus are present.  
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Chapter 5  
5 General Discussion 
The results in this thesis demonstrate that positive mood enhances rule-based category 
learning that benefits from cognitive flexibility (Chapter 3). Additionally, self-reports of 
positive mood are positively related to this same kind of category learning performance 
(Chapter 2). Manipulated and measured negative mood did not have any strong influence 
or relationship to rule-based category learning (Chapters 2 and 3). Self-reported 
depressive symptoms, history of hypomanic symptoms, and proneness to worry were 
negatively related to rule-based category learning performance, but positive mood and 
history of hypomanic symptoms accounted for the most variance in rule-based category 
learning performance (Chapter 2). In contrast to the rule-based category learning 
findings, none of the factors measured or manipulated in Chapters 2 and 3 significantly 
influenced or related to non-rule-based category learning. This is the first series of studies 
to examine the influence of mood on category learning. 
Although negative mood did not influence or relate to category learning performance, the 
findings of Chapter 4 demonstrate that self-reported negative mood is negatively related 
to typicality ratings of poor and moderate exemplar typicality ratings. The results in 
Chapter 4 also showed that a promotion focus resulted in higher poor exemplar typicality 
ratings than a prevention focus, however this effect did not remain significant when 
negative mood was taken into account.  
5.1 Positive mood implications 
Across the first three studies (Chapters 2 and 3) this research demonstrates that positive 
mood influences rule-based category learning that benefits from cognitive flexibility. 
These results are in line with the dopaminergic hypothesis of positive affect (Ashby, Isen, 
& Turken, 1999). Ashby et al. (1999) posit that mild increases in positive mood are 
associated with increased dopamine levels in frontal brain regions, specifically the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC), and anterior cingulated cortex (ACC). This increase in dopamine 
is associated with enhanced cognitive flexibility. In the COmpetition between Verbal and 
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Implicit Systems theory of category learning (COVIS; Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & 
Waldron, 1998) the authors predicted that "Slight increases in dopamine, such as might 
occur during periods of mild transient happiness, could improve performance in verbal 
conditions" (p. 452). My results confirm the tentative prediction that positive mood could 
improve performance on a rule-based category learning task.  
The rule-based task used in Study 2, Chapter 2, and in Chapter 3 has previously been 
found to benefit from cognitive flexibility (Maddox, Baldwin, & Markman, 2006). 
Maddox et al. (2006) define cognitive flexibility as the ability to seek out and apply 
alternate strategies to problems, and used the same rule-based category set that I used in 
Chapter 2 (Study 2) and Chapter 3 to test whether regulatory fit enhances performance on 
this category set. This category set requires participants to ignore the more salient 
stimulus dimension (orientation of the lines) and focus on the less salient dimension 
(frequency of the lines) to learn the perfect rule and achieve very high or perfect 
performance. Learning the correct rule, and that orientation does not result in perfect 
performance requires hypothesis-testing, rule selection, and response inhibition. It is 
likely that learning to ignore a salient dimension, and discovering that frequency is 
important requires flexibility that is comparable to overcoming functional fixedness. 
Further, once the correct rule has been learned, continuing to apply this rule accurately 
requires the kind of processing that Isen (1999) argues is enhanced by positive mood, 
namely processing that is careful and thorough.  
These results also provide evidence against the capacity limitation hypothesis of positive 
mood (e.g. Mackie & Worth, 1989). If positive mood acts as a cognitive load that detracts 
from explicit reasoning processes, performance in the rule-based condition would have 
been worse, not better, than performance in the neutral and negative mood conditions. 
Prior research using the same category set has found that the addition of a secondary task 
during category learning that requires working memory impairs rule-based performance 
relative to a condition that does not (Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006). Therefore if positive 
mood acts as a cognitive load performance should have been impaired as opposed to 
enhanced on the rule-based category learning task.  
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It is also hard to argue that the present results demonstrate that positive mood participants 
responded more heuristically or carelessly than neutral mood participants, as is suggested 
by some research and theories (e.g. Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990). A heuristic 
or superficial response style would not have resulted in accurate performance on the rule-
based category learning task used in Chapters 2 and 3. As mentioned, the most salient 
stimulus dimension in the rule-based task is orientation of the lines. If a participant 
responded carelessly or superficially they would likely focus on this salient but non-
criterial dimension and demonstrate lower performance than a participant who paid closer 
attention to the two dimensions and learned that frequency was perfectly predictive of 
category membership. Further, learning the verbal rule required participants to pay close 
attention to the number of lines in each stimulus. The modeling results showed that 
participants in the positive mood condition were in fact more likely than participants in 
the neutral and negative mood conditions to be basing their responding on the frequency 
of the lines and not the orientation.  
There is recent evidence that positive mood results in slower reaction times on tasks that 
require a narrowing of attention (e.g. Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002; Rowe, 
Hirsch, & Anderson, 2007). The current tasks used were not time limited, and it is 
possible that if participants had been required to make responses more quickly that 
positive mood advantages may not have been found. What seems evident is that when 
response time is not limited, rule-based categorization performance is enhanced by 
positive mood. However, it is unclear whether all rule-based categorization performance 
would be improved by positive mood. For instance, Maddox et al. (2006) created a rule-
based category set that did not benefit from cognitive flexibility. The optimal strategy 
was verbalizable but for the rule to be found small, incremental changes in strategy were 
required. Participants in a regulatory fit condition performed less well than participants in 
a regulatory mismatch condition, presumably due to the fact that cognitive flexibility was 
disadvantageous for performance (Maddox et al., 2006). Future research should 
investigate whether positive mood results in homologous findings.  
Ashby et al. (1999) note it is possible that positive mood will enhance non-rule-based 
category learning due to a dopamine projection extending from the substantia nigra to the 
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striatum, an area implicated in non-rule-based category learning. I did not find evidence 
for this in the behavioral data, however the computational modeling results suggested that 
participants in the positive mood condition were better able to find the correct strategy 
than neutral mood participants in both the rule-based and non-rule-based category 
learning tasks in early learning. It is possible that the modeling results are evidence of a 
positive mood enhancement. Because the computational modeling took the individual 
responses of participants into account this offers a finer-grained look at the learning 
abilities of participants relative to performance.  
5.2 Negative mood implications 
Chapter 3 successfully manipulated negative mood, but failed to find any significant 
difference in rule-based or non-rule-based category learning performance. Chapter 2 
measured negative mood as well as depressive symptoms, but negative mood did not 
correlate significantly with performance. Current depressive symptoms did correlate 
negatively with complex rule-based performance, but when positive mood was taken into 
account this correlation was no longer significant.  
Prior research on the influence of negative mood on cognitive processing has been mixed, 
with some research demonstrating that negative mood narrows attention (Baumann & 
Kuhl, 2005; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Mikulincer, Kedem, & Paz, 1990a; Mikulincer, Paz, 
& Kedem, 1990b), some research demonstrating it broadens attention (Gable & Harmon-
Jones, 2010), and other research reporting null findings (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 
1987; Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan, 1990). Overall the literature suggests it is more 
common for manipulated negative mood to result in null effects. Several possibilities 
might explain my results as well as previous results.  
Isen (1985) suggests that people are motivated to maintain positive mood states, and 
motivated to resist negative states. The resistance of negative mood is called mood repair. 
A related explanation is that even successful negative mood manipulations do not last 
long enough to have an influence on performance in many tasks. This could be due to 
mood repair strategies or it could be due to a lack of rehearsal of the negative information 
(which could be construed as part of the mood repair process). For instance Baumann and 
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Kuhl (2005) reported that negative mood resulted in slower responses on trials that 
required a global response. What is noteworthy about their manipulation is that 
participants in the negative mood condition were primed with a negatively valenced word 
before each trial, unlike most experiments where the mood manipulation precedes and 
does not continue into the experimental task. Similarly, Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010) 
primed participants before each response trial with a neutral or negatively valenced 
picture. In both cases the mood manipulations were maintained on a trial-by-trial basis, 
and resulted in significant results.  
A third related possibility to explain why manipulated negative mood did not negatively 
influence rule-based category learning performance is that for most participants it is 
unusual to focus on negative events/feelings evoked by mood manipulations to the extent 
that it takes up space in working memory for a prolonged period of time, in other words, 
most people are able to regulate their emotions such that they do not experience negative 
mood for very long in an experimental situation. The hallmark of anxiety is worry, which 
can be defined as persistent, relatively uncontrollable negative thoughts (Borkovec, 
Robinson, Pruzinsky, & Depree, 1983), and a symptom of depression is rumination, 
which can be defined as repetitive, negative, and self-focused thoughts about the future 
impact of current depressive feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). It can be argued that 
anxiety and depression each represent an impaired ability to regulate one’s emotions, 
particularly negative ones, although paradoxically both worry and rumination are 
considered to represent attempts to regulate one’s negative emotions (Borkovec et al., 
1983; Gross, 1999). Rumination is linked to increased negative mood and depressive 
symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), and people high in trait rumination are 
more likely to become depressed (Just & Alloy, 1997). Likewise worry is related to 
increased anxiety (Borkovec et al., 1983). Worry and rumination both involve a 
significant verbal component (Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Stober, 
Tepperwien, & Staak, 2000). It is possible that for most individuals, an experimental 
manipulation of negative mood does not result in the persistent negative thoughts 
associated with anxiety and depressive disorders that are related to impaired executive 
functions (see Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001; and Castaneda, Tuulio-Henriksson, 
Marttunen, Suvisaari, & Lönnqvist, 2008 for reviews). Again, it is noteworthy that two 
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successful negative mood inductions that resulted in significantly altered performance 
used trial-by-trial exposure to negatively valenced stimuli (Baumann & Kuhl, 2005; 
Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010). However Gasper and Clore (2002) did not use trial-by-
trial maintenance of negative mood, and reported significant results. Participants in the 
experiment wrote about a “sad experience” and then completed a brief global-local 
processing task. It is possible that because writing about a sad experience resulted in a 
negative mood state that persisted throughout the brief task.  
Thus it is possible that a trial-by-trial negative mood induction might result in a 
significant reduction in rule-based category learning performance. In contrast positive 
mood inductions are posited to result in a release of dopamine in frontal brain regions and 
the effects of this release have been found to last about 30 minutes (Ashby et al., 1999). 
Thus successful positive mood inductions should not require maintenance in the way that 
negative mood inductions appear to. Evidence in support of the idea that negative mood 
inductions do not last as long as positive mood inductions argument comes from Kliegel 
et al. (2005), who reported significant performance differences between negative and 
neutral mood conditions in the first five minutes of the experimental task following the 
mood induction procedures.   
5.3 Depressive symptom implications 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that although depressive symptoms correlated strongly and 
negatively with complex rule-based category learning performance, their association with 
performance was not unique. In fact positive mood and history of hypomanic symptoms 
were the only two significant predictors of rule-based performance. However even 
though depressive symptoms did not contribute significant amounts of unique variance to 
rule-based performance, the negative correlations found support the hypothesis that 
depressive symptoms would be negatively related to rule-based category learning. These 
results are in line with the work of Smith et al. (1993), but go further to demonstrate that 
current positive mood contributes more unique variance to rule-based category learning 
performance than depressive symptoms.  
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A key limitation of this research is that participants were not clinically depressed. If self-
reported depressive symptoms are comparable to major depression, then these results are 
in line with predictions made by COVIS, namely that depression should impair 
performance on rule-based category learning tasks. However whether one argues that 
current depressive symptoms exist on a continuum from non-depressed to major 
depression, or that participants who self report high levels of depressive symptoms are 
undergoing psychological distress that is more general, it is clear that this construct is 
negatively related to performance on rule-based category learning tasks. It has been 
proposed that self-reported depressive symptoms represent general negative affectivity 
(Watson & Clark, 1984). If this is true, then general negative affectivity is negatively 
related to performance, a finding in line with the idea that negative mood narrows 
attention (e.g. Gasper and Clore, 2002). What is interesting is that positive mood 
accounted for more unique variance than depressive symptoms, suggesting that the 
degree of positive mood (or the absence or presence of positive mood) is more important 
for performance on rule-based category learning tasks than general psychological distress 
or negative affectivity. Further, participants’ current negative mood ratings were not 
significantly related to rule-based performance and did not contribute significant unique 
variance to performance.  
The finding that positive mood might be more important for performance on rule-based 
category learning tasks than negative affectivity/depressive symptoms is interesting. 
Several researchers have suggested that depression may represent a lack of a positive 
mood more so than a presence of negative mood (Davidson, 1993; Heller, 1990; as cited 
by Fredrickson, 2001). Watson, Clark, and Carey (1984) have shown that depression 
presents a condition in which there is both high negative mood and low positive mood, 
and that it is positive mood that distinguishes depression from other psychological 
disorders (such as anxiety). However it is possible that the reason only positive mood 
contributes unique variance in the present research is because the sample consisted of 
university students who were not necessarily depressed. It is possible that in a clinically 
depressed sample that depressive symptoms and positive mood would show a different 
pattern of results, however recent research by Heller et al. (2009) provides evidence that 
depressive symptoms are related to a decreased ability to maintain positive mood states. 
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Participants with clinical depression showed decreased sustained activation of the nucleus 
accumbens during an emotion regulation task relative to non-depressed controls. The 
nucleus accumbens is implicated in positive mood. Participants’ ratings of positive mood 
were related to this decreased activity, providing support for the hypothesis that a reduced 
capacity to experience positive mood is related to depressive symptoms.   
5.4 Mood or motivation? 
The Latin root of the word “emotion” is emovere, which means “to move or to push”. 
Reflecting this definition, different groups of researchers argue that motivation and 
emotion are intertwined. One viewpoint argues that emotion in animals and humans have 
evolved from basic motivational systems concerned with approach and avoidance (Gray, 
1981; Gray, 1990). Positive mood is argued to stem from the approach system, and 
negative mood is argued to stem from the avoidance system. A distinct but related line of 
research argues that feeling states arise from people’s judgments of how effective their 
efforts are to approach goals and avoid anti-goals (Carver & Scheier, 1998). In this theory 
the purpose of positive emotions/moods is to motivate one to seek out new experiences 
(Carver, 2003). Positive moods encourage exploration because they signal that one is 
performing better than necessary, whereas negative moods signal that one is performing 
worse than necessary (Carver, 2003). In this framework positive and negative emotions 
can arise from either the approach or the avoidance systems, and this will influence the 
kind of emotion. For instance approach-motivated positive emotions include joy, and 
eagerness, whereas avoidance-motivated positive emotions include relief, and calmness 
(Carver, 2003). In all cases, emotion is the result of a feedback signaling process that 
monitors one’s progress towards goals, and motivation is an integral part of emotional 
experience (Carver & Scheier, 1998).  
Other theories argue that motivational systems exist independent of emotion, but that 
emotion is influenced by these systems (Higgins, 2001). For instance self-discrepancy 
theory is similar to control systems theory (Carver & Scheier, 1998) in that the perceived 
distance from ideal or ought motivational states influences emotion in predictable ways. 
When one perceives they are failing/succeeding at attaining a desired end state 
(promotion), depression/happiness results. When one perceives they are 
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succeeding/failing at avoiding an undesired end state (prevention), relief/anxiety results. 
So although the motivational states preceding these emotions are supposed to be 
independent of emotion, emotion is tied to these states once the cognitive evaluative 
processes involved in assessing the progress being made towards reaching goals are 
active.  
Higgins (2001) argues that:  
When studies manipulate emotional experiences with music, movies, gifts, or 
recollections of past events, it is possible that they manipulate nonemotional 
motivational states as well, such as promotion and prevention motivational states, 
and these motivational states might influence memory independent of emotions. 
(p. 209) 
This implies that positive mood manipulations might be confounded with promotion 
focus motivation. This is an interesting and plausible proposition. A promotion regulatory 
focus state has been argued to broaden attention (Förster & Higgins, 2005; Friedman & 
Förster, 2005) as has regulatory fit (Memmert, Unklebach, & Ganns, 2010). Regulatory 
fit has also been argued to enhance cognitive flexibility (Maddox et al., 2006; Zhang & 
Chan, 2012). Thus there is convergence between results obtained with positive mood 
manipulations (e.g. Ashby et al., 1999) and with regulatory focus and fit manipulations. 
In fact Zhang and Chan (2012) replicated the results of Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) 
with promotion and prevention regulatory focus states. In Chapter 4 the majority of 
participants had a dominant chronic promotion focus, a finding that is corroborated in 
other research using participants from individualistic cultures (Elliot, Chirkov, Kim & 
Sheldon, 2001; Lee, Aaker & Gardner, 2000). It is possible that if most students in North 
American universities and colleges have a chronic promotion focus that a positive mood 
manipulation could create either a strong promotion focus or a state of regulatory fit.  
Chapter 4 manipulated promotion and prevention regulatory focus states, but found that 
mood accounted for the variance in poor exemplar typicality ratings. Specifically, current 
self-reported negative mood was negatively related to poor exemplar typicality ratings. It 
seems likely that the prevention focus manipulation created increased negative 
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mood/anxiety in participants. It is possible that writing about “duties and responsibilities” 
in the future created anxiety in first year undergraduate students, for instance by 
activating cognitive evaluative processes that made some students feel like they were 
failing at meeting their prevention-based goals, as predicted by self-discrepancy theory 
(Higgins, 1987). This finding is in line with research by Mikulincer and colleagues 
(Mikulincer, Paz, Kedem, 1990a; Mikulincer, Kedem, & Paz, 1990b). Mikulincer et al. 
(1990a; 1990b), who reported that state and trait anxiety was connected to reduced poor 
exemplar typicality ratings. Unlike Mikulincer et al. (1990a), I did not try to create an 
evaluative state amongst participants. Participants in Chapter 4’s study were told there 
were no correct or incorrect answers. In contrast Mikulincer et al. (1990a) explicitly 
attempted to create an evaluative atmosphere to amplify the effects of anxiety on the 
rating task. My research demonstrates that an evaluative framework need not be 
explicitly promoted in order for negative affectivity to influence poor exemplar typicality 
ratings.  
Higgins (2001) argues that the high anxiety group in Mikulincer et al. (1990) were likely 
to have been in a prevention focus, and that it was the prevention focus, and not the 
anxiety that influenced the typicality ratings. This argument is made in light of the 
findings of Crowe and Higgins (1997), who reported that participants in a prevention 
focus created less inclusive category groupings than participants in a promotion focus. 
Further, this effect was reported to be independent of mood, as mood was measured at 
several times throughout the task. Although my research did not find an effect of 
motivational state that was independent of mood, it is still possible that all of these results 
are concordant with one another, but that the varied results are due to differences in 
methodology and measurement. Future research should seek to disentangle nonemotional 
motivation from emotions resulting from success and failure.  
5.5 Implications for category learning performance 
The finding that positive mood influenced performance on a rule-based category learning 
task but not a non-rule-based category learning task supports the hypothesis that these 
tasks tap different abilities. This evidence can also be used to support the hypothesis that 
distinct verbal and nonverbal category learning systems exist (Ashby et al., 1998). For 
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instance it was originally hypothesized that the nonverbal system should not be 
influenced by executive functioning. However research is accumulating suggesting that 
the two systems have more in common than previously thought, and that executive 
functioning is important for both. Maddox, Pacheco, Reeves, Zhu, and Schnyer (2010) 
reported age-related declines in performance on both RB and NRB category learning 
tasks. Further, they reported that Stroop and WCST performance correlated with 
performance on both types of tasks. Maddox et al. (2010) argue that set-shifting is 
important for accurate performance on both RB and NRB tasks. Set-shifting is important 
for performance on RB learning tasks because it enables participants to find the correct 
rule. Set-shifting is important for performance on NRB category learning tasks because it 
allows participants to shift away from verbal strategies. Schnyer, Maddox, Ell, Davis, 
Pacheco, and Verfaelliee (2009) studied a group of patients with ventral PFC damage, 
and reported that performance was impaired on both RB and NRB category learning 
tasks, which provides support for the hypothesis that the PFC is important for both the 
verbal and the implicit systems, or at least, for RB and NRB learning tasks.  
The modeling results in Chapter 3 revealed that positive mood participants showed 
increased evidence of correct strategy usage in both the RB and NRB conditions, 
although behavioral data did not demonstrate a positive mood advantage in the NRB 
condition. Because computational modeling goes beyond performance to show the 
acquisition of optimal strategies, these results are particularly compelling. This finding 
lends support to the idea that set-shifting is important for both category learning tasks, 
because positive mood has been found to increase set-shifting (Dreisbach & Goschke, 
2004). Future research should examine whether positive mood performance advantages 
are found on different NRB learning tasks with longer learning periods.  
5.6 Future Directions 
While the studies in this dissertation conceptualized mood according to valence (positive 
or negative), some researchers argue that motivational intensity, not valence, determines 
whether attention is broadened or narrowed (Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2008; Harmon-
Jones, Price, & Gable, 2012). In the motivational dimension model of affect, low 
intensity motivational states (approach or avoidance) are argued to broaden attention, 
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while high intensity motivational states (approach or avoidance) are argued to narrow 
attention. This is based on the reasoning that low intensity mood states do not motivate 
one to approach desired end states, but high intensity states do. Thus if one is focused on 
a desired end state (like a delicious piece of cake), one is narrowed in on the desired end 
state and not open to other possibilities. In contrast low intensity approach-related states 
indicate that things are going well, and thus it is safe to be open to new possibilities (e.g. 
Carver, 2003).  
Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010a) argue that the positive mood that is typically 
manipulated in studies tends to be low in motivational intensity, because the stimuli used 
to evoke positive mood were not “post-goal or not goal relevant” (p. 325). This argument 
is in line with the dopaminergic hypothesis of positive mood, because that theory 
specifies that it is mild to moderate changes in positive mood that increase cognitive 
flexibility (Ashby et al., 1999). Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010c) reported that sadness (a 
low intensity state) resulted in broadened attention, whereas disgust (a high intensity 
state) narrowed attention. However one issue with this research is that there are 
inconsistencies in the use of mood manipulations across studies. For instance in one 
experiment funny cat videos are operationalized as low in motivational intensity (Gable 
& Harmon-Jones, 2008, Experiment 1), but in another experiment cute baby animals are 
operationalized as being high in motivational intensity (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008; 
Experiment 3). My experiment in Chapter 3 used a video of a cute laughing baby to 
evoke positive mood. If cute babies evoke high intensity approach motivation across 
species, then it can be argued that high intensity positive mood was induced (and 
consequently that the attention of participants in this condition was narrowed). However 
it is difficult to argue that funny cat videos are low in motivational intensity while cute 
baby animals are high in it, and it is also difficult to align the results of Chapter 3 with the 
idea that attention was narrowed in positive mood participants. Despite these 
inconsistencies, future research investigating the influence of mood on cognitive 
processes should take motivational intensity into account when designing experiments so 
that the potential influence of motivational intensity can be assessed more readily.  
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5.7 Conclusions 
This is the first series of experiments to examine the influence and relationship between 
mood and performance on category learning tasks, and this dissertation’s unique 
contribution to knowledge is that positive mood enhances performance on rule-based 
category learning tasks. Further, my results show that depressive symptoms are 
negatively related to performance on rule-based category learning tasks, but positive 
mood contributes more unique variance to performance than depressive symptoms.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Penn State Worry Questionnaire used in Chapter 2. 
Meyer, T. J., Miller, M. L., Metzger, R. L., & Borkovec, T. D. (1990). Development and 
validation of the penn state worry questionnaire. Behavior Research and Therapy, 28, 
487-495. 
Instructions: Rate each of the following statements on a scale of 1 (“not at all typical of 
me”) to 5 (“very typical of me”).  
1. If I do not have enough time to do everything, I do not worry about it. _____  
2. My worries overwhelm me. _____  
3. I do not tend to worry about things. _____  
4. Many situations make me worry. _____  
5. I know I should not worry about things, but I just cannot help it. _____  
6. When I am under pressure I worry a lot. _____ 
7. I am always worrying about something. _____  
8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts. _____  
9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry about everything else I have to do. _____  
10. I never worry about anything. _____  
11. When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I do not worry about it 
anymore. _____  
12. I have been a worrier all my life. _____  
13. I notice that I have been worrying about things. _____  
14. Once I start worrying, I cannot stop. _____  
15. I worry all the time. _____  
16. I worry about projects until they are all done. _____ 
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Appendix B: BIS/BAS Questionnaire used in Chapters 2 and 4. 
 
Carver, C. S., & White, T. L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective 
responses to impending reward and punishment: The BIS/BAS scales. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 67, 319-333. 
 
BIS/BAS 
 
Each item of this questionnaire is a statement that a person may either agree with or disagree 
with.  For each item, indicate how much you agree or disagree with what the item says.  Please 
respond to all the items; do not leave any blank.  Choose only one response to each statement.  
Please be as accurate and honest as you can be.  Respond to each item as if it were the only item.  
That is, don't worry about being "consistent" in your responses.  Choose from the following four 
response options: 
 
  1 = very true for me  
  2 = somewhat true for me  
  3 = somewhat false for me  
  4 = very false for me 
 
1.  A person's family is the most important thing in life.  
2.  Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or nervousness.  
3.  I go out of my way to get things I want.  
4.  When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it.  
5.  I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun.  
6.  How I dress is important to me.  
7.  When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized.  
8.  Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit.  
9.  When I want something I usually go all-out to get it.  
10.  I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun. 
11.  It's hard for me to find the time to do things such as get a haircut.  
12.  If I see a chance to get something I want I move on it right away.  
13.  I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me.  
14.  When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away.  
15.  I often act on the spur of the moment.  
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16.  If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty "worked up."  
17.  I often wonder why people act the way they do.  
18.  When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly.  
19.  I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something important.  
20.  I crave excitement and new sensations. 
21.  When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach.  
22.  I have very few fears compared to my friends.  
23.  It would excite me to win a contest.  
24.  I worry about making mistakes.  
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Scoring 
Items other than 2 and 22 are reverse-scored. 
BAS Drive:  3, 9, 12, 21  
BAS Fun Seeking:  5, 10, 15, 20  
BAS Reward Responsiveness:  4, 7, 14, 18, 23 
BIS:  2, 8, 13, 16, 19, 22, 24 
Items 1, 6, 11, 17,  are fillers.  
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Appendix C: PANAS Mood Scale used in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
Watson, D.,Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070.
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Appendix D: Stimulus parameters for the rule-based and non-rule-based category sets 
used in Chapter 2, Study 2, and Chapter 3. 
 
Rule-based Category Set 
Category A Stimuli Category B Stimuli 
Stimulus Frequency Orientation Stimulus Frequency Orientation 
1 283.8460133 -24.56300957 41 319.3785576 53.24238592 
2 276.1225535 97.00693267 42 308.6047207 115.8039403 
3 279.286904 -48.9443983 43 322.2350621 9.876615775 
4 266.1785457 166.8635214 44 305.2867591 87.91707132 
5 290.2247953 215.4030348 45 309.1792953 226.7368235 
6 271.7570989 74.1700582 46 325.0817444 115.6382904 
7 271.2612246 102.0911086 47 320.5455444 133.9862819 
8 268.4519829 163.2142623 48 316.1964926 279.3326036 
9 271.786766 -15.3873503 49 307.6897982 2.983472443 
10 280.6156419 234.9824086 50 328.25006 159.7867858 
11 278.0100402 196.3919967 51 335.9716659 155.264361 
12 276.8577927 40.86790811 52 328.598592 47.00197604 
13 273.7139204 -23.14104699 53 320.6748883 128.616499 
14 289.7222719 248.0725067 54 321.84533 98.83918294 
15 261.7537936 161.738353 55 323.749982 156.8985557 
16 280.5081194 88.20461269 56 324.0989995 160.2878353 
17 269.7348719 156.0337873 57 320.417003 83.08315314 
18 276.1902066 287.2454369 58 313.2896274 229.8267174 
19 275.0993669 -39.6412487 59 327.6880318 10.65074923 
20 287.123303 209.9715879 60 324.0664411 185.5598301 
21 282.7021015 -42.51908936 61 311.8659338 69.239177 
22 261.3764317 82.89150632 62 325.0576269 203.6632243 
23 293.0069585 150.4444213 63 313.0725469 22.74620519 
24 292.8680139 144.0368391 64 325.864941 61.30196056 
25 290.1204498 87.1400317 65 317.3117443 179.1732226 
26 271.9360476 44.3866242 66 319.5901952 204.9056857 
27 274.9907137 58.27213831 67 328.5276356 68.82101009 
28 268.9337482 146.9918492 68 314.0393546 64.36204639 
29 271.9787983 155.6017496 69 306.2907393 76.64492031 
30 279.0071465 158.8556302 70 309.8575362 161.1674514 
31 260.3049691 100.967234 71 318.7128888 138.7313717 
32 261.3294168 143.5239126 72 330.2678946 87.06740326 
33 283.1108725 244.1779493 73 316.6723589 183.994948 
34 288.8519437 41.01991073 74 318.5456244 79.43798295 
35 273.946041 203.140319 75 323.8792694 124.5656651 
36 288.5698567 163.2343911 76 302.9410884 92.85328747 
37 273.5385075 59.79198383 77 324.1729031 55.76495776 
38 279.9134468 121.1809873 78 323.1260289 131.0135311 
39 297.1142236 152.2617164 79 335.380337 128.6668018 
40 287.2954522 177.6313886 80 309.921267 102.0079193 
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Non-rule-based Category Set  
Category A Stimuli Category B Stimuli 
Stimulus Frequency Orientation Stimulus Frequency Orientation 
1 281.7 177.5 41 295.6 62.78 
2 306.6 219.5 42 287.9 52.18 
3 202.1 119 43 409.4 170.9 
4 154.2 25.89 44 377.6 158.8 
5 189.8 88.98 45 531.5 286.6 
6 278.9 205.4 46 488.5 253.2 
7 217.7 96.32 47 383.6 169.7 
8 260 158.5 48 297.8 33.97 
9 221.3 94.36 49 317.3 78.83 
10 330.2 194.8 50 403.9 160.4 
11 326 235.5 51 464 247.5 
12 420.4 343.9 52 323.9 80.73 
13 261.4 150.9 53 289 36.72 
14 206.7 101 54 227.2 -26.7 
15 184.5 73.3 55 388.5 155.6 
16 317.9 190.7 56 224.9 -32.13 
17 292 212.1 57 308.3 44.57 
18 340 208.9 58 422.7 177.8 
19 194 100.6 59 518.7 288.5 
20 210.5 121.9 60 416.3 157.6 
21 273 184.3 61 333.2 78.77 
22 137.4 71.98 62 372 133.4 
23 321.5 238.4 63 388 155.9 
24 245.8 157.8 64 368.3 127.8 
25 209 105.7 65 344.4 103.1 
26 311.5 160.4 66 268.4 37.72 
27 205.5 93.75 67 420.4 173.3 
28 288.3 214.1 68 336.9 115 
29 324.8 183.8 69 235.9 -3.019 
30 290.9 154.9 70 350.3 87.22 
31 250 158.1 71 322.3 89.1 
32 210.4 83.96 72 318.7 86.3 
33 243.4 131.9 73 318.2 72.52 
34 215.6 105.5 74 392.3 142.4 
35 349 254.3 75 254.6 -0.7396 
36 358.1 227.3 76 344 115 
37 345.5 232.6 77 263.2 17.73 
38 392.3 279.1 78 270.5 53.76 
39 313.6 222.8 79 414.2 192.6 
40 209.6 128.4 80 271 49.43 
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Appendix E: Intercorrelations between all Chapter 2 Questionnaires. 
 
Study 1 Intercorrelations between questionnaires 
 BDI-II GBI-D PSWQ HPS GBI-H BAS BIS 
BDI-II ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
GBI-D .552*** ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
PSWQ .439*** .319** ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
HPS -.061 -.004 -.086 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
GBI-H .250* .724*** .124 .245* ----- ----- ----- 
BAS .117 .124 .035 .264* .263* ----- ----- 
BIS .203 .149 .405*** .156 .112 .416*** ----- 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p <  .05. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II, GBI-
D= General Behavior Inventory Depression, PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire, 
HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; GBI-H = General Behavior Inventory – 
Hypomania, BAS = Behavioral Activation Scale, BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale. 
 
Study 1 Intercorrelations between questionnaires - HRB 
 BDI-II GBI-D PSWQ HPS GBI-H BAS BIS 
BDI-II ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
GBI-D .500** ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
PSWQ .645*** .426* ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
HPS -.016 -.002 -.065 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
GBI-H .354 .673*** .140 .255 ----- ----- ----- 
BAS .402* .257 .361 .273 .363* ----- ----- 
BIS .468* .332 .493** .164 .195 .289 ----- 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p <  .05. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II, GBI-
D= General Behavior Inventory Depression, PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire, 
HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale; GBI-H = General Behavior Inventory – 
Hypomania, BAS = Behavioral Activation Scale, BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale.
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Study 2 Intercorrelations between questionnaires across conditions 
 BDI-II GBI-D PSWQ GBI-H BAS BIS PAN_P PAN_N 
BDI-II ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
GBI-D .800*** ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
PSWQ .475*** .471** ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
GBI-H .658*** .824*** .423*** ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
BAS -.057 -.075 .058 .151 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
BIS .220 .116 .458*** .103 -.038 ----- ----- ----- 
PANAS_P -.130 -.078 .004 .131 .267* -.186 ----- ----- 
PANAS_N .622*** .590*** .343** .573*** .004 -.034 .321** ----- 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p <  .05. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II,  
GBI-D= General Behavior Inventory Depression, PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire,  
GBI-H = General Behavior Inventory – Hypomania, BAS = Behavioral Activation Scale,  
BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale, PANAS_P = Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule Positive Scale,  
PANAS_N = Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule Negative Scale.  
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Study 2 Intercorrelations between questionnaires in RB condition 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
BDI-II ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- 
GBI-D .687*** ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- 
PSWQ .380* .437** ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- 
GBI-H .539*** .797*** .423** ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- 
BAS -.113 -.159 .056 .138 ----- ----- ---- ----- 
BIS .040 -.122 .495** -.119 -.001 ----- ---- ----- 
PANAS_P -.337* -.100 -.181 .220 .373* -.270 ---- ----- 
PANAS_N .407* .547** .147 .605*** .092 -.396* .378* ----- 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p <  .05. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II,  
GBI-D= General Behavior Inventory Depression, PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire,  
GBI-H = General Behavior Inventory – Hypomania, BAS = Behavioral Activation Scale,  
BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale, PAN_P = Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule Positive Scale,  
PAN_N = Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule Negative Scale. 
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Appendix F: Chapter 2, Study 1 Easy, Rule-based Scatterplots. 
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Appendix G: Chapter 2, Study 1 Hard, Rule-based Scatterplots. 
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Appendix H: Chapter 2, Study 1 Non-rule-based Scatterplots. 
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Appendix I: Chapter 2, Study 1 Tests for the Difference between Two Independent 
Correlation Coefficients Results. 
 
Questionnaire/Measure HRB ERB Zdiff 
Beck Depression Inventory Total -.541** .087 -2.22* 
 n = 27 n = 21 p = .03 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire Total .036 .045 -.033 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .49 
General Behavior Inventory - Depression -.188 -.126 -0.234 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .41 
General Behavior Inventory - Hypomania -.488** -.120 -1.52 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .13 
Hypomanic Personality Scale -.168 -.259 0.351 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .73 
Behavior Inhibition Scale -.103 .108 -1.05 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .30 
Behavior Activation Scale Total -.401 .179 -2.23* 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .03 
Note: ** p < .007; * p < .05, 2-tailed 
 
Questionnaire/Measure HRB NRB Zdiff 
Beck Depression Inventory Total -.541** -.124 -1.71 
 n = 27 n = 30 p = .09 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire Total .036 -.294 1.25 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .21 
General Behavior Inventory - Depression -.188 -.418 0.94 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .35 
General Behavior Inventory - Hypomania -.488** -.315 -0.76 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .45 
Hypomanic Personality Scale -.168 .166 -1.24 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .22 
Behavior Inhibition Scale -.103 -.027 -0.28 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .78 
Behavior Activation Scale Total -.401 .141 -2.08* 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .04 
Note: ** p < .007; * p < .05, 2-tailed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
171 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire/Measure ERB NRB Zdiff 
Beck Depression Inventory Total .087 -.124 0.70 
 n = 21 n = 30 p = .49 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire Total .045 -.294 1.28 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .20 
General Behavior Inventory - Depression -.126 -.418 1.17 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .24 
General Behavior Inventory - Hypomania -.120 -.315 0.76 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .45 
Hypomanic Personality Scale -.259 .166 -1.59 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .11 
Behavior Inhibition Scale .108 -.027 0.50 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .62 
Behavior Activation Scale Total .179 .141 0.14 
 n = 30 n = 30 p = .89 
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Appendix J: Chapter 2, Study 2 Rule-based Block 1 and Overall Scatterplots. 
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Appendix K: Chapter 2, Study 2 Non-rule-based Block 1 and Overall Scatterplots. 
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Appendix L: Chapter 2, Study 2 Test for the Difference between Two Independent 
Correlation Coefficients Results. 
Block 1 
Questionnaire/Measure RB NRB Zdiff 
Beck Depression Inventory Total -.539** .025 -2.74* 
 n = 42 n = 40 p = .006 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire Total -.424 -.096 -1.53 
 n = 41 n = 39 p = .13 
General Behavior Inventory - Depression -.382 -.024 -1.61 
 n = 39 n = 39 p = .108 
General Behavior Inventory - Hypomania -.357 .153 -2.24* 
 n = 39 n = 39 p = .03 
Behavioral Inhibition Scale -.280 .096 -1.62 
 n = 39 n = 38 p = .106 
Behavioral Activation Scale Total .055 .184 -0.56 
 n = 39 n = 39 p = .58 
PANAS Positive -.424** .163 -2.62* 
 n = 39 n = 39 p = .009 
PANAS Negative -.076 -.060 -0.07 
 n = 39 n = 39 p = .95 
Note: ** p < .0063; * p < .05, 2-tailed.  
 
Overall Performance 
Questionnaire/Measure RB NRB Zdiff 
Beck Depression Inventory Total -.462** -.001 -2.17* 
 n = 42 n = 40 p = .03 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire Total -.304 -.142 -0.74 
 n = 41 n = 39 p = .46 
General Behavior Inventory - Depression -.312 -.138 -0.78 
 n = 39 n = 39 p = .44 
General Behavior Inventory - Hypomania -.383 -.083 -1.36 
 n = 39 n = 39 p = .17 
Behavioral Inhibition Scale -.171 .052 -0.95 
 n = 39 n = 38 p = .34 
Behavioral Activation Scale Total -.007 .034 -0.17 
 n = 39 n = 39 p = .86 
PANAS Positive .397 .241 0.74 
 n = 39 n = 39 p = .46 
PANAS Negative -.040 .066 -0.45 
 n = 39 n = 39 p = .65 
Note: ** p < .0063; * p < .05, 2-tailed.  
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Appendix M: Permission from Publishers for re-use of Chapter 3. 
Journal Authors 
Under the terms of your contributor agreement, without seeking permission, you may: 
• At any time, distribute on a not-for-profit basis photocopies of the published article for 
your own teaching needs or to supply on an individual basis to research colleagues.  
• At any time, circulate or post on any repository or website the version of the article 
that you submitted to the journal (i.e. the version before peer-review) or an abstract 
of the article. 
• At least 12 months after publication, post on any non-commercial repository or 
website the version of your article that was accepted for publication.  
• At least 12 months after publication, re-publish the whole or any part of the 
Contribution in a printed work written, edited or compiled by you provided reference is 
made to first publication by SAGE/SOCIETY. 
When posting or re-using the article, please provide a link/URL from the article posted to  the 
SAGE Journals Online where the article is published: http://online.sagepub.com and please 
make the following acknowledgment  ‘The final, definitive version of this paper has been 
published in <journal>, Vol/Issue, Month/Year by <<SAGE Publications Ltd.>>/<<SAGE 
Publications, Inc.>>, All rights reserved. © [as appropriate] 
The licenses granted above in this paragraph are expressly made subject to and limited by the 
following restrictions: 
• The SAGE-created PDF of the published Contribution may not be posted at any time. 
• In each instance of use of the Contribution, or any part of it, must include the 
copyright notice that appears on the issue of the Journal in which the Contribution is 
first published and a full bibliographic citation to the Journal as published by SAGE;  
• Copies of the Contribution, or any part of it, shall not be sold, distributed, or 
reproduced for commercial purposes (i.e., for monetary gain on Contributor’s own 
account or on that of a third party, or for indirect financial gain by a commercial 
entity);  
• The Contribution, or any part of it, shall not be used for any systematic external 
distribution by a third party (e.g., a listserve or database connected to a public access 
server). 
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Appendix N: Chapter 3 Computational Modeling Details. 
The table below shows an example of the data that was modeled. 80 lines of data (representing 
the complete first block of performance) were entered for each participant, along with the 
category set they completed (RB or NRB), the mood induction condition (positive, neutral, 
negative), the trial (1 through 80), the stimulus they categorized on each trial (from 1 through 80, 
randomly assigned on each trial), and their categorization decision on each trial (e.g. A or B, 
represented by “0” or “1”).  
 
Subject Category Set Condition Trial Stimulus Decision 
1 RB  positive 1 68 0 
1 RB positive 2 1 1 
1 RB positive 3 42 1 
… … … … … … 
1 RB positive 80 15 0 
 
The stimulus coordinates (shown in Appendix D) were used to determine the optimal 
decision bounds for each category learning task (RB or NRB), and these decision bounds were 
compared to the decision bound that resulted from each participant’s pattern of responses. Each 
participant’s first block of responses was fit with several different models, one class of which 
were RB models (and therefore all single-dimensional), and one class of which were NRB models 
(and therefore all two-dimensional). All RB participants were fit by two suboptimal RB models 
and an optimal, RB model. All NRB participants were fit with two suboptimal NRB models and 
an optimal, NRB model. These models work by comparing the response a participant would have 
given had they used a given strategy, to the response they actually gave. The model fits the 
participant's data to the extent that the model's predicted response corresponds with the 
participant's actual response. 
The two suboptimal RB models were a “frequency” model, which assumed participants 
were classifying according to frequency, but not optimally, and an “orientation” model, which 
assumed participants were classifying according to orientation (which was not the optimal rule). 
The “optimal” model assumed participants had learned the frequency-based, optimal rule.  
The two suboptimal NRB models were a “slope1” model, which had a fixed slope (set to 
“1”) but a freely varying intercept, and a “X2d” model, which had a freely varying slope and 
intercept. The “optimal” NRB model assumed that participants used the ideal decision boundary, 
and had a fixed intercept and slope.  
 These models were compared to the first block of each subject’s data by minimizing the 
log likelihood. Model comparisons were carried out with the AIC index, which penalizes a model 
for the number of free parameters (Ashby, 1992b). AIC is a measure of goodness of fit that takes 
into account number of free parameters in the model and small values indicate a good fit of the 
strategy to the data. 
The two tables below show the modeling results. Each line is an individual participant. 
The proportion of participants whose performance were best fit by correct RB models (the two 
frequency-based models) in the RB condition, and by any two-dimensional model ("sub-optimal" 
2d + optimal model + slope1 model) in the NRB category condition was calculated. The 
proportions shown in Figure 3.3, in Chapter 3, are taken from these results. 
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Rule-based Block 1 Modeling Results 
    RB Models  NRB Models  
Sub Cond Mood Perf 
Orientation Frequency Optimal X2d Slope1 
Best 
Fit 
1 RB positive 0.56 112.3905 106.7383 110.5678 107.7461 110.4612 freq 
7 RB positive 0.81 119.1173 82.6281 81.9239 80.7592 115.0602 X2d 
13 RB positive 0.78 115.4833 80.4131 79.8871 81.5471 112.0699 optimal 
19 RB positive 0.86 115.7028 65.6719 64.2115 67.6654 111.2918 optimal 
25 RB positive 0.75 119.9544 92.0351 90.0951 90.3262 116.1315 optimal 
37 RB positive 0.68 113.3071 99.7315 99.2643 101.6244 111.1520 optimal 
43 RB positive 0.89 115.7220 60.6581 58.8498 62.5166 111.0667 optimal 
49 RB positive 0.94 116.4563 39.5248 40.8497 39.9278 111.4896 freq 
55 RB positive 0.71 111.4735 86.2032 90.8543 87.5267 108.4114 freq 
61 RB positive 0.69 118.9773 103.3138 101.5173 103.6415 116.0039 optimal 
79 RB positive 0.81 109.7984 77.6283 75.6332 73.0005 101.2124 X2d 
85 RB positive 0.73 118.3154 87.0682 85.1389 87.5944 114.7816 optimal 
3 RB neutral 0.55 114.6237 112.8147 112.6903 114.7902 113.6901 optimal 
9 RB neutral 0.59 117.3373 110.1156 108.7803 111.6606 115.3024 optimal 
21 RB neutral 0.84 115.6930 71.3428 71.0384 72.4953 111.9437 optimal 
27 RB neutral 0.65 116.5109 103.8739 105.9658 103.3178 113.6030 X2d 
33 RB neutral 0.79 116.2182 80.0071 83.0219 79.6610 112.4435 X2d 
39 RB neutral 0.54 122.0090 112.2602 112.7374 102.6023 118.7321 X2d 
51 RB neutral 0.50 31.8372 40.2585 112.7310 115.5372 23.7207 slope1 
57 RB neutral 0.61 112.1784 107.6153 109.4109 109.6138 110.7352 freq 
63 RB neutral 0.61 115.3727 111.3056 109.6368 113.2888 114.0643 optimal 
69 RB neutral 0.76 115.6889 85.0315 85.7430 86.5586 112.5095 freq 
75 RB neutral 0.85 118.2464 60.8101 58.8766 59.8237 113.9774 optimal 
81 RB neutral 0.70 110.1428 102.8383 101.3347 100.2981 106.0720 X2d 
87 RB neutral 0.71 113.5022 97.2749 97.4966 99.0532 110.9625 freq 
5 RB negative 0.54 118.5263 111.8173 112.4386 110.0783 116.1433 X2d 
11 RB negative 0.66 116.2606 100.6671 103.7250 97.5410 112.7936 X2d 
17 RB negative 0.50 118.7574 114.6188 112.8374 115.5205 117.1951 optimal 
29 RB negative 0.51 114.4702 103.6771 112.6548 87.7813 110.4300 X2d 
35 RB negative 0.43 124.8452 115.1284 113.8782 99.2469 122.0389 X2d 
41 RB negative 0.58 116.5365 113.9411 112.1958 115.9097 115.3623 optimal 
47 RB negative 0.65 115.4937 96.0158 97.0081 97.5878 112.7491 freq 
53 RB negative 0.69 114.0016 99.1786 97.4045 100.5613 111.2536 optimal 
59 RB negative 0.65 115.9709 105.1085 103.1456 107.1084 114.0114 optimal 
65 RB negative 0.56 107.1552 109.6678 110.5565 106.6624 105.5220 slope1 
71 RB negative 0.54 120.1685 111.1979 110.2589 108.3297 117.3109 X2d 
77 RB negative 0.73 114.2739 92.3782 95.2517 93.6481 111.3465 freq 
83 RB negative 0.65 116.3874 105.0956 105.5451 106.2905 113.9127 freq 
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Non-rule-based Block 1 Modeling Results 
    RB Models  NRB Models  
Sub Cond Mood Perf 
Orientation Frequency Optimal X2d Slope1 
Best 
Fit 
2 NRB positive 0.51 112.2287 116.7150 112.7199 114.2276 113.5276 ori 
8 NRB positive 0.55 125.6485 86.9157 112.7377 82.2700 113.9842 X2d 
14 NRB positive 0.76 113.5694 102.4819 92.2215 92.8022 92.9548 optimal 
20 NRB positive 0.65 117.8893 104.2196 105.4592 104.3741 107.3336 freq 
26 NRB positive 0.51 113.2178 113.0456 112.7085 114.1397 112.1405 slope1 
32 NRB positive 0.65 115.1062 109.0090 105.2689 107.3117 106.5981 optimal 
38 NRB positive 0.54 114.1521 114.8830 111.4613 114.8832 112.9352 optimal 
50 NRB positive 0.68 121.6983 81.0306 103.0343 82.3262 104.6642 freq 
56 NRB positive 0.50 114.5160 116.0949 113.3641 116.2963 114.5042 optimal 
62 NRB positive 0.70 118.8689 94.9176 100.0848 93.6960 102.0687 X2d 
68 NRB positive 0.71 116.8250 85.1399 95.4759 81.7804 94.7715 X2d 
74 NRB positive 0.50 117.2965 109.1226 114.0364 109.3620 112.6958 freq 
80 NRB positive 0.70 119.3986 78.9121 99.1344 78.8410 99.3489 X2d 
86 NRB positive 0.60 115.8587 112.6860 109.9954 113.3572 111.8483 optimal 
4 NRB neutral 0.66 101.1077 116.9507 101.5199 97.9163 102.8069 X2d 
10 NRB neutral 0.66 122.3760 82.9895 106.1917 84.9678 107.8405 freq 
16 NRB neutral 0.46 114.1909 117.5830 114.8116 114.1475 115.4884 X2d 
22 NRB neutral 0.58 116.7434 106.6699 110.3830 108.4020 110.3194 freq 
28 NRB neutral 0.60 121.7714 95.3916 109.4477 97.3804 111.1692 freq 
34 NRB neutral 0.45 115.0944 104.2758 114.7685 100.8767 109.6241 X2d 
40 NRB neutral 0.65 121.5445 83.9800 102.5411 85.1019 104.5299 freq 
44 NRB neutral 0.59 115.1374 110.8957 109.5261 111.5610 110.3761 optimal 
46 NRB neutral 0.54 119.2733 111.7909 112.8080 113.5618 114.7434 freq 
52 NRB neutral 0.68 122.6023 70.6046 103.1147 72.3229 104.4293 freq 
58 NRB neutral 0.68 116.0680 89.0431 99.1051 87.8122 97.7865 X2d 
64 NRB neutral 0.53 118.5361 113.1406 113.2357 114.8673 115.0070 freq 
70 NRB neutral 0.69 122.3229 73.7306 102.6870 75.4419 103.9936 freq 
76 NRB neutral 0.74 119.4456 83.8398 96.2422 81.7838 97.9007 X2d 
82 NRB neutral 0.56 118.5618 108.4634 110.9377 110.3988 112.5540 freq 
6 NRB negative 0.61 114.7259 111.1927 109.5784 111.5203 110.0786 optimal 
12 NRB negative 0.68 115.8833 105.1134 103.0394 102.9439 103.8520 X2d 
18 NRB negative 0.55 117.4972 113.1035 112.4136 115.0968 114.2382 optimal 
24 NRB negative 0.68 117.5795 84.5940 101.8565 84.5711 100.5944 X2d 
30 NRB negative 0.56 117.5984 109.1970 111.7289 111.1940 112.5557 freq 
36 NRB negative 0.68 118.8662 96.3377 102.3839 96.0567 104.0238 X2d 
42 NRB negative 0.63 120.6717 98.3163 109.7972 100.2982 111.0935 freq 
48 NRB negative 0.66 121.7393 74.9972 104.2620 76.9622 104.5925 freq 
54 NRB negative 0.64 120.0829 72.4161 108.2954 73.9798 105.5625 freq 
60 NRB negative 0.50 115.9014 108.5853 112.7957 110.4407 111.4518 freq 
66 NRB negative 0.63 119.2474 92.2408 106.8823 93.8849 106.6354 freq 
72 NRB negative 0.56 111.5815 106.7358 112.3932 108.6944 108.0442 freq 
78 NRB negative 0.54 120.6818 108.8020 113.1447 109.5940 114.6503 freq 
84 NRB negative 0.60 116.9109 110.7411 109.6751 111.7640 111.3934 optimal 
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Appendix O: Chronic Regulatory Focus Measure used in Chapter 4. 
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Source 
Higgins, E. T., Friedman, R. S., Harlow, R. E., Idson, L. C., Ayduk, O. N., Taylor, A. 
(2001). Achievement orientations from subjective histories of success: Promotion pride 
versus prevention pride. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 3-23. 
 
Scoring 
 
COMPUTE promote = (6 - resp_1) + resp_3 + resp_7 + (6 - resp_9) + resp_10 + (6 - 
resp_11).  
 
COMPUTE prevent = (6 - resp_2) + (6 - resp_4) + resp_5 + (6 - resp_6) + (6 - resp_8).  
 
EXECUTE. 
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Appendix P: Regulatory Focus Essay Manipulation used in Chapter 4. 
 
Within each condition, participants write a short essay for approximately 5-7 minutes 
(roughly 1 page). Instructions (below) are given at the top of a piece of lined paper. 
 
Promotion: “Think about what you want to achieve a few years from now. Please write 
down some of the aspirations and ambitions that you hope to achieve.”  
 
Prevention: “Think about your responsibilities for the next few years. Please write down 
some of the duties and obligations that you have to fulfill over the next years. 
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Appendix Q: Rosch Categories and Exemplars used in Chapter 4. 
 Furniture  Fruit  Vehicle  Weapon  Vegetable  
Good Chair 6.96 Orange 6.93 Bus 6.73 Gun 6.97 Spinach 6.78 
 Table 6.90 Banana 6.85 Car 6.76 Knife 6.60 Pea 6.93 
Mod Bench 5.23 Passionfruit 4.78 Scooter 4.76 Missile 5.10 Leek 4.85 
 Cupboard 3.73 Papaya 5.42 Subway 4.68 Axe 4.66 Sweet Potato 4.73 
 Piano 4.36 Cranberry 4.78 Wheelchair 4.32 Ice Pick 4.86 Mushroom 4.44 
Poor Fan 1.51 Pumpkin 2.61 Feet 2.66 Car 2.69 Rhubarb 4.34 
 Rug 3.00 Avocado 2.63 Canoe 3.99 Rope 2.92 Garlic 2.93 
 Picture 2.25 Olive 1.79 Camel 2.78 Hand 2.99 Baked beans 3.27 
 Clock 2.52 Nut 1.99 Skateboard 2.46 Screwdriver 2.60 Pumpkin 3.26 
 Stove 2.60 Tomato 2.42 Rocket 3.26 Airplane 2.91 Pickles 3.43 
 Carpenter Tools  Bird  Sport  Toy  Clothing  
Good Saw 6.96 Robin 6.98 Football 6.97 Doll 6.59 Pants 6.88 
 Drill 6.41 Eagle 6.25 Tennis 6.85 Teddy bear 6.10 Coat 6.12 
Mod Bench 5.50 Albatross 5.20 Boxing 6.34 Balloon 4.93 Bathing suit 5.56 
 Ladder 5.36 Parrot 5.93 Pole vault 5.91 Puzzle 5.18 Shoes 5.27 
 Wood 5.23 Owl 5.04 Golf 6.23 Drum 4.77 Stockings 5.21 
Poor Hatchet 2.85 Chicken 3.98 Cards 2.21 Cards 3.44 Hat 3.80 
 Cement 3.09 Penguin 3.47 Hunting 3.95 Rope 3.80 Necklace 1.79 
 Stapler 3.79 Bat 1.85 Chess 2.93 Books 2.09 Hairband 2.02 
 Axe 3.47 Turkey 3.91 Dancing 2.51 Tennis racket 2.6 Cuff links 1.82 
 Scissors 2.64 Emu 3.62 Jump rope 3.00 Bike 4.23 Watch 1.85 
Note: The second column shows the typicality ratings reported by Rosch (1975), however the ratings have been reversed to match the 
Likert scale used in the current study. 
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Appendix R: Correlations between Mood and Motivation Measures in Chapter 4. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 RFQ Promotion --------      
2 RFQ Prevention .32** --------     
3 BAS Total .29** -0.18 --------    
4 BIS Total -.29** 0.03 0.08 --------   
5 PANAS Positive  .22* 0.03 .40*** -0.09 --------  
6 PANAS Negative  -.33** -0.17 0.21 .24* .44*** -------- 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, RFQ = Regulatory Focus Questionnaire, BAS 
= Behavioral Activation Scale; BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale; PANAS = Positive 
Affect Negative Affect Scale. 
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Appendix S: Ethics approval for Experiment 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
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Appendix T: Ethics Approval for Experiment 2, Chapter 2. 
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Appendix U: Ethics Approval for Chapter 4. 
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